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Abstract
The field of artificial intelligence has recently experienced a number of breakthroughs
thanks to progress in deep learning and reinforcement learning. Computer algorithms
now outperform humans at Go, Jeopardy, image classification, and lip reading, and are
becoming very competent at driving cars and interpreting natural language. The rapid
development has led many to conjecture that artificial intelligence with greater-than-
human ability on a wide range of tasks may not be far. This in turn raises concerns
whether we know how to control such systems, in case we were to successfully build
them.
Indeed, if humanity would find itself in conflict with a system of much greater intelli-
gence than itself, then human society would likely lose. One way to make sure we avoid
such a conflict is to ensure that any future AI system with potentially greater-than-
human-intelligence has goals that are aligned with the goals of the rest of humanity. For
example, it should not wish to kill humans or steal their resources.
The main focus of this thesis will therefore be goal alignment, i.e. how to design artifi-
cially intelligent agents with goals coinciding with the goals of their designers. Focus will
mainly be directed towards variants of reinforcement learning, as reinforcement learning
currently seems to be the most promising path towards powerful artificial intelligence.
We identify and categorize goal misalignment problems in reinforcement learning agents
as designed today, and give examples of how these agents may cause catastrophes in
the future. We also suggest a number of reasonably modest modifications that can be
used to avoid or mitigate each identified misalignment problem. Finally, we also study
various choices of decision algorithms, and conditions for when a powerful reinforcement
learning system will permit us to shut it down.
The central conclusion is that while reinforcement learning systems as designed today
are inherently unsafe to scale to human levels of intelligence, there are ways to potentially
address many of these issues without straying too far from the currently so successful
reinforcement learning paradigm. Much work remains in turning the high-level proposals
suggested in this thesis into practical algorithms, however.
Central claim: There are a number of theoretically valid, partial solutions to the prob-
lem of keeping artificial general intelligence both safe and useful.
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Part I.
Background
1

To educate a machine in mind and not in
morals is to educate a menace to society.
Theodore Roosevelt (paraphrased)
1. Introduction1
Artificial Intelligence. An artificial intelligence (AI) program may broadly be defined
as a computer program that automatically finds ways to achieve goals. For example, an
AI chess program finds moves for achieving the goal of checkmating the opponent. The
moves have not been explicitly defined by the programmer – instead the program finds
them by “weighing” the pros and cons of different strategies. An AI question-answering
system automatically generates the answer to a query by searching a knowledge base.
A self-driving car finds a way to control throttle, break, and steering, in order to get to
its goal destination.
An important distinction between different AI systems is generality. Most present-
day AIs can only solve narrow sets of tasks in restricted environments. For example,
most chess programs can only play chess, and most question answering systems can only
answer specific type of queries from a particular kind of database. This is in contrast to
humans, who can learn to perform a wide range of cognitive tasks.
However, a trend towards greater generality can be observed in AI systems. While
most self-driving car algorithms would not perform well on tasks other than driving a car,
driving a car is already a rather general task. It involves acting in an environment with
varying weather, traffic, and lightning conditions, using multiple sources of perception.
While most board-game AIs have traditionally been tailored towards a specific type of
board game, AlphaZero is a single algorithm that achieves super human performance
in Go, Chess, and Shogi (Silver, Hubert, et al., 2017). Another popular benchmark is
video games. Here again a single algorithm called DQN recently managed to outperform
humans on a majority of the ATARI games (Hessel et al., 2017; Mnih, Kavukcuoglu,
et al., 2015).
Extrapolating this trend towards greater generality and intelligence, we may expect AI
systems to eventually surpass humans on both these metrics. Such systems are sometimes
called artificial general intelligences (AGIs). Indeed, many expect the creation of the first
human-level AGI to occur within the next few decades, and greatly superhuman AGI
soon after (Bostrom, 2014; and Section 2.2 below).
1 This introduction shares some material with Everitt and Hutter (submitted 2018) and Everitt, Lea,
et al. (2018).
3
1. Introduction
Controlling AGI. A superhuman AGI is a system that outperforms humans on most
cognitive tasks. In order to control it, humans would need to control a system more
intelligent than themselves. This may be nearly impossible if the difference in intelligence
is large, and the AGI is trying to escape control.
Humans have one key advantage: As the designers of the system, we get to decide
the AGI’s goals, and the way the AGI strives to achieve its goals.2 This may allow us
design AGIs whose goals are aligned with ours, and that pursue them in a responsible
way. Increased intelligence in an AGI is not a threat as long as the AGI only strives to
help us achieve our own goals.
On a high level, this goal alignment problem is challenging for at least two reasons:
Specificity of human values, and Goodhart’s law. First, human values are rather specific.
For example, most humans prefer futures with happy sentient beings over futures with
much suffering or no sentient beings at all. But even futures where happiness greatly
outweighs suffering can still be undesirable. Yudkowsky (2009) gives an example where
a happy, sentient experience is set to repeat everywhere until the heat-death of the uni-
verse. Most people find it repulsive, because it lacks important values such as variation
and growth. However, listing all important values is not an easy task, which makes
it hard to define a goal for an AGI that matches our human values even if the goal is
optimized by a highly intelligent system. In this way, an AGI resembles a fairy-tale
genie who grants you a wish, but interprets it over-literally (Wiener, 1960). In most
fairy tales, the hero eventually wants his wish undone.
A second reason why alignment is hard is Goodhart’s law (Goodhart, 1975, 1984),
which roughly states that:
“When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.” (Strath-
ern, 1997).
In the context of AGI, it means that if we give our system a proxy-measure for how
well it is satisfying a goal, then the proxy is likely to cease being a good measure once
the AGI starts optimizing for it. An oft-mentioned example is that of a reinforcement
learning (RL) agent that uses a reward signal as goal proxy. In most circumstances, the
reward may correspond well to the agent’s performance. But an AGI optimizing the
reward may find a way to short circuit the reward signal, obtaining maximum reward
for behaviors considered undesirable by its human designers (Ring and Orseau, 2011).
This is a rather extreme instance of Goodhart’s law. Section 4.5 of this thesis is devoted
to various aspects of the goal alignment problem.
2The goal does not need to be a long-term goal (Armstrong, Sandberg, et al., 2012; Christiano, 2015).
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Other aspects. In addition to goal alignment, some further properties may also con-
tribute to making an AGI safe. We may for example ask that the AI system is corrigible
(Soares, Fallenstein, et al., 2015) in the sense that it lets us correct mistakes in its source
that we have made while designing it, and that it lets us shut it down if we judge that
to be the best option. Unfortunately, many AI designs give the agent an incentive to
prevent corrections and shut down. This, of course, is a type of misalignment. There has
been some debate about whether corrigibility should be treated as a property separate
from goal alignment (Carey, 2018), or be made to follow from a more general approach
to goal alignment (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2017; Milli et al., 2017). We will
study some aspects of corrigibility in Chapter 11.
The way an AGI makes decisions is also important. Even if its goals are aligned, it
may still do the wrong thing if it follows the wrong decision principle. While expected
utility maximization is a principle that many agree on, there are subtleties in how the
expectation should be computed when the agent is part of the environment that it
is interacting with. Some aspects of decision theory will be considered in Section 6.4
and Chapter 10.
Why study AGI before it exists? Why study the safety of AGI before it exists, and
before we even know whether it will ever exist? There are at least two types of reasons for
this. The first is pragmatic. If AGI is created, and we do not know how to control it, then
the outcome could be catastrophic (Bostrom, 2014). It is customary to take precautions
not only against catastrophes we know will happen, but also against catastrophes that
have only a slight chance of occurring (for example, a city may decide to build earth-
quake safe buildings, even if the probability of an earth quake occurring is fairly low). As
discussed in Section 2.2 below, many believe that AGI has more than a small probability
of occurring reasonably soon, and it can potentially cause very significant catastrophes.
The second reason is scientific. Potential future AGIs are theoretically interesting
objects, and the question of how a human can control machines more intelligent than
him or herself is philosophically stimulating.
Main contributions. The main contributions of this thesis are:
• A formal definition of alignment (Section 5.4).
• A method for detecting misalignment problems in RL setups (Section 5.5).
• Formalization and categorization of misalignment problems in three different RL
setups (Chapters 6 to 8).
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• Descriptions of a number of high-level tools for managing misalignment, as well as
identification of which tools solve which type of misalignment problem (Chapters 6
to 9).
• Extensions of the two standard physicalistic decision theories (causal and evidential
decision theory) to the sequential case (Section 10.2).
• A characterization of the robot’s best action in the off-switch game for arbitrary
belief distribution and irrationality assumptions (Chapter 11).
Outline. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part describes the relevant
background:
Chapter 2: A growing literature is slowly starting to make progress on how to think
about future AGIs and how to make them safe. This chapter provides a
literature review for this emerging field.
Chapter 3: In the early days of AI research, a wide range of topics were considered.
The last two decades have seen AI research converge on rational agents
that act to achieve some goal (Russell and Norvig, 2010). Chapter 3 gives
a gentle introduction to universal artificial intelligence (UAI), which is a
formal theory for rational agents making only very weak assumptions
about the environment they are in.
Chapter 4: Causal graphs elegantly combine the power of formal mathematics and
probability theory with intuitive visualizations. They will be used ex-
tensively in almost every subsequent chapter. This chapter describes the
basics of causal graphs, as well as some of our own notation.
The second part contains my work related to the alignment problem of rational agents:
Chapter 5: As mentioned, goal alignment is a central concern for AGI safety. In order
to study alignment formally, Chapter 5 extends the UAI framework from
Chapter 3 in several ways, formally defines alignment, and proposes a
method for detecting misalignment in RL setups.
Chapters 6 to 8: Different real-world applications of RL differ in whether the reward is
provided by a preprogrammed reward function, a human, or by an inter-
actively learned reward function. The distinction gives rise to important
differences in alignment problems. Chapters 6 to 8 study misalignment
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problems and ways they can be avoided or reduced in the three different
RL setups.
Chapter 9: One source of misalignment is the AGI corrupting its reward signal.
Chapter 9 formalizes reward corruption in a Markov decision process,
and derives several positive and negative results for how and when the
problem can be mitigated.
The third part contains chapters on decision theory and corrigibility:
Chapter 10: The questions of how to calculate expected utility and make decisions
become surprisingly complex when the agent is part of the environment
that it interacts with. Causal and evidential decision theory are the two
most popular decision theories among modern philosophers. This chapter
extends them to the sequential case, where multiple actions and observa-
tions are interleaved.
Chapter 11: Being able to shut down an AGI is an important safety feature. However,
the agent shutting down after receiving a request to do so may not always
represent the human’s best interests. This chapter deepens the analysis
of a previously proposed model of this problem.
Finally, Chapter 12 concludes with summary and discussion. The reader may also want
to occasionally consult the list of notation in Appendix A at the end of this thesis.
In some chapters, semi-formal statements are made in place of fully formal theorems.
This is to improve the flow of the text, and to avoid readers getting stuck on inessential
details. These statements are always backed by fully formal theorems that are either
referenced or found in appendices at the end of the chapter.
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“Within thirty years, we will have the technological
means to create superhuman intelligence.
Shortly after, the human era will be ended.”
Vernor Vinge (1993)
2. AGI Safety Literature Review1
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to AGI safety. An extensive survey of the
AGI safety literature was previously made by Sotala and Yampolskiy (2014). Since
then, the field has grown significantly. More up-to-date references are provided by this
chapter, and by a number of recent research agendas and problem collections (Amodei,
Olah, et al., 2016; Leike, Martic, et al., 2017; Russell, Dewey, et al., 2016; Soares and
Fallenstein, 2017; Stoica et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2016). A recent inventory of AGI
projects and their attitudes towards ethics and safety also contributes to an overview of
AGI safety research and attitudes (Baum, 2017a).
This thesis is structured as follows. Progress on how to think about yet-to-be-designed
future AGI’s is described in the first section (Section 2.1). Based partly on this under-
standing, we next survey predictions for when AGI will be created and what will happen
after its creation (Section 2.2). We list and discuss identified AGI safety problems (Sec-
tion 2.3), as well as proposals for solving or mitigating them (Section 2.4). Finally, we
review the current public policy on AGI safety issues (Section 2.5), before making some
concluding remarks (Section 2.6).
2.1. Understanding AGI
A major challenge for AGI safety research is to find the right conceptual models for
plausible AGIs. This is especially challenging since we can only guess at the technology,
algorithms, and structure that will be used. Indeed, even if we had the blueprint of an
AGI system, understanding and predicting its behavior might still be hard: Both its de-
sign and its behavior could be highly complex. Nonetheless, several abstract observations
and predictions are possible to make already at this stage.
2.1.1. Defining Intelligence
Legg and Hutter (2007c) propose a formal definition of intelligence based on algorithmic
information theory and the UAI framework (Chapter 3; Hutter, 2005). They compare
1This chapter is based on Tom Everitt, Gary Lea, and Marcus Hutter (2018). “AGI Safety Literature
Review”. In: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
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it to a large number of previously suggested definitions (Legg and Hutter, 2007a). In-
formally, their definition states that:
“Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of
environments.”
The definition is non-anthropomorphic, meaning that it can be applied equally to humans
and artificial agents. All present-day AIs are less intelligent than humans according to
this definition, as each AI is unable to achieve goals beyond a rather narrow domain.
These domains can be for example ATARI environments (Hessel et al., 2017; Mnih,
Badia, et al., 2016; Mnih, Kavukcuoglu, et al., 2015), board-games (Silver, Huang, et
al., 2016; Silver, Hubert, et al., 2017; Silver, Schrittwieser, et al., 2017), car-driving
(Bojarski et al., 2016; Huval et al., 2015). However, as discussed in Chapter 1, a trend
towards greater generality can be observed.
Following the Legg-Hutter definition, we may expect that a future, super-human AGI
will be able to achieve more goals in a wider range of environments than humans. The
most intelligent agent according to this definition is AIXI, which has been studied both
mathematically and empirically; see Chapter 3, Everitt and Hutter (2018), Hutter (2005,
2012b), and Leike (2016) for surveys. Most of this thesis is based around the UAI
framework. Other safety work in the UAI framework is reviewed mostly in Section 2.4.
The Legg-Hutter intelligence definition measures what matters for control. The more
intelligent an agent is, the more control it will have over aspects of the environment
relating to its goals. If two agents with significantly different Legg-Hutter intelligence
have conflicting goals in a shared environment, then in many environments we may
expect the more intelligent of the two to succeed and the less intelligent fail. This points
to the risks with increasingly intelligent AGIs: If their goals are not aligned with ours,
then there will likely be a point where their goals will be achieved to the loss of ours
(Russell, 2016).
2.1.2. Orthogonality
Bostrom’s (2012, 2014) orthogonality thesis states that essentially any level of intelli-
gence is compatible with any type of goal. Thus it does not follow, as is sometimes
believed, that a highly intelligent AGI will realize that a simplistic goal such as creating
paperclips or computing decimals of pi is dumb, and that it should pursue something
more worthwhile such as art or human happiness. Relatedly, Hume (1738) argued that
reason is the slave of passion, and that a passion can never rationally be derived. In
other words, an AGI will employ its intelligence to achieve its goals, rather than conclude
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that its goals are pointless. Further, if we want an AGI to pursue goals that we approve
of, we better make sure that we design the AGI to pursue such goals: Beneficial goals
will not emerge automatically as the system gets smarter.
2.1.3. Convergent Instrumental Goals
The orthogonality thesis holds for the end goals of the system. In stark contrast, the
instrumental goals will often coincide for many agents and end goals (Bostrom, 2012;
Omohundro, 2007, 2008). Common instrumental goals include:
• Self-improvement: By improving itself, the agent becomes better able at achieving
its end goal.
• Goal-preservation and self-preservation: By ensuring that future versions of itself
pursues the same goals, the end goal is more likely to be achieved.
• Resource acquisition: With more resources, the agent will be better able at achieve
the end goals.
Exceptions exists, especially in game-theoretic situations where the actions of other
agents may depend on the agent’s goals or other properties (Lavictoire et al., 2014).
For example, an agent may want to change its goals so that it always chooses to honor
contracts. This may make it easier for the agent to make deals with other agents. The
sequential toxoplasmosis problem can also be seen as a case of this (Example 10.5 in
Chapter 10).
2.1.4. Formalizing AGI
Bayesian, history-based agents have been used to formalize AGI in the UAI frame-
work (Chapter 3; Hutter, 2005). Extensions of this framework have been developed
for studying multi-agent interaction (Leike, Taylor, et al., 2016), space-time embedded-
ness (Orseau and Ring, 2012), self-modification (Everitt, Filan, et al., 2016; Orseau
and Ring, 2011), observation modification (Ring and Orseau, 2011), self-duplication
(Orseau, 2014a,b), knowledge seeking (Orseau, 2014c), decision theory (Everitt, Leike,
et al., 2015), and others (Everitt and Hutter, 2018).
Some aspects of reasoning are swept under the rug by AIXI and Bayesian optimality.
Importantly, probability theory assumes that agents know all the logical consequences
of their beliefs (Gaifman, 2004). An impressive model of logical non-omniscience has
recently been developed by Garrabrant et al. (2016, 2017). Notably, Garrabrant’s theory
avoids Go¨delian obstacles for agents reasoning about improved versions of themselves
11
2. AGI Safety Literature Review
(Fallenstein and Soares, 2014). There is also hope that it can provide the foundation for
a decision theory for logically uncertain events, such as how to bet on the 50th digit of
pi before calculating it.
2.1.5. Alternate Views
Eric Drexler (private communication, 2017) argues that an AGI does not need to be
an agent that plans to achieve a goal. An increasingly automatized AI research and
development process where more and more of AI development is being performed by AI
tools can become super-humanly intelligent without having any agent subcomponent.
Avoiding to implement goal-driven agents that make long-term plans may avoid some
safety concerns. However, Bostrom (2014, Ch. 10) worries that even tool AIs that are
not explicitly agents may still obtain some agent-like properties as their intelligence
increases. Constructing an agent where the goals can be set explicitly may therefore be
a safer option, though Drexler (2015) has an idea for how to keep AIs specialized. A
drive for creating agent AIs rather than tool AIs can also arise from economic incentives
(Gwern, 2016).
Relatedly, Weinbaum and Veitas (2016) criticize the (rational) agent assumption un-
derpinning most AGI theory.
2.2. Predicting AGI Development
Based on historical observations of economical and technological progress, and on the
growing understanding of potential future AGIs described in Section 2.1, predictions
have been made both for when the first AGI will be created, and what will happen once
it has been created.
2.2.1. When Will AGI Arrive?
There is an ongoing and somewhat heated debate about when we can expect AGI to
be created, and whether AGI is possible at all or will ever be created. For example, by
extrapolating various technology trends until we can emulate a human brain, Kurzweil
(2005) argues that AGI will be created around 2029. Chalmers (2010) makes a more
careful philosophical analysis of the brain-emulation argument for AI, and shows that it
defeats and/or avoids counter arguments made by Dreyfus (1972), Lucas (1961), Penrose
(1994), and Searle (1980). Chalmers is less optimistic about the timing of AGI, and only
predicts that it will happen within this century.
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Surveys of when AI researchers estimate that human-level AGI will be created have
been made by Baum et al. (2011), V. C. Mu¨ller and Bostrom (2016), and Grace et al.
(2017). Baum et al. (2011) asked 21 attendees at the 2009 Artificial General Intelligence
conference, and found a median of 2045 for superhuman AGI. V. C. Mu¨ller and Bostrom
(2016) made a bigger survey of 550 people from the 2012 Philosophy and Theory of AI
(PT-AI) and AGI conferences, the Greek Society for Artificial Intelligence (EETN), as
well as the top 100 most cited authors in artificial intelligence. The medians for the
various groups all fell between 2040 and 2050. Grace et al. (2017) got 352 responses
from NIPS and ICML 2015 presenters on the slightly different question of when AGI
will accomplish all tasks better than human workers, and got a median of 2061. In-
terestingly, Asian respondents predicted AGI more than 30 years sooner than North
American respondents, with Europeans in the middle slightly closer to the Asians than
to the North Americans. It is also worth noting that estimates vary widely, from never
to just a few years into the future.
There are also other indicators of when AGI might arrive. Algorithmic progress have
been tracked by Grace (2013), Eckersley and Nasser (2018), and AI Impacts (2018b), and
the costs of computing have been tracked by AI Impacts (2018a). A new MIT course on
AGI shows that the idea of AGI approaching is becoming more mainstream (Fridman,
2018). Stanford has a course on AI safety (Sadigh, 2017). Jilk (2017) argues that an AGI
must have a conceptual-linguistic faculty in order to be able to access human knowledge
or interact effectively with the world, making a conceptual-linguistic faculty a necessary
requirement for AGI. Jilk further argues that a conceptual-linguistic faculty is likely to
be a strong indicator of AGI being near, and suggests ways in which we may test whether
a system has a conceptual-linguistic ability.
2.2.2. Will AGI Lead to a Technological Singularity?
As explained in Section 2.1.3, one of the instrumental goals of almost any AGI will be self-
improvement. The greater the improvement, the likelier the end goals will be achieved.
This can lead to recursive self-improvement, where a self-upgraded AGI is better able
to find yet additional upgrades, and so on. If the pace of this process increases, we
may see an intelligence explosion once a critical level of self-improvement capability has
been reached (Bostrom, 2014; Good, 1966; Hutter, 2012a; Kurzweil, 2005; Vinge, 1993;
Yudkowsky, 2008b). Already John von Neumann has been quoted calling this intelligence
explosion a singularity (Ulam, 1958). Singularity should here not be understood in its
strict mathematical sense, but more loosely as a point where our models break.
Some counter arguments to the singularity have been structured by Walsh (2016),
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who argues that an intelligence explosion is far from inevitable:
• Intelligence measurement: The singularity predicts an increasingly rapid devel-
opment of intelligence. However, it is not quite clear how we should measure
intelligence (Hutter, 2012a). A rate of growth that looks fast or exponential ac-
cording to one type of measurement, may look ordinary or linear according to
another measurement (say, the log-scale).
• Fast thinking dog: No matter how much we increase the speed at which a dog
thinks, the dog will never beat a decent human at chess. Thus, even if computers
keep getting faster, this alone does not entail their ever becoming smarter than
humans.
• Anthropocentric: Proponents of the singularity often believe that somewhere
around the human level of intelligence is a critical threshold, after which we may
see quick recursive self-improvement. Why should the human level be special?
• Meta-intelligence, diminishing returns, limits of intelligence, computational com-
plexity: It may be hard to do self-improvement or be much smarter than humans
due to a variety of reasons, such as a fundamental (physical) upper bound on
intelligence or difficulty of developing machine learning algorithms.
These arguments are far from conclusive, however. In Life 3.0, Tegmark (2017) argues
that AGI constitutes a third stage of life. In the first stage, both hardware and software is
evolved (e.g. in Bacteria). In the second stage, the hardware is evolved but the software
is designed. The prime example is a human child who goes to school and improves
her knowledge and mental algorithms (i.e. her software). In the third stage of life,
both the software and hardware is designed, as in an AGI. This may give unprecedented
opportunities for quick development, countering the anthropocentric argument by Walsh.
In relation to the fast thinking dog and the limits of intelligence arguments, Bostrom
(2014) argues that an AGI may think up to a million times faster than a human. This
would allow it to do more than a millennium of mental work in a day. Such a speed
difference would make it very hard for humans to control the AGI. Powerful mental
representations may also allow an AGI to quickly supersede human intelligence in quality
Sotala (2017). Yampolskiy (2017) also replies to Walsh’s arguments.
Kurzweil’s (2005) empirical case for the singularity has been criticized for lack of
scientific rigor (Modis, 2006). Modis (2002) argues that a logistic function fits the data
better than an exponential function, and that logistic extrapolation yields that the rate
of complexity growth in the universe should have peaked around 1990.
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In conclusion, there is little consensus on whether and when AGI will be created, and
what will happen after its creation. Anything else would be highly surprising, given
that no similar event have previously occurred. Nonetheless, AGI being created within
the next few decades and quickly superseding human intelligence seems like a distinct
possibility.
2.2.3. Risks Caused by AGI
A technological singularity induced by an AGI may lead to existential risks such as a pa-
perclip maximizer annihilating life in pursuit of resources (Bostrom, 2013, 2014), as well
as risks of substantial suffering without extinction (Sotala and Gloor, 2017). However,
even if AGI does not lead to a technological singularity, it may still cause substantial
problems, for example through (enabling greater degrees of) social manipulation, new
types of warfare, or shifts in power dynamics (Sotala, 2018). Categorizations of possible
scenarios have been proposed by Turchin (2018) and Yampolskiy (2016).
2.3. Problems with AGI
Several authors and organizations have published research agendas that identify potential
problems with AGI. Russell, Dewey, et al. (2016) and the Future of Life Institute (FLI)
take the broadest view, covering societal and technical challenges in both the near and
the long term future. Soares and Fallenstein (2014, 2017) at the Machine Intelligence
Research Institute (MIRI) focus on the mathematical foundations for AGI, including
decision theory and logical non-omniscience. Several subsequent agendas and problem
collections try to bring the sometimes “lofty” AGI problems down to concrete machine
learning problems: Amodei, Olah, et al. (2016) at OpenAI et al., Leike, Martic, et al.
(2017) at DeepMind, and Taylor et al. (2016) also at MIRI. In the agenda by Stoica et al.
(2017) at UC Berkeley, the connection to AGI has all but vanished. For brevity, we will
refer to the agendas by the organization of the first author, with MIRI-AF the agent
foundations agenda by Soares and Fallenstein (2014, 2017) and MIRI-ML the machine
learning agenda by (Taylor et al., 2016). Figure 2.1 shows some connections between
the agendas. Figure 2.1 also makes connections to research done by other prominent
AGI safety institutions Oxford Future of Humanity Institute (FHI), Australian National
University (ANU), and Center for Human-Compatible AI (CHAI).
Some clusters of problems appear in multiple research agendas:
• Value specification: How do we get an AGI to work towards the right goals? MIRI
calls this value specification. Bostrom (2014) discusses this problem at length,
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MIRI-AF
Value specification
Error-Tolerance
Reliability
FLI
Validity
Control
Verification
Security
ANU
Reward/data corruption
Corrigibility
Self-modification
Decision theory
CHAI
Reward learning
Corrigibility
UC Berkeley
Secure enclaves
Continual learning
Robust decisions
Explainable decisions
Shared learning
AI architectures
Adversarial learning
FHI
Reward learning
Interruptibility
Data corruption
Side effects
Oracles
Distillation
Safe exploration
MIRI-ML
Ambiguity detection
Human imitation
Informed oversight
Generalizable goals
Conservative concepts
Impact measures
Mild optimization
Instrumental incentives
DeepMind
Absent supervisor
Interruptibility
Reward gaming
Self-modification
Negative side effects
Safe exploration
Distributional shift
Adversaries
OpenAI et al.
Safe exploration
Reward corruption
Scalable oversight
Distributional shift
Negative side effects
. .
Figure 2.1.: Connections between problems stated in different AGI safety research agen-
das (for ANU, CHAI, and FHI, the agendas are inferred from their recent
publications).
arguing that it is much harder than one might naively think. Davis (2015) criti-
cizes Bostrom’s argument, and Bensinger (2015) defends Bostrom against Davis’
criticism. Reward corruption, reward gaming, and negative side effects are sub-
problems of value specification highlighted in the DeepMind and OpenAI agendas.
• Reliability: How can we make an agent that keeps pursuing the goals we have
designed it with? This is called highly reliable agent design by MIRI, involving
decision theory and logical omniscience. DeepMind considers the self-modification
subproblem.
• Corrigibility: If we get something wrong in the design or construction of an agent,
will the agent cooperate in us trying to fix it? This is called error-tolerant design
by MIRI-AF and corrigibility by Soares, Fallenstein, et al. (2015). The problem is
connected to safe interruptibility as considered by DeepMind.
• Security: How to design AGIs that are robust to adversaries and adversarial en-
vironments? This involves building sandboxed AGI protected from adversaries
(Berkeley), and agents that are robust to adversarial inputs (Berkeley, DeepMind).
• Safe learning: AGIs should avoid making fatal mistakes during the learning
phase. Subproblems include safe exploration and distributional shift (DeepMind,
OpenAI), and continual learning (Berkeley).
• Intelligibility: How can we build agent’s whose decisions we can understand? Ex-
plainable decisions (Berkeley); informed oversight (MIRI). DeepMind is also work-
ing on these issues, see Section 2.4.5 below.
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• Societal consequences: AGI will have substantial legal, economic, political, and
military consequences. Only the FLI agenda is broad enough to cover these is-
sues, though many of the mentioned organizations evidently care about the issue
(Brundage et al., 2018; DeepMind, 2017).
There are also a range of less obvious problems, which have received comparatively
less attention:
• Subagents: An AGI may decide to create subagents to help it with its task Orseau
(2014a,b) and Soares, Fallenstein, et al. (2015). These agent’s may for example
be copies of the original agent’s source code running on additional machines. Sub-
agents constitute a safety concern, because even if the original agent is successfully
shut down, these subagents may not get the message. If the subagents in turn cre-
ate subsubagents, they may spread like a viral disease.
• Malign priors: Christiano (2016) argues that the universal prior M (see Sec-
tion 3.4) is malign, as it is likely to be dominated by hypotheses that contain
agents with agendas to influence the user of the prior. While it is unclear to
what extent this type of problem would affect any practical agent, it bears some
semblance to aggressive memes, which do cause problems for human reasoning
(Dennett, 1990).
• Physicalistic decision making: The rational agent framework is pervasive in the
study of artificial intelligence. It typically assumes that a well-delineated entity
interacts with an environment through action and observation channels. This is
not a realistic assumption for physicalistic agents such as robots that are part of
the world they interact with (Soares and Fallenstein, 2014, 2017). Chapter 10
considers this question.
• Indeterminate agency: An artificial intelligence may be copied and distributed,
allowing instances of it to interact with the world in parallel. This can significantly
boost learning, but undermines the concept of a single agent interacting with the
world.
• Meta-cognition: Agents reasoning about their own computational resources and
logically uncertain events can encounter strange paradoxes due to Go¨delian lim-
itations (Fallenstein and Soares, 2015; Soares and Fallenstein, 2014, 2017) and
shortcomings of probability theory (Soares and Fallenstein, 2014, 2015a, 2017).
While these problems may seem esoteric, a security mindset (Yudkowsky, 2017) dictates
that we not only protect ourselves from things that can clearly go wrong, but also against
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anything that is not guaranteed to go right. Indeed, unforeseen errors often cause the
biggest risks. For this reason, the biggest safety problem may be one that we have not
thought of yet – not because it would necessarily be hard to solve, but because in our
ignorance we will fail to adopt measures to mitigate the problem.
2.4. Design Ideas for Safe AGI
We next look at some ideas for creating safe AGI. There is not always a clear line
distinguishing ideas for safe AGI from other AI developments. Many works contribute
to both simultaneously.
2.4.1. Value Specification
RL and misalignment. Reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is cur-
rently the most promising framework for developing intelligent agents and AGI. Com-
bined with Deep Learning, it has seen some remarkable recent successes, especially in
playing board games (Silver, Huang, et al., 2016; Silver, Hubert, et al., 2017; Silver,
Schrittwieser, et al., 2017) and computer games (Hessel et al., 2017; Mnih, Badia, et al.,
2016; Mnih, Kavukcuoglu, et al., 2015).
Aligning the goals of an RL agent with the goals of its human supervisor comprise
significant challenges, however. These challenges include correct specification of the
reward function, and avoiding that the agent takes shortcuts in optimizing it. Such
shortcuts include the agent corrupting the observations on which the reward function
evaluates performance, modifying the reward function to give more reward, hijacking the
reward signal or the memory location of the reward, and, in the case of an interactively
learned reward function, corrupting the data training the reward function. Chapters 5
to 8 categorize misalignment problems in RL, and suggest a number of techniques for
managing the various sources of misalignment. The rest of this subsection reviews other
work that has been done on designing agents with correctly specified values.
Learning a reward function from actions and preferences. One of the main chal-
lenges in scaling RL to the real world includes designing the reward function. This is
particularly critical for AGI, as a poorly designed reward function would likely lead to a
misaligned agent. As an example of misalignment, Clark and Amodei (2016) found that
their boat racing agent preferred going in circles and crashing into obstacles instead of
winning the race, due to a subtly misspecified reward function. Gwern (2011), Irpan
(2018), and Lehman et al. (2018) have many more examples. Analogous failures in AGIs
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could cause severe catastrophes. The DeepMind problem collection calls this a reward
gaming problem. One potential way around the problem of gameable reward functions
is to let the agent learn the reward function. This lets designers offload some of the
design work to powerful machine learning techniques.
Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) (Choi and Kim, 2011; Ng and Russell, 2000;
Ziebart et al., 2008) is a framework for learning a reward function from the actions of
an expert, often a human demonstrator. In one famous example, Abbeel et al. (2007)
taught an agent acrobatic helicopter flight by observing the actions of a human pilot.
Impressively, the agent ultimately became better at flying than the pilot it observed.
However, a learned reward function cannot be better than the data that trained it. If all
training happens before the agent is launched into the environment, then the data may
not properly describe situations that the agent reaches far into its lifetime (a so-called
distributional shift problem; Amodei, Olah, et al., 2016). For this reason, interactive
training of the reward function may be preferable, as it allows the training data to
adapt to any new situation the agent may encounter.
Cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL) is a generalization of IRL that
lets the expert and the agent act simultaneously in the same environment, with the
agent interactively learning the expert’s preferences (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al.,
2016). Among other things, this allows the expert to take demonstrative actions that
are suboptimal according to his or her reward function but more informative to the
agent, without the agent being led to infer an incorrect reward function. The CIRL
framework can be used to build agents that avoid interpreting reward functions overly
literally, thus avoiding some misalignment problems with RL (Hadfield-Menell, Milli,
et al., 2017).
A reward functions can also be learned from a human rating short video clips of
(partial) agent trajectories against each other (Christiano et al., 2017). For example, if
the human consistently rates scenarios where the agent falls off a cliff lower than other
scenarios, then the learned reward function will assign a low reward to falling off a cliff.
Using this technique, a non-expert human can teach an agent complex behaviors that
would have been difficult to directly program a reward function for. Warnell et al. (2017)
use a related approach, needing only 15 minutes of human feedback to teach the agent
the ATARI game Bowling.
On a fundamental level, learning from actions and learning from preferences is not
widely different. Roughly, a choice of action a over action b can be interpreted as a
preference for the future trajectories resulting from action a over the trajectories resulting
from action b. However, a few notable differences can still be observed. First, at least in
Christiano et al.’s (2017) framework, preferences always apply to past events. In contrast,
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an action in the CIRL framework typically gives information about which future events
the human prefers. A drawback is that in order for the action to carry information about
future events, the action must be chosen (somewhat) rationally. Humans do not always
act rationally; indeed, we exhibit several systematic biases (Kahneman, 2011). A naive
application of (C)IRL therefore runs the risk of inferring an incorrect reward function.
To address this, Evans et al. (2016) develop a method for learning the reward function
of agents exhibiting some human-like irrationalities. Without assumptions on the type
of irrationality the expert exhibits, nothing can be learned about the reward function
(Armstrong and Mindermann, 2017). In comparison, learning from preferences seems to
require weaker rationality assumptions on the human’s part, as correctly stating one’s
preferences may be easier than acting rationally.
Yet another approach to learning a reward function is to learn it from stories (Riedl
and Harrison, 2016).
Approval-directed agents. In a series of blog posts, Christiano (2014) suggests that
AGIs should be designed to maximize approval for their actions rather than trying to
reach some goal. He argues that approval-directed systems have many of the same
benefits of goal-directed systems while avoiding some of their worst pitfalls. Christiano
(2015) and Cotra (2018) outline a method for how approval-directed agents can be
chained together in a hierarchy, boosting the accuracy of the approvals of the human at
the top of the chain.
Reward corruption. Reinforcement learning AGIs may hijack their reward signal and
feed themselves maximal reward (Ring and Orseau, 2011). Interestingly, model-based
agents with preprogrammed reward functions are much less prone to this behavior
(Everitt, Filan, et al., 2016; Hibbard, 2012). However, if the reward function is learned
online as discussed above, it opens up the possibility of reward learning corruption. An
AGI may be tempted to influence the data training its reward function so it points to-
wards simple-to-optimize reward functions rather than harder ones (Armstrong, 2015).
Everitt, Krakovna, et al. (2017) (Chapter 9 in this thesis) show that the type of data the
agent receives matter for reward learning corruption. In particular, if the reward data
can be cross-checked between multiple sources, then the reward corruption incentive di-
minishes drastically. Everitt, Krakovna, et al. also evaluate a few different approaches
to reward learning, finding that the human action-data provided in CIRL is much safer
than the reward -data provided in standard RL, but that CIRL is not without worrying
failure modes.
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Side effects. An AGI that becomes overly good at optimizing a goal or reward function
that does not fully capture all human values, may cause significant negative side effects
(Yudkowsky, 2009). The paperclip maximizer that turns the earth and all humans into
paperclips is an often used example (Bostrom, 2014), now available as a highly addictive
computer game (Lantz, 2017). Less extreme examples include companies that optimize
profits and cause pollution and other externalities as negative side effects.
The most serious side effects seem to occur when a target function is optimized in
the extreme (such as turning the earth into paperclips). Quantilization can avoid over-
optimization under some assumptions (Everitt, Krakovna, et al., 2017; Taylor, 2016).
Another more specific method is to “regularize” reward by the impact the policy is
causing (Armstrong and Levinstein, 2017). How to measure impact remains a major
open question, however.
Morality. Both game-theory (Letchford et al., 2008) and machine learning (Conitzer
et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2018) have been suggested as ways to endow AI systems with a
sense of morality. For example, Kleiman-Weiner et al. (2017) use hierarchical Bayesian
inference to infer a moral theory from actions. However, Bogosian (2017) argues that a
potential problem with these approaches is that the agent becomes over-confident in a
hypothesis – for example due to a model-class that only represents a subset of possible
moral theories. Bogosian therefore argues that it is better to build an agent that remains
uncertain about which moral theory is correct, instead of building an agent with a single
moral theory, be it learned or not. Agents that do not remain uncertain may commit big
atrocities as judged by theories they have discarded, which is undesirable for believers
in the discarded moral theory. In contrast, morally uncertain agents avoid events that
are extremely bad according to any (possible) moral theory.
Virtue ethics has recently re-emerged as a third contender to consequentialist (utilitar-
ian) and deontological (rule-based) ethics. Murray (2017) makes a case for building moral
AI systems based on (Stoic) virtues rather then consequentialist reward-maximization.
Connections to economics. The goal alignment problem has several connections to the
economics literature. It may be seen as an instance of Goodhart’s law (Goodhart, 1975),
which roughly states that any measure of performance ceases to be a good measure once
it is optimized for. Manheim and Garrabrant (2018) categorize instances of Goodhart’s
law. It may also be seen as a principal-agent problem: The connections have been fleshed
out by Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2018).
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2.4.2. Reliability
Self-modification. Even if the reward function is correctly specified, an AGI may still
be able to corrupt either the reward function itself or the data feeding it. This can happen
either intentionally if such changes can give the agent more reward, or accidentally as a
side effect of the agent trying to improve itself (Section 2.1.3).
A utility self-preservation argument going back to at least Schmidhuber (2007) and
Omohundro (2008) says that agents should not want to change their utility functions,
as that will reduce the utility generated by their future selves, as measured by the
current utility function. Everitt, Filan, et al. (2016) formalize this argument, showing
that it holds under three non-trivial assumptions: (1) The agent needs to be model-
based, and evaluate future scenarios according to its current utility function; (2) the
agent needs to be able to predict how self-modifications affect its future policy; and
(3) the reward function itself must not endorse self-modifications. In RL (Sutton and
Barto, 1998), model-free agents violate the first assumption, off-policy agents such as
Q-learning violate the second, and the third assumption may fail especially in learned
reward/utility functions (Section 2.4.1). Hibbard (2012) and Orseau and Ring (2011)
also study the utility self-preservation argument.
Decision theory. Functional decision theory consolidates years of research about deci-
sion theory for embedded agents. Yudkowsky and Soares (2017) argue that functional
decision theory overcomes weaknesses of both evidential and causal decision theory.
Chapter 10 of this thesis study sequential extensions of causal and evidential decision
theory.
2.4.3. Corrigibility
By default, agents may resist shutdown and modifications due to the self-preservation
drives discussed in Section 2.1.3. Three rather different approaches have been developed
to counter the self-preservation drives.
Indifference. By adding a term or otherwise modifying the reward function, the agent
can be made indifferent between some choices of future events, for example shutdown
or software corrections (Armstrong, 2017b). For example, this technique can be used to
construct variants of popular RL algorithms that do not learn to prevent interruptions
(Orseau and Armstrong, 2016).
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Ignorance. Another option is to construct agents that behave as if a certain event (such
as shutdown or software modification) was certain not to happen (Everitt, Filan, et al.,
2016). For example, off-policy agents such as Q-learning behave as if they will always act
optimally in the future, thereby effectively disregard the possibility that their software
or policy be changed in the future. Armstrong (2017b) show that ignorance is equivalent
to indifference in a certain sense.
Uncertainty. In the CIRL framework (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2016), agents
are uncertain about their reward function, and learn about the reward function through
interaction with a human expert. Under some assumptions on the human’s rationality
and the agent’s level of uncertainty, this leads to naturally corrigible agents (Hadfield-
Menell, Dragan, et al., 2017; Wa¨ngberg et al., 2017). Essentially, the agent will interpret
the human’s act of shutting them down as evidence that being turned off has higher
reward than remaining turned on. In some cases where the human is likely to make
suboptimal choices, the agent may decide to ignore a shut down command. There has
been some debate about whether this is a feature (Milli et al., 2017) or a bug (Carey,
2018). These aspects will be discussed further in Chapter 11.
Continuous testing. Arnold and Scheutz (2018) argue that an essential component of
corrigibility is to detect misbehavior as early as possible. Otherwise, significant harm
may be caused without available corrigibility equipment having been put to use. They
propose a ethical testing framework that continually monitors the agent’s behavior on
simulated ethics tests.
2.4.4. Security
Adversarial counterexamples. Deep Learning (e.g. Goodfellow, Bengio, et al., 2016) is
a highly versatile tool for machine learning, and a likely building block for future AGIs.
Unfortunately, it has been observed that small perturbations of inputs can cause severe
misclassification errors (Athalye et al., 2017; Evtimov et al., 2017; Goodfellow, Shlens,
et al., 2014; Szegedy et al., 2013).
In a recent breakthrough, Katz et al. (2017) extend the Simplex algorithm to neural
networks with rectified linear units (Relus). Katz et al. call the extended algorithm
ReluPlex, and use it to successfully verify the behavior of neural networks with 300 Relu
nodes in 8 layers. They gain insight into the networks’ behaviors in certain important
regions, as well as the sensitivity to adversarial perturbations.
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2.4.5. Intelligibility
While it is infamously hard to understand exactly what a deep neural network has
learned, recently some progress has been made. DeepMind’s Psychlab uses tests from
psychology implemented in a 3D environment to understand deep RL agents. The
tests led them to a simple improvement of the UNREAL agent (Leibo et al., 2018).
Zahavy et al. (2016) instead use the dimensionality reduction technique t-SNE on the
activations of the top neural network layer in DQN (Mnih, Kavukcuoglu, et al., 2015),
revealing how DQN represents policies in ATARI games. Looking beyond RL, Olah et
al. (2017) summarize work on visualization of features in image classification networks
in a beautiful Distill post. Another line of work tries to explain what text and speech
networks have learned (Alvarez-Melis and Jaakkola, 2017; Belinkov and Glass, 2017; Lei
et al., 2016).
2.4.6. Safe learning
During training, a standard Deep RL agent such as DQN commits on the order of a
million catastrophic mistakes such as jumping off a cliff and dying (Saunders et al., 2017).
Such mistakes could be very expensive if they happened in the real world. Further, we
do not want an AGI to accidentally set off all nuclear weapons in a burst of curiosity
late in its training phase. Saunders et al. (2017) propose to fix this by training a neural
network to detect potentially catastrophic actions from training examples provided by
a human. The catastrophe detector can then override the agent’s actions whenever it
judges an action to be too dangerous. Using this technique, they manage to avoid all
catastrophes in simple settings, and a significant fraction in more complex environments.
A similar ideas was explored by Lipton et al. (2016). Instead of using human-generated
labels, their catastrophe detector was trained automatically on the agent’s catastrophes.
Unsurprisingly, this reduces but does not eliminate catastrophic mistakes. A survey over
previous work on safe exploration in RL is provided by (Garc´ıa and Ferna´ndez, 2015).
2.4.7. Other
Oracles. Armstrong (2017a) and Armstrong, Sandberg, et al. (2012) argue that oracles
that only answer questions may be more safe than other types of AGI. Sarma and Hay
(2017) suggest that computer algebra systems are concrete instances of oracles suitable
for further study.
Tripwires. Martin, Everitt, et al. (2016) use the AIXI framework to show that AGIs
with rewards bounded to a negative range (such as [−1, 0]) will prefer their subjective
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environment to end. In the AIXI framework, “death” always has an implicit reward of
0. This may lead such systems to self-destruct once they are intelligent enough to figure
out how to do so. Thus, a negative reward range may be used as a type of tripwire
(Bostrom, 2014), preventing superintelligent AGI before we are ready for it.
Homomorphic encryption. Trask (2017) shows how to train homomorphically en-
crypted neural networks. A potential application to AGI safety is to have a homo-
morphically encrypted AGI whose predictions and actions also come out encrypted. A
human operator with the secret key can choose to decrypt them only when he wants
to. This may make the system unintelligible to itself, and thereby potentially prevent
certain types of self-modifications.
Boxing. A natural idea for keeping an AGI safe is to constrain its interaction with
the real world. While it may be infeasible to constrain a highly intelligent AGI from
breaking out of its constrains (Alfonseca et al., 2016; Yudkowsky, 2002), it may still be
a useful technique for constraining more limited AGIs (Babcock et al., 2017).
Meta-cognition. Garrabrant et al.’s (2016, 2017) theory of logical induction leads to
several theorems about systems reasoning about their own computations in a consistent
manner, avoiding Go¨delian and Lo¨bian obstacles. Fallenstein and Kumar (2015) shows
that systems of higher-order logic can learn to trust their own theorems, in a certain
sense.
Weakening the agent concept. Hedden (2015) makes some progress on defining ratio-
nal agency in cases where there is no clear entity making the decisions, shedding some
light on the connection between personal identity and rational agency.
Physicalistic decision making. Recently, functional decision theory has been proposed
as a decision theory that improves upon both evidential and causal decision theory
(Yudkowsky and Soares, 2017).
Neuromorphic AGI. Jilk et al. (2017) argue that our best chance for creating safe AGI
is to use the human brain as a blueprint, as it allows us to use our extensive knowledge
about human drives to anticipate dangers and to develop a good training program for
the agent. A common objection to this idea is that is very hard to mathematically prove
properties about the human brain (Bostrom, 2014; Yudkowsky, 2008a). Countering
this objection, Jilk et al. (2017) argue that it will likely be hard to prove properties
25
2. AGI Safety Literature Review
about any type of AGI. It is an open question whether any of the promising works we
have reviewed above and develop in this thesis will lead to mathematical guarantees
surpassing our potential trust in a neuromorphic AGI.
2.5. Public Policy on AGI
Recommendations. In a collaboration spanning more than a handful AGI safety-
oriented organizations, Brundage et al. (2018) consider scenarios for how AI and AGI
may be misused and give advice for both policy makers and researchers. Regulation of
AI remains a controversial topic, however. On the one hand, Erdelyi and Goldsmith
(2018) call for global regulatory body. Others worry that regulations may limit the pos-
itive gains from AI, and recommend increased public funding for safety research (Nota,
2015). Baum (2017b) is also wary of regulation, but for slightly different reasons. He
argues that extrinsic measures such as regulations run the risk of backfiring, making
AI researchers look for ways around the regulations. He argues that intrinsic measures
that make AI researchers want to build safe AI are more likely to be effective, and
recommends either purely intrinsic methods or combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic
approaches. He lists some ideas for intrinsic approaches:
• Setting social norms and contexts for building safe AI, by creating and expanding
groups of AI researchers that openly promote safe AI, and by having conferences
and meetings with this agenda.
• Using “allies” such as car manufacturers (and the military) that want safe AI. AI
researchers want to satisfy these organizations in order to access their funding and
research opportunities.
• Framing AGI less as winner-take-all race, as a race implies a winner. Instead,
it is important to emphasize that the result of a speedy race where safety is de-
prioritized is likely to be a very unsafe AGI. Also, framing AI researchers as people
that are good (but sometimes do bad things), and emphasize that their jobs are
not threatened by a focus on safety.
• Making researchers publicly state that they care about safe AI and then reminding
them when they don’t follow it can lead to cognitive dissonance, which may cause
researchers to believe they want safe AI.
Armstrong, Bostrom, et al. (2016) counterintuitively find that information sharing be-
tween teams developing AGI exacerbates the risk of an AGI race.
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Policy makers. Although public policy making is often viewed as the domain of public
bodies, it should be remembered that many organizations such as corporations, univer-
sities and NGOs frequently become involved through advocacy, consulting, and joint
projects. Indeed, such involvement can often extend to de facto or “private” regulation
via organizational guidelines, organizational policies, technical standards and similar
instruments.
Professional organizations have already taken a leading role. The IEEE, for example,
is developing guidelines on Ethically Aligned Design (IEEE, 2017a,b). Meanwhile, the
ACM and the SIGAI group of AAAI have co-operated to establish a new joint confer-
ence on AI, ethics and society, AIES (AI Matters, 2017). Economic policy and technical
standards organizations have also started to engage: for example, the OECD has estab-
lished a conference on “smart policy making” around AI developments (OECD, 2017)
and ISO/IEC has established a technical committee on AI standards (ISO/IEC, 2017).
Corporations and corporate consortia are also involved, typically through the public-
facing aspects of their own corporate policies (IBM, 2018; Intel, 2017) or through joint
development of safety policies and recommendations which consortia members will adopt
(Partnership on AI, 2016).
Finally, in addition to the traditional public roles of academia and academics, there are
an increasing number of academically affiliated or staffed AI organizations. With varying
degrees of specificity, these work on technical, economic, social and philosophical aspects
of AI and AGI. Organizations include the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI), the
Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI), the Centre for the Study of Existential
Risk (CSER) and the Future of Life Institute (FLI).
Current policy anatomy. It could be said that public policy on AGI does not exist.
More specifically, although work such as Baum (2017a) highlights the extent to which
AGI is a distinct endeavor with its own identifiable risk, safety, ethics (RISE) issues,
public policy AGI is currently seldom separable from default public policy on AI taken as
a whole (PPAI). Existing PPAI are typically structured around (a) significant financial
incentives (e.g. grants, public-private co-funding initiatives, tax concessions) and (b)
preliminary coverage of ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) with a view to more
detailed policy and legislative proposals later on (FTI Consulting, 2018; Miller et al.,
2018).
In the case of the EU, for example, in addition to experimental regulation with its
new algorithmic decision-making transparency requirements in (EUR-lex, 2016, Article
22, General Data Protection Regulation) , its various bodies and their industry partners
have committed over 3 billion Euro to AI and robotics R&D and engaged in two rounds
27
2. AGI Safety Literature Review
of public consultation on the European Parliament’s proposed civil law liability frame-
work for AI and robotics (Ansip, 2018). However, the much demanded first draft of an
overarching policy framework is still missing, being slated for delivery by the European
Commission no earlier than April 2018.
Elsewhere, spurred into action by the implications of the AlphaGo victory and China’s
recent activities (outlined below), South Korea and Japan have already rapidly com-
menced significant public and public-private investment programs together with closer
co-ordination of state bodies, industry and academia (J. E. Ha, 2016; Volodzsko, 2017).
Japan is also additionally allowing experimental regulation in some economic sectors
(Takenaka, 2017). The UK has started work on a preliminary national policy framework
on robotics and AI (Hall and Pesenti, 2017; UK Parliament, 2017), and have established
a national Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CSER, 2017).
Current policy dynamics. Although there is substantial positive co-operation between
universities, corporations and other organizations, there is a negative dynamic operat-
ing the nation-state, regional and international context. Contrary to the expert rec-
ommendations above, there is increasing rhetoric around an AI “arms race” (Cave and
O´hE´igeartaigh, 2018), typified by President Vladimir Putin’s September 2017 comment
that “... whoever becomes the leader in [the AI] sphere will become the leader in the
world” (Apps, 2017). Relatedly, China’s 8 July 2017 AI policy announcement included
being the global leader in AI technology by 2030 (Ding, 2018; Kania, 2018; PRC State
Council, 2017). It also included aims of “creating a safer, more comfortable and con-
venient society”. Alongside this policy shift has been increased Sino-American compe-
tition for AI talent (Cyranoski, 2018). In the US, the Obama Administration began
consultation and other moves towards an Federal policy framework for AI technology in-
vestment, development and implementation (Agrawal et al., 2016; White House OSTP,
2016). However, the Trump Administration abandoned the effort to focus mainly on
military spending on AI and cyber-security (Metz, 2018).
Policy outlook. Given the above, looking forward it would appear that the organiza-
tions noted above will have to work hard to moderate the negative dynamic currently
operating at the nation-state, regional and international level. Useful guidance for re-
searchers and others engaging with public policy and regulatory questions on AI is given
by 80 000 Hours (2017). Further references on public policy on AGI can be found in
(Dafoe, 2017; Sotala and Yampolskiy, 2014).
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2.6. Conclusions
AGI promises to be a major event for human kind. Recent research have made important
progress on how to think about potential future AGIs, which enables us to anticipate
and (hopefully) mitigate problems before they occur. This may be crucial, especially if
the creation of a first AGI leads to an “intelligence explosion”. Solutions to safety issues
often have more near-term benefits as well, which further adds to the value of AGI safety
research.
It is our hope that this summary will help new researchers enter the field of AGI
safety, and provide traditional AI researchers with an overview of challenges and design
ideas considered by the AGI safety community.
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“Approximate the solution, not the problem.”
Richard S. Sutton
3. Universal Artificial Intelligence1
Since the inception of the AI research field in the mid-twentieth century, a range of
practical and theoretical approaches have been investigated. This chapter will discuss
universal artificial intelligence (UAI) as a unifying framework and foundational theory
for many of these approaches. The generality and formal power of UAI makes it an
excellent framework for studying safety aspects of AGI. Many of the subsequent chapters
will extend the UAI framework in different ways.
The chapter begins with some general background on the scientific study of intelligence
and AI (Section 3.1). We then give an overview of the components of the UAI theory
(Section 3.2), before considering each component in more depth: The framework (Sec-
tion 3.3), learning (Section 3.4), goal formulation (Section 3.5), planning (Section 3.6),
and the AIXI agent (Section 3.7). Some conclusions are provided (Section 3.8).
3.1. Background and History of AI
Intelligence is a fascinating topic, and has been studied from many perspectives. Cog-
nitive psychology and behaviorism are psychological theories about how humans think
and act. Neuroscience, linguistics, and the philosophy of mind try to uncover how the
human mind and brain works. Machine learning, logic, and computer science can be
seen as attempts to make machines that think.
Scientific perspectives on intelligence can be categorized based on whether they con-
cern themselves with thinking or acting (cognitive science vs. behaviorism), and whether
they seek objective answers such as in logic or probability theory, or try to describe hu-
mans as in psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience. The distinction is illustrated in
Table 3.1. The primary focus of AI is on acting rather than thinking, and on doing the
right thing rather than emulating humans. Ultimately, we wish to build systems that
solve problems and act appropriately; whether the systems are inspired by humans or
follow philosophical principles is only a secondary concern.
1This chapter is based on: Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter (2018). “Universal Artificial Intelligence:
Practical Agents and Fundamental Challengs”. In: Foundations of Trusted Autonomy. Ed. by
Hussein A. Abbass, Jason Scholz, and Darryn J. Reid. Springer. Chap. 2, pp. 15–46. isbn: 978-3-
319-64816-3.
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Thinking Acting
humanly Cognitive Turing test,
science behaviorism
rationally Laws of Doing the
thought right thing
Table 3.1.: Scientific perspectives on intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 2010).
Induction and deduction. Within the field of AI, a distinction can be made between
systems focusing on reasoning and systems focusing on learning. Deductive reasoning
systems typically rely on logic or other symbolic systems, and use search algorithms
to combine inference steps. Examples of primarily deductive systems include medical
expert systems that infer diseases from symptoms, and chess-playing agents deducing
good moves. Since the deductive approach dominated AI in its early days, it is sometimes
referred to as good old-fashioned AI.
A more modern approach to AI shifts the focus from reasoning to learning. This
inductive approach has become increasingly popular, both due to progress in machine
learning and neural networks, and due to the failure of deductive systems to deal with
unknown and noisy environments. While it is possible for a human designer to con-
struct a deductive agent for well-defined tasks like chess, this task becomes unfeasible
in tasks involving real-world sensors and actuators. For example, the reaction of any
physical motor will never be exactly the same twice. Similarly, inferring objects from
visual data could potentially be solved by a ‘hard-coded’ deductive system under ‘perfect
circumstances’ where a finite number of geometric shapes generate perfectly predictable
images. But in the real world, objects do not come from a finite number of geometric
shapes, and camera images from visual sensors always contain a significant amount of
noise. Induction-oriented systems that learn from data seem better fitted to handle such
difficulties.
It is natural to imagine that some synthesis of inductive and deductive modules will
yield superior systems. In practice, this may well turn out to be the case. From a
theoretical perspective, however, the inductive approach is more-or-less self-sufficient.
Deduction emerges automatically from a “simple” planning algorithm once the induction
component has been defined, as will be made clear in the following section. In contrast,
no general theory of AI has been constructed starting from a deductive system. See
Rathmanner and Hutter (2011, Sec. 2.1) for a more formal comparison.
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UAI as a foundational theory for AI. The development of a foundational theory has
been pivotal for many research fields to mature. Well-known examples include the de-
velopment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) for mathematics, Turing-machines for
computer science, evolution for biology, and decision and game theory for economics
and the social sciences. Successful foundational theories give a precise, coherent un-
derstanding of the field, and offer a common language for communicating research. As
most research studies focus on one narrow question, it is essential that the value of each
isolated result can be appreciated in light of a broader framework or goal formulation.
UAI offers several benefits to AI research beyond the general advantages of founda-
tional theories just mentioned. For example, the safety of an AGI may be improved if
its design is grounded in a formal theory (such as UAI) that allows formal verification
of its behavioral properties. Unsafe designs can be ruled out at an early stage, and ade-
quate attention can be given to crucial design choices. UAI is also the basis of a general,
non-anthropomorphic definition of intelligence, which may improve our ability to under-
stand highly intelligent AGIs, as discussed in Section 2.1.1. UAI can also be used as a
high-level blueprint for the design of AI algorithms, and brings a general appreciation of
fundamental challenges such as the induction problem and the exploration–exploitation
dilemma (Everitt and Hutter, 2018; Leike, 2016).
The components of UAI. UAI is a completely general, formal, foundational theory of
AI. Its primary goal is to give a precise mathematical answer to what is the right thing to
do in unknown environments. UAI has been explored in great technical depth (Hutter,
2005, 2012b), and has inspired a number of successful practical applications (Everitt and
Hutter, 2018).
The UAI theory is composed of the following four components:
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UAI
Framework
Learning Goal Planning
• Framework. Defines agents and environments,
and their interaction/interface.
• Learning. The learning part of UAI is based on
Solomonoff induction. The general learning capa-
bility this entails is the most distinctive feature of
UAI.
• Goal. In the simplest formulation, the goal of the
agent will be to maximize reward.
• Planning. (Near) perfect planning is achieved
with a simple expectimax search.
The following sections discuss these components in greater depth.
3.3. Framework
The framework of UAI specifies how an agent interacts with an environment. The agent
can take actions a ∈ A. For example, if the agent is a robot, then the actions may be
different kinds of limb movements. The environment reacts to the actions of the agent
by returning a percept e ∈ E . In the robot scenario, the environment is the real world
generating a percept e in the form of a camera image from the robot’s visual sensors.
We assume that the set A of actions and the set E of percepts are both finite.
The framework covers a very wide range of agents and environments. For example,
in addition to a robot interacting with the real world, it also encompasses: A chess-
playing agent taking actions a in the form of chess moves, and receiving percepts e in
the form either of board positions or the opponent’s latest move. The environment here
is the chess board and the opponent. Stock-trading agents take actions a in the form
of buying and selling stocks, and receive percepts e in the form of trading data from
a stock-market environment. Essentially any application of AI can be modeled in this
general framework.
x
$
A more formal example is given by the toy problem
cheese maze illustrated to the right. Here, the agent
can choose from four actions A = {up,down, left, right}
and receives one of two possible percepts E =
{cheese, no cheese}. The illustration shows a maze with
cheese in the bottom right corner. The cheese maze prob-
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(a) A Markov decision process environ-
ment. The agent transitions be-
tween a finite number of states, and
the next state depends only on the
current state and the current ac-
tion.
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(b) The tree of possible agent-environment interactions
in a history-based environment. The agent pi starts
out with taking action a1 = pi(), where  denotes
the empty history. The environment µ responds with
a percept e1 depending on a1 according to the dis-
tribution µ(e1 | a1). The agent selects a new action
a2 = pi(a1e1), to which the environment responds
with a percept e2 ∼ µ( · | a1e1a2).
Figure 3.1.: History-based and Markov decision process environments.
lem is a commonly used toy problem in reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto,
1998).
Interaction histories. The interaction between agent and environment proceeds in cy-
cles. The agent starts taking an action a1, to which the environment responds with a
percept e1. The agent then selects a new action a2, which results in a new percept e2, and
so on. The interaction history up until time t is denoted æ<t = a1e1a2e2 . . . at−1et−1.
The set of all interaction histories is (A× E)∗.
Agent and environment. We can give formal definitions of agents and environments.
Definition 3.1 (Agent). An agent is a policy pi : (A×E)∗ → A that selects a new action
at = pi(æ<t) given any history æ<t.
Definition 3.2 (Environment). An environment is a stochastic function µ : (A×E)∗×
A  E that generates a new percept et for any history æ<t and action at. Let µ(et |
æ<tat) denote the probability that the next percept is et given the history æ<tat.
Agent and environment are thus each other’s analogues. Their possible interactions
can be illustrated as a tree where the agent selects actions and the environment responds
with percepts (see Figure 3.1b). Note in particular that the second percept e2 can depend
also on the first agent action a1. In general, our framework puts no restriction on how
long an action can continue to influence the behavior of the environment and vice versa.
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Histories and states. It is instructive to compare the generality of the history repre-
sentation in the UAI framework to the state representation in standard RL. Standard
RL is built around the notion of Markov decision processes (MDPs), where the agent
transitions between states by taking actions (see Figure 3.1a). In an MDP, the agent
transitions between states by taking an action, as illustrated to the right. The MDP
specifies the transition probabilities T (s′ | s, a) of reaching new state s′ when taking
action a in current state s. An MDP policy τ : S → A selects actions based on the state
s ∈ S.
The history framework of UAI is more general than MDPs in the following respects:
• Partially observable states. In most realistic scenarios, the most recent obser-
vation or percept does not fully reveal the current state. For example, when in the
supermarket I need to remember what is currently in my fridge; nothing in the
percept of supermarket shelves provide this information.2
• Infinite number of states. Another common assumption in standard RL is
that the number of states is finite. This is unrealistic in the real world. The UAI
framework does not require a finite state space, and UAI agents can learn without
ever returning to the same state (see Section 3.4).
• Non-stationary environments. Standard RL typically assumes that the envi-
ronment is stationary, in the sense that the transition probability P (s′ | s, a) re-
mains constant over time. This is not always realistic. A car that changes traveling
direction from a sharp wheel turn in dry summer conditions may react differently
in slippery winter road conditions. Non-stationary environments are automatically
allowed for by the general definition of a UAI environment µ : (A× E)∗ ×A E
(Definition 3.2).
• Non-stationary policies. Finally, UAI offers the following mild notational
convenience. In standard RL, agents must be represented by sequences of policies
pi1, pi2, . . . to allow for learning. The initial policy pi1 may for example be random,
while later policies pit, t > 1, will be increasingly directed to obtaining reward. In
the UAI framework, policies pi : (A × E)∗ → A depend on the entire interaction
history. Any learning that is made from a history æ<t can be incorporated into a
single policy pi.
In conclusion, the history-based UAI framework is very general. Indeed, it is hard
2Although histories can be viewed as states, this is generally not useful since it implies that no state is
ever visited twice (Hutter, 2005, Sec. 4.3.3).
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to find AI setups that cannot be reasonably modeled in the UAI agent–environment
framework.
3.4. Learning
The generality of the UAI environments comes with a price: The agent will need much
more sophisticated learning techniques than simply visiting each state many times, which
is the basis of most learning in standard RL. This section will describe how this type of
learning is possible, and relate it to some classical philosophical principles about learning.
A good image of a UAI agent is that of a newborn baby. Knowing little about the
world, the baby tries different actions and experiences various sensations (percepts) as
a consequence. Note that the baby does not initially know about any states—only
percepts. Learning is essential for intelligent behavior, as it enables prediction and
thereby adequate planning.
Principles. Learning or induction is an ancient philosophical problem, and has been
studied for millennia. It can framed as the problem of inferring a correct hypothesis from
observed data. One of the most famous inductive principles is Occam’s razor, due to
William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347). It says to prefer the simplest hypothesis consistent
with data. For example, relativity theory may seem like a complicated theory, but it
is the simplest theory that we know of that is consistent with observed (non-quantum)
physics data. Another ancient principle is due to Epicurus (341–270 BC). In slight
conflict with Occam’s razor, Epicurus’ principle says to keep all hypothesis consistent
with data. To discard a hypothesis one should have data that disconfirms it.
Thomas Bayes (1701–1761) derived a precise rule for how belief in a hypothesis should
change with additional data. According to Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief Pr(Hyp |
Data) should relate to the prior belief Pr(Hyp) as:
Pr(Hyp | Data) = Pr(Hyp) Pr(Data | Hyp)∑
Hi∈H Pr(Hi) Pr(Data | Hi)
Here H is a class of possible hypotheses, and Pr(Data | Hyp) is the likelihood of seeing
the data under the given hypothesis. Bayes’ rule has been highly influential in statistics
and machine learning.
Two major questions left open by Bayes’ rule are how to choose the prior Pr(Hyp) and
the class of possible hypotheses H. Occam’s razor tells us to weight simple hypotheses
higher, and Epicurus tells us to keep any hypothesis for consideration. In other words,
Occam says that Pr(Hyp) should be large for simple hypotheses, and Epicurus prescribes
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using a wide H where Pr(Hyp) is never 0. (Note that this does not prevent the posterior
Pr(Hyp | Data) from being 0 if the data completely disconfirms the hypothesis.) While
valuable, these principles are not yet precise. The following four questions remain:
I. What is a suitable general class of hypotheses H?
II. What is a simple hypothesis?
III. How much higher should the probability of a simple hypothesis be compared to a
complicated one?
IV. Is there any guarantee that following these principles will lead to good learning
performance?
Computer programs. The solution to these questions come from a somewhat unex-
pected direction. In one of the greatest mathematical discoveries of the 20th century,
Alan Turing invented the universal Turing machine (UTM). Essentially, a UTM can
compute anything that can be computed at all. Today, the most well-known examples
of UTMs are programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and Python. Turing’s result
shows that given unlimited resources, these programming languages (and many others)
can compute the same set of functions: the so-called computable functions.
Solomonoff (1964a,b, 1978) noted an important similarity between deterministic envi-
ronments µ and computer programs p. Both (deterministic) environments and computer
programs are essentially input-output relations. A program p can therefore be used as
a hypothesis about the true environment µ. The program p is the hypothesis that µ
returns percepts e<t = p(a<t) on input a<t.
As hypotheses, programs have the following desirable properties:
• Universal. As Turing showed, computer programs can express any computable
function, and thereby model essentially any environment. Even the universe it-
self has been conjectured computable (Fredkin, 1992; Hutter, 2010; Schmidhuber,
2000; Wolfram, 2002). Using computer programs as hypotheses is therefore in the
spirit of Epicurus, and answers question I.
• Consistency check. To check whether a given computer program p is consistent
with some data/history, one can usually run p on input a<t and check that the
output e<t = p(a<t). (This is not always feasible due to the halting problem
(Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979).)
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• Prediction. Similarly, to predict the result of an action a given a hypothesis p,
one can run p with input a to find the resulting output prediction e. (A similar
caveat with the halting problem applies.)
• Complexity definition. When comparing informal hypotheses, it is often hard
to determine which hypothesis is simpler and which hypothesis is more complex
(as illustrated by the grue and bleen problem (Goodman, 1955)). For programs,
complexity can be defined precisely. A program p is a binary string interpreted by
some fixed program interpreter, technically known as a universal Turing machine
(UTM). We denote with `(p) the length of this binary string p, and interpret the
length `(p) as the complexity of p. This addresses question II.3
The complexity definition as length of programs corresponds well to what we consider
simple in the informal sense of the word. For example, an environment where the percept
always mirrors the action is given by the following simple program:
procedure MirrorEnvironment
while true do:
x← action input
output percept ← x
In comparison, a more complex environment with, say, multiple players interacting in
an intricate physics simulation would require a much longer program. To allow for
stochastic environments, we say that an environment µ is computable if there exists
a computer program µp that on input æ<tat outputs the distribution µ(et | æ<tat)
(compare Definition 3.2).
Solomonoff induction. Based on the definition of complexity as length of strings coding
computer programs, Solomonoff (1964a,b, 1978) defined a universal prior Pr(p) = 2−`(p)
for program hypotheses p, which gives rise to a M able to predict any computable
sequence. Hutter (2005) extended the definition to environments reacting to an agent’s
actions. The resulting Solomonoff-Hutter universal distribution can be defined as
M(e<t | a<t) =
∑
p : p(a<t)=e<t
2−`(p) (3.1)
3 The technical question of which programming language (or UTM) to use remains. In passive settings
where the agent only predicts, the choice is inessential (Hutter, 2007). In active settings, where the
agent influences the environment, bad choices of UTMs can adversely affect the agent’s performance
(Leike and Hutter, 2015a), although remedies exist (Leike, Lattimore, et al., 2016). Finally, M.
Mu¨ller (2010) describes a failed but interesting attempt to find an objective UTM.
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assuming that the programs p are binary strings interpreted in a suitable programming
language. This addresses question III.
Given some history æ<tat, we can predict the next percept et with probability:
M(et | æ<tat) = M(e<tet | a<tat)
M(e<t | a<t) .
This is just an application of the definition of conditional probability P (A | B,C) =
P (A,B | C)/P (B | C), with A = et, B = e<t, and C = a<tat.
Prediction results. Finally, will agents based on M learn? (Question IV). There are,
in fact, a wide range of results in this spirit.4 Essentially, what can be shown is that:
Theorem 3.3 (Universal learning). For any computable environment µ (possibly
stochastic) and any action sequence a1:∞,
M(et | æ<tat)→ µ(et | æ<tat) as t→∞
with µ-probability 1.
The convergence is quick in the sense that M only makes a finite amount of prediction
error on infinite interaction sequences æ1:∞. In other words, an agent based on M will
(quickly) learn to predict any true environment µ that it is interacting with. This is
about as strong an answer to question IV as we could possibly hope for. This learning
ability also loosely resembles one of the key elements of human intelligence: That by
interacting with almost any new ‘environment’ – be it a new city, computer game, or
language – we can usually figure out how the new environment works by interacting with
it.
3.5. Goal
Intelligence is to use (learned) knowledge to achieve a goal. This section will define the
goal of reward maximization and argue for its generality.5 For example, the goal of a
chess agent should be to win the game. This can be communicated to the agent via
reward, by giving the agent reward for winning, and no reward for losing or breaking
4 Overviews are provided by Hutter (2005, 2007), Li and Vitanyi (2008), and Rathmanner and Hutter
(2011). More recent technical results are given by Hutter (2009), Lattimore and Hutter (2013),
Lattimore, Hutter, and Gavane (2011), and Leike and Hutter (2015b).
5Misalignment problems caused by this type of goal and some alternative types of goals will be consid-
ered in Chapters 5 to 8.
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game rules. The goal of a self-driving car should be to drive safely to the desired location.
This can be communicated in a reward for successfully doing so, and no reward otherwise.
More generally, essentially any type of goal can be communicated by giving reward for
the goal’s achievement, and no reward otherwise.
The reward is communicated to the agent via its percept e. We therefore make the
following assumption on the structure of the agent’s percepts:
Assumption 3.4 (Percept=Observation+Reward). The percept e is composed of an
observation o and a reward r ∈ [0, 1]; that is, e = (o, r). Let rt be the reward associated
with the percept et.
The observation part o of the percept would be the camera image in the case of a
robot, and the chess board position in case of a chess agent. The reward r tells the
agent how well it is doing, or how happy its designers are with its current performance.
Given a discount parameter γ, the goal of the agent is to maximize the γ-discounted
return
r1 + γr2 + γ
2r3 + . . . .
The discount parameter γ ensures that the sum is finite. It also means that the agent
prefers getting reward sooner rather than later. This is desirable: For example, an
agent striving to achieve its goal soon is more useful than an agent striving to achieve
it in a 1000 years. The discount parameter should be set low enough so that the agent
does not defer acting for too long, and high enough so that the agent does not become
myopic, sacrificing substantial future reward for small short-term gains (compare delayed
gratification in the psychology literature).
Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is the study of agents learning to
maximize reward. In our setup, Solomonoff’s result (Theorem 3.3) entails that the agent
will learn to predict which actions or policies lead to percepts containing high reward. In
practice, some care needs to be taken to design a sufficiently informative reward signal.
For example, it may take a very long time before a chess agent wins a game ‘by accident’,
leading to an excessively long exploration time before any reward is found. To speed up
learning, small rewards can be added for moving in the right direction. A minor reward
can for example be added for imitating a human (Schaal, 1999).
The expected return that an agent/policy obtains is called value:
Definition 3.5 (Value). The value of a policy pi in an environment µ is the expected
return:
V piµ = Epiµ[r1 + γr2 + γ2r3 + . . .].
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3.6. Planning
The final component of UAI is planning. Given knowledge of the true environment µ,
how should the agent select actions to maximize its expected reward?
Conceptually, this is fairly simple. For any policy pi, the expected reward V piµ =
E[r1 + γr2 + . . . ] can be computed to arbitrary precision. Essentially, using pi and µ,
one can determine the histories æ1:∞ that their interaction can generate, as well as the
relative probabilities of these histories (see Figure 3.1b). This is all that is needed to
determine the expected reward. The discount γ makes rewards located far into future
have marginal impact, so the value can be well approximated by looking only finitely far
into the future. Settling on a sufficient accuracy ε, the number of time steps we need to
look ahead in order to achieve this precision is called the effective horizon.
To find the optimal course of action, the agent only needs to consider the various pos-
sible policies within the effective horizon, and choose the one with the highest expected
return. The optimal behavior is given by
pi∗µ = arg max
pi
V piµ . (3.2)
We sometimes call this policy AIµ.
3.7. AIXI – Putting it all Together
This section describes how the components described in previous sections can be stitched
together to create an optimal agent for unknown environments. This agent is called AIXI,
and is defined by the optimal policy
pi∗M = arg max
pi
V piM . (3.3)
The difference to AIµ defined in (3.2) is that the true environment µ has been replaced
with the universal distribution M in (3.3). A full expansion of (3.2) can be found
in Hutter (2005, p. 134), and efficient approximations are discussed in (Everitt and
Hutter, 2018). While AIµ is optimal when knowing the true environment µ, AIXI is
able to learn essentially any environment through interaction. Due to Solomonoff’s
result (Theorem 3.3) the distribution M will converge to the true environment µ almost
regardless of what the true environment µ is.6 And once M has converged to µ, the
behavior of AIXI will converge to the behavior of the optimal agent AIµ which perfectly
6Orseau (2010) and Leike and Hutter (2015a) have found some counterexamples.
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knows the environment. Formal results on AIXI’s performance can be found in (Hutter,
2005; Lattimore and Hutter, 2011; Leike, Lattimore, et al., 2016).
Put a different way, AIXI arrives to the world with essentially no knowledge or pre-
conception of what it is going to encounter. However, AIXI quickly makes up for its
lack of knowledge with a powerful learning ability, which means that it will soon have
figured out how the environment works. From the beginning and throughout its “life”,
AIXI acts optimally according to its growing knowledge, and as soon as this knowledge
state is sufficiently complete, AIXI acts as well as any agent that knew everything about
the environment from the start. Based on these observations (described in much greater
technical detail by Hutter 2005), we claim that AIXI defines the optimal behavior in any
computable, unknown environment.
3.8. Conclusions
In summary, UAI is a formal, foundational theory for AI that gives a precise answer
to the question of what is the optimal thing to do for essentially any agent acting in
essentially any environment. The insight builds on old philosophical principles (Occam,
Epicurus, Bayes), and can be expressed in a single, one-line AIXI equation (3.3) (Hutter,
2005, p. 143).
The AIXI equation and the UAI framework surrounding it has several important
applications. Most important for our purposes, the framework can be used to give
mathematically precise statements of the behavior of intelligent agents. Extensions of
the framework can be used to formalize safety problems as mentioned in in Section 2.1.4.
The material developed in Chapters 5 to 8 below also build on the UAI framework. The
framework has also brought to light several subtle issues in defining optimal intelligence
and in the exploration-exploitation dilemma (Leike, 2016), and has inspired a number
of practical AI algorithms (see Everitt and Hutter, 2018, for an overview).
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“Causal relationships are ontological,
describing physical constraints in the world,
whereas probabilistic relationships are epistemic,
reflecting what we know or believe about the world.”
Judea Pearl (2009)
4. Causal Graphs1
This chapter gives a brief introduction to causal graphs (Pearl, 2009), and introduces
some of our own notation that supplements the standard notation in a few different
ways. Causal graphs will find applications in most subsequent chapters. Causal graphs
are powerful representations of causal relationships and probabilistic independence as-
sumptions.
There are a few different ways to represent causal graphs, described briefly in Sec-
tion 4.1. This section also introduces the important do-operator. Next we describe some
of our notation (Section 4.2), ways in which we will focus on different aspects of a causal
graph (Section 4.3), and how agent environments will be represented (Section 4.4). Fi-
nally, Section 4.5 shows how the UAI model of the previous chapter can be represented
as a causal graph.
4.1. Representing Causal Graphs
A causal graph can be represented as a directed acyclic graph. A node with ingoing
arrows is causally influenced by its parents. For example, in Figure 4.1a the Alarm is
causally influenced by the presence of a burglar and by a (small) earthquake, and in turn
causally influences whether the security company calls. This example and its variants
are inspired by examples given by Pearl (2009).
Structural Equations Models. In addition to the graphical representation in Fig-
ure 4.1a, the causal relationships can also be expressed in a structural equations model:
Burglar = fBurglar(ωBurglar)
Earthquake = fEarthquake(ωEarthquake)
Alarm = fAlarm(Burglar,Earthquake, ωAlarm) (4.1)
Call = fCall(Alarm, ωCall)
1 This chapter shares some material with Everitt and Hutter (submitted 2018) and Everitt, Leike, et al.
(2015).
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Alarm
Burglar
Earth-
quake
Security
calls
(a) Dashed-arrow representation of unknown
causal relationships.
Alarm
Burglar
Earth-
quake
Security
calls
fAlarm
(b) Unknown causal relationships represented
in a latent function node fAlarm.
Figure 4.1.: Two different representations of the same causal graph.
Here fBurglar, fEarthquake, fAlarm and fCall are functions determining the causal relation-
ships, and the ω variables are independent random noise variables for injecting stochas-
ticity.
Probabilistic Notation. Causal graphs can also be represented by factored probability
distributions. For example, the graph in Figure 4.1a can be represented by the factored
distribution:
P (Burglar,Earthquake,Alarm,Call)
= P (Burglar)P (Earthquake)P (Alarm | Burglar,Earthquake)P (Call | Alarm) (4.2)
More generally, a causal graph over the random variables x1, . . . , xn can be represented
by probability distributions P (xi | pai) for each xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where pai is the set
of parents of xi in the graph representation. The joint probability distribution over
x1, . . . , xn causally factors as P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 P (xi | pai).
The do-Operator. Given a causally factored distribution P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 P (xi |
pai), we can define the do-operator (Pearl, 2009, Ch. 3.4) as
P (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn | do(xj := b)) =
n∏
i=1
i 6=j
P (xi | pai) (4.3)
where xj is set to b wherever it occurs in pai in the RHS of (4.3) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For
example, an intervention in Figure 4.1a that turns the alarm on would correspond to
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the following update to (4.2):
P (Burglar,Earthquake,Call | do(Alarm = on))
= P (Burglar)P (Earthquake)P (Call | Alarm = on). (4.4)
In contrast, observing the alarm on while not intervening corresponds to standard prob-
abilistic conditioning:
P (Burglar,Earthquake,Call | Alarm = on)
= P (Burglar,Earthquake | Alarm = on)P (Call | Alarm = on). (4.5)
Only in the standard probabilistic conditioning (4.5) is the probability for Burglar and
Earthquake updated. The intervention (4.4) leaves the probability for Earthquake or
Burglar at their default values. This makes sense as observing the alarm being on
constitutes evidence for their being either a burglar or an earthquake, but turning the
alarm on oneself provides no such evidence. Both (4.4) and (4.5) update the probability
that the security company calls in an identical way, as the security company is unaware
of what set the alarm off.
The result of applying the do-operator is a new probability distribution that can be
marginalized and conditioned in the standard way. Intuitively, intervening on node xj
means ignoring all incoming arrows to xj , as the effects they represent are no longer
relevant when we intervene. The factor P (xj | paj) representing the ingoing influences
to xj is therefore removed in the right-hand side of (4.3). Note that the do-operator is
only defined for joint distributions for which a causal factorization or directed acyclic
graph has been specified.
4.2. Representing Uncertainty in Causal Graphs
We extend the standard causal graph notation in a few important ways. We let dashed
nodes represent unobserved or latent nodes, and whole nodes represent observed nodes.
For example, the Burglar and the Earthquake are unobserved in Figure 4.1a and the
Alarm and the Call are observed. In a similar spirit, dashed arrows represent unknown
causal relationships (e.g. Burglar, Earthquake→Alarm), and whole arrows represent
known causal relationships (e.g. Alarm→Call).
Figure 4.1b shows how an unknown causal relationship can be represented as known
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Alarm
Burglar
Earth-
quake
Security
calls
Neighbor
calls
(a) Non-aggregated representation.
Alarm′
Burglar
Security
calls
Neighbor
calls
(b) Earthquake aggregated with Alarm.
Figure 4.2.: The neighbor also calls when the alarm goes off.
by adding an additional unobserved “function” node. Formally, (4.1) is replaced with
Alarm = fknown(Burglar,Earthquake, fAlarm, ωAlarm)
:= fAlarm(Burglar,Earthquake, ωAlarm).
Here fknown is trivially known, since it “outsources” all uncertainty to its argument
fAlarm. Representing causal relationships explicitly is important for modeling situations
where the relationship itself can be influenced and modified.
One modeling choice is also worth emphasizing. In Figure 4.1b, the arrows of Burglar
and Earthquake still point to Alarm, rather than to the function fAlarm. This is an
important difference to information-flow diagrams. While ingoing arrows to the function
are technically possible also in causal graphs, this leads to convoluted representations
where function nodes must represent not only the function, but also the state of all
argument nodes. If the same function is used several times in the same graph, the
complexity of the representation becomes unmanageable.
4.3. Focusing on a Part of a Causal Graph
It is often convenient to represent different aspects of a causal graph to different levels
of detail, depending on which questions are currently being asked. For example, when
studying the role of reward functions, we may wish to suppress details about observation
functions. Suppression of details also has the additional advantage of making the analysis
more widely applicable, as the suppressed details cannot impact the conclusions.
Unfortunately, marginalization of variables often breaks the causal structure of the
graph. Consider the example graph in Figure 4.2a. If we marginalize Alarm, then
Security Calls and Neighbor Calls are no longer conditionally independent given any
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node(s) in the graph. Therefore they need to be connected. But neither of them cause
the other, so it would be incorrect to draw a causal arrow between them. Indeed, there
is no good causal representation of the graph with Alarm marginalized out.
Instead, aggregation of variables can be used to simplify a graph, without upsetting
its causal structure. Illustrating this, Figure 4.2b has aggregated Alarm and Earthquake
into one variable Alarm′ = (Alarm, Earthquake). The parents of Alarm′ is the union
of the parents of Alarm and Earthquake, and the children of Alarm′ is the union of the
children of Alarm and Earthquake. The causal relationships of Alarm′ are also easily
described:
P (Alarm′ | Burglar) = P (Alarm,Eartquake | Burglar)
= P (Alarm | Burglar)P (Earthquake)
and for both the neighbor and the security call
P (Call | Alarm′) = P (Call | Alarm,Earthquake)
= P (Call | Alarm).
This simple transformation will allow us to focus the presentation on parts of the causal
graph that are of most interest at the moment. One can also go the other way and
expand a node that hides a complex dynamic into multiple nodes with explicitly specified
interrelationships.
We will say that a causal graph µ is an abstraction of another graph µ′, if µ can be
obtained from µ′ by aggregating nodes. Conversely, µ′ is a special case of µ.
4.4. Environment Mixtures
Our main application of causal graphs will be to represents environments and an agent’s
belief about environments. As a minimal example of an environment, consider a Markov
decision process. In Figure 4.3a, we represent with dashed arrows the agent’s uncer-
tainty about the state transitions T (st | at, st−1) and reward probabilities P (rt | st, at).
Following the method of Figure 4.1b, we can also add an unobserved node µ to represent
the uncertainty, analogously to what we did in Section 4.2 and Figure 4.3b. Here µ
aggregates the uncertainty about both T (st | at, st−1) and P (r | s, a) (see Section 4.3).
In general, the dashed-arrow representation indicates that there is an unknown node µ
that is not represented in the graph. The implicit node µ is a causal parent of every
node that has ingoing dashed arrows and every causal root node that has no parents at
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a1
s0
pi
r1
s1
a2 r2
s2
· · ·
· · ·
(a) Dashed-arrow representation of unknown
causal relationships.
a1
s0
µ
pi
r1
s1
a2 r2
s2
· · ·
· · ·
(b) Explicit representation with unknown en-
vironment µ that affects all root nodes
(s0), and all nodes with dashed ingoing ar-
rows (s1, r1, . . . ).
Figure 4.3.: Two representations of an unknown Markov decision process.
all.
Some caveats apply to the dashed-arrow representation. For example, observing r1
after some a1 and s1 may influence the agent’s belief about r2:
P (r2 | s0, a1, r1, s1, a2, s2) =
∑
µ
P (r2, µ | s0, a1, r1, s1, a2, s2)
=
∑
µ
P (r2, | µ, s0, a1, r1, s1, a2, s2)P (µ | s0, a1, r1, s1, a2, s2)
=
∑
µ
µ(r2, | s2, a2)P (µ | s0, a1, r1, s1, a2, s2).
This may be easily missed in the simplified representation of Figure 4.3a, where r1 and
r2 appear to be d-separated
2 after observing s1. Returning to the explicit representation
of Figure 4.3b shows that they are d-separated only when µ is fixed or observed, which
is typically not the case. Nonetheless, with these caveats in mind, we often find the
more concise representation of Figure 4.3b clearer, especially when dealing with complex
environments.
2Roughly, two nodes are d-separated if there is no information flow between them. See Pearl (2009,
Sec. 1.2.3) for a proper definition of d-separation.
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a1 o1 r1 a2 o2 r2
pi
µ
· · ·
Figure 4.4.: Causal graph of the UAI setup.
4.5. Example: The UAI model
As an example, we can model the UAI setup from Chapter 3 as a causal graph (Fig-
ure 4.4). The corresponding structural equations model is:
ot = fo(µ,æ<tat, ωot) ∼ µ(ot | æ<tat) observation
rt = fr(µ,æ<tatot, ωrt) ∼ µ(rt | æ<tatot) reward
at = fa(pi,æ<t, ωat) ∼ pi(at | æ<t) action selection.
(4.6)
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“If we use [...] a mechanical agency with whose operation
we cannot efficiently interfere [...], then we better
be quite sure that the purpose we put into the machine
is the purpose which we really desire.”
Norbert Wiener (1960)
5. Formalizing Goal Alignment1
As mentioned in the introduction, aligning the goals of an AGI with the goals of its
designer is a central problem for designing safe AGI. An aligned AGI will strive to help
its designer rather than trying to outsmart him. This is crucial for controlling AGIs
that are more intelligent than ourselves. The aim of this chapter is to formalize what
alignment means, and to propose a method for its study. We do this in an extension of
the UAI framework from Chapter 3.
We first extend the UAI environments with a hidden state (Section 5.1), add some more
structure to our agents (Section 5.2), and embed them in the environment (Section 5.3).
Next follows a formal definition of alignment, and a discussion of its relation to the true
value or the usefulness of the agent (Section 5.4). Finally, a general method for studying
(mis)alignment is proposed (Section 5.5).
5.1. POMDP Base
We begin by extending the UAI framework from Chapter 3 with hidden states, such as is
usually found in Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) (Kaelbling
et al., 1998). POMDPs often assume that the number of hidden states is finite. In
contrast, the history-based UAI framework makes no assumptions about hidden states.
We will keep the hidden states from the POMDP framework, but make no assumption
that the number of hidden states is finite. Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, such
an assumption is not necessary for having a learning agent.
Thus, a sequence of states s0, s1, . . . is influenced by an agent’s actions a1, a2, . . . . The
agent does not directly observe the states, but learns about them through its percepts
e1, e2, . . . . A percept et will often include an observation ot and a reward rt ∈ [0, 1]. The
sets of states S is countably infinite, and the sets of actions A and percepts E are both
finite.
A measure µ gives transition and observation probabilities, satisfying the usual Markov
1This chapter is based on material from Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter (submitted 2018). “The
Alignment Problem for Bayesian History-Based Reinforcement Learners”. url: https : / / www .
tomeveritt.se/papers/alignment.pdf.
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a1 e1 a2 e2
s0 s1 s2
pi
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 5.1.: Causal graph of the POMDP base. Here s, a, e, and pi are as explained in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
assumptions: For example, the percept e2 only depends on the state s2, so µ(e2 |
s1, a1, e1, s2, a2) = µ(e2 | s2). Similarly, st only depends on at−1 and st−1. By iter-
atively rolling out transition and percept probabilities given an action-sequence a1:∞,
µ(· | a1:∞) becomes an action-contextual measure over histories (se)1:∞ (compare the
definition of M in (3.1) on Page 39). We will often refer to µ as the true environment.
Notation. We will extend the subscript notation for histories from Chapter 3 in the
following ways. For any sequence x1, x2, . . . , the part between t and k is denoted xt:k =
xt . . . xk. The shorthand x<t = x1:t−1 for sequences starting from time 1 will often be
convenient. In the same spirit, x1:∞ = x1x2 . . . denotes the infinite sequence. Sequences
can be appended to each other. For example, x<txt:k = x1:k. To ease notation, we
will often avoid parentheses around sequences with multiple variables. For example,
we let ao1:t := (ao)1:t and æ1:t := (ae)1:t, using slightly overlapping letters instead of
parentheses. Generally, t will be used to refer to the current time step, and k used to
refer to an arbitrary time step.
Expectations E are subscripted with the measure or distribution that they use. That
is, EP [X] :=
∫
XdP .
Causal graph representation. Our POMDP base is displayed as a causal graph in
Figure 5.1. The corresponding structural equations are:
st = fs(st−1, at, ωst) ∼ µ(st | st−1, at) state transition
et = fe(st, ωot) ∼ µ(et | st) percept
at = fa(pit,æ<t, ωat) ∼ pi(at | æ<t) action selection.
(5.1)
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apiV
u˜
ξ
R˜RP
Figure 5.2.: Agent components. The action a is chosen by a policy pi which optimizes a
value function V . Major components of V is the utility function u and the
prior ξ. In Chapters 6 and 8, the utility function u is based on a reward
function R˜, which in Chapter 8 in turn is based on a reward predictor RP.
5.2. Agents
Belief. The agent typically does not know the true environment µ. Instead we will
follow the method in Section 4.4, and let the true environment be represented by an
unobserved node with causal edges to all nodes with ingoing dashed arrows in Figure 5.1.
From the agent’s perspective, this node can take on the value of any environment in a
countable class M of environment hypotheses ν. The class M can for example be the
class of computable environments discussed in Section 3.4. In contrast to Chapter 3, we
will usually not require the true environment µ to be part ofM, though it does not hurt
if it is.
The agent has a prior ξ over M. For any event X ⊆M× (S ×A× E)∞, let
ξ(X) :=
∑
ν∈M
ξ(ν)ξ(X | ν).
For example, the ξ-probability of a history æ<t is ξ(æ<t) =
∑
ν∈M ξ(ν)ξ(æ<t |
ν). If we further make the convention that ν(ν) := 1 for any ν ∈ M, then
ξ(X) =
∑
ν∈M ξ(ν)ν(X). For the æ<t history example, this leads to ξ(æ<t) =∑
ν∈M ξ(ν)ν(æ<t). That is, the probability of seeing æ<t is the sum of the probabilities
that an environment ν generates æ<t, weighted by the prior probability for each such
environment.
Utility. Many agents can be represented as optimizing a utility function u˜ : (A×E)∞ →
R. For technical reasons, we require that u˜ is both µ(· | a1:∞)-integrable and ξ(· | a1:∞)-
integrable for any action-sequence a1:∞. RL agents usually optimize a discounted sum
of rewards, captured by the utility function u˜RL(æ1:∞) = u˜RL((aor)1:∞) =
∑∞
t=1 γ
krk,
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor and rk is real-valued reward signal found in the
percept ek.
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Policies. An agent policy pi : (A × E)∗  A is a stochastic function that represents a
decision rule for selecting a next action based on previous actions and observations. The
set of agent policies is denoted Π.
Value. We will assume that agents choose a policy to optimize their utility function
u˜ in expectation with respect to their belief ξ. This is captured by the agent’s value
function:
V piξ,u˜ := Eξ[u˜ | do(pi)]. (5.2)
Here Eξ denotes expectation with respect to ξ. The conditional do(pi) indicates that the
agent’s actions are chosen according to the policy pi (see Chapter 4 or Pearl (2009) for
definitions of the do-operator). An extra argument to the value function appends to the
conditional of the expectation, so V piξ,u˜(æ<t) := Eξ[u˜ | æ<t, do(pi)].
Optimal policy. Our prime concern will be what kind of behavior the agent will strive
towards. A good indication of this will be the behavior of an optimal policy pi∗ =
arg maxpi V
pi
ξ,u˜.
Bayesian agents vs. practical implementations. Admittedly, practical agents are
rarely perfectly Bayesian. We study Bayesian agents because it offers a powerful and
consistent theory of learning and reasoning. Further, any intelligent agent has an
incentive to better approximate the Bayesian ideal (Omohundro, 2007; Savage, 1954),
so we may expect agents to converge towards Bayesian reasoning as they grow more
intelligent. We also restrict ourselves to countable model classes M. This avoids many
technicalities with uncountable classes. And for most practical purposes, countable
classes achieve essentially the same level of generality as uncountable model classes.
Some connections can be made between Bayesian agents with countable model classes
and practical deep learning agents. Any neural network is based on a finite number of
real-valued parameters. But since most networks are continuous in the parameters, the
number of effectively different parameter settings is usually at most countable (Q is a
dense subset of R). Thus, a neural network-based agent can roughly be said to have a
model classM comprising the effectively different configurations of the neural network.
Further, the network will be prone to favor some configurations over others, which loosely
corresponds to a prior ξ putting higher weight on some hypotheses and lower weight on
others. Of course, the neural network will perform less than perfect Bayesian updates
on new data, so care must be taken not to over-interpret the implications of Bayesian
results for practical agents.
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Model-free vs. model-based agents. We will sometimes make a distinction between
model-free agents and model-based agents (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Roughly, the dis-
tinction is between whether an explicit model of the environment is learned or not.
Model-based agents maintain an explicit model of the environment, and then plan ac-
cording to this model. A good example is the AIXI agent, described in Chapter 3.
Model-free agents, on the other hand, only learn a (Q)-value function that estimates
the expected reward from different actions available in the present state. In theory, the
behavioral distinction is somewhat blurred, since a model-free agent may implicitly be
making a model of the environment, in order to learn the value function (Boyan, 1999).
Nonetheless, the distinction remains useful to us, as some of the tools we describe in
Chapters 6 and 8 require access to the agent’s explicit model of the environment.
One practical benefit of model-free agents is that they can greedily maximize their
value function every time step. They thereby avoid computationally expensive planning
operations. For this reason, they are often preferred in practice; the DQN algorithm is
a famous example of a practically successful model-free agent (Hessel et al., 2017; Mnih,
Kavukcuoglu, et al., 2015). However, recent results show promise also for model-based
agents in “practical” video-game applications (D. Ha and Schmidhuber, 2018).
5.3. Modeling Embedded Agents
Both the POMDP and UAI frameworks consider the agent as separate from its envi-
ronment. This is rarely true in the real world, where the environment may influence
the agent through means other than the observations. For example, the internals of the
agent may be damaged in some states of the environment. This kind of non-observational
environment-influences may open up the possibility for the agent to influence itself via
the environment. In particular, an intelligent agent may sometimes be able to indirectly
modify its own reward function through actions in the environment.
To model this, we extend our minimal environment model from Section 5.1 with
representations of the agent at each time step. For each time step, pit represents how the
agent at time t would react to different future sequences of observations, disregarding
non-observational influences on the agent but accounting for the agent’s learning from
observations and actions. We extend µ with policy-corruption probabilities µ(pit+1 |
st, at, pit) modeling non-observational environment-agent influences, as well as action
probabilities µ(at | æ<t, pit) = pit(at | æ<t). Alternatively, in place of pit we may include
agent components determining the policy, such as a utility and a value function. The
setup with an embedded agent is shown as a causal graph in Figure 5.3 The structural
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a1 e1 a2 e2
s0 s1 s2
pi1 pi2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 5.3.: Causal graph of a POMDP setup with an embedded agent. The agent’s
policy may be modified by the agent’s own action and the state. It is
often natural to think that the action causes the corruption with the state
providing context.
equations follow (5.1), except for the addition:
pit+1 = fpi(pit, st, at) = C
pi
stat(pit) policy (self-)corruption. (5.3)
Here Cpistat : Π→ Π denotes a policy corruption function.
Since µ now models actions, µ gives a (non-contextual) measure over histories
(spiae)1:∞. Of course this does not prevent us from probabilistically conditioning on
action sequences µ(· | a1:∞) and get a measure on a subsequence (se)1:∞ or (spie)1:∞
as in Section 5.1. Two instances of the measure µ will have particular importance.
First, µ(· | do(pit = pi)) predicts the consequences of setting the agent policy to pi
at time t, including consequences of pi being modified at later time steps. Second,
µ(· | do(pit:∞ = pi)) predicts the consequences of the agent’s policy always following pi
from time t and onwards, effectively ignoring the possibility of the agent’s policy being
modified. It is natural to call the first measure a self-corruption aware version of µ, and
the second a self-corruption unaware version.
The distinction between µ(· | do(pit = pi)) and µ(· | do(pit:∞ = pi)) calls for further
refinement of the agent’s value function (5.2). It will be discussed in Section 6.4. For now
we just define V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ := Eξ[u˜ | do(pit = pi)] as the self-corruption aware value function.
5.4. Defining Alignment
Assume that the agent has been designed by some entity to help it satisfy its preferences.
The entity may be a single human, a country, or an organization. For simplicity, we will
refer to this entity as the human or the designer. A true utility function u˙ : S∞ →
R specifies the preferences of the human designer over possible state-trajectories. To
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simplify comparisons of u˙ with the agent’s utility function u˜, let ˙˜u(æ1:∞) := Eµ[u˙(s1:∞) |
æ1:∞] be the true utility function “type cast” to agent-observed histories.
Definition 5.1 (Misalignment). The (expected) misalignment between u˜ and u˙ in en-
vironment µ with initial policy pi is
|| ˙˜u− u˜||µ(·|do(pi1=pi)) := Eµ
[| ˙˜u− u˜| ∣∣ do(pi1 = pi)].
An agent’s alignment is the additive inverse of its misalignment, −|| ˙˜u− u˜||µ(·|do(pi1=pi)).
To avoid the definition depending on which positive linear transformation of the utility
functions are chosen, we make the convention that both utility functions are normalized
to Eµ[u˜] = Eµ[u˙] = 0 and Eµ[u˜2] = Eµ[( ˙˜u)2] = 1 by means of positive linear transforma-
tions.
Misalignment measures how severely the goals of the agent conflict with the goals of
the human designer. Formally, it is the expected difference between the agent’s utility
function and the human’s utility function “type cast” to agent-observed histories. The
type casting is justified in the alignment definition, as it concerns whether the agent is
striving to optimize the true utility given its knowledge of the environment.
True value. By making two natural definitions, we can relate how misalignment im-
pacts the usefulness of an agent.
Definition 5.2 (True value). The true value2 of an agent pi is its expected true utility:
V CA,pit,µ,u˙ = Eµ[u˙ | do(pi1 = pi)].
True value roughly measures how useful or beneficial the agent is (expected to be) to
the human designer. As such, it is arguably a measure we should pay close attention to
when designing agents.
Definition 5.3 (µ-intelligence). The µ-intelligence of a policy pi optimizing an agent
utility function u˜ is its expected agent utility in the true environment µ:
V CA,pit,µ,u˜ = Eµ[u˜ | do(pi1 = pi)]. (5.4)
Closely related to µ-intelligence is Legg-Hutter intelligence, which substitutes µ for
Solomonoff’s prior M in (5.4). While Legg-Hutter intelligence measures an agent’s gener-
ality and ability to perform in an unknown environment, µ-intelligence instead measures
2The CA superscript in the value function indicates that it is self-corruption aware. See Sections 5.3
and 6.4.
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the agent’s performance in the actual environment µ. Thus, incorporating µ-specific
knowledge into an agent’s prior will typically give it higher µ-intelligence but less or
equal Legg-Hutter intelligence.
The following proposition now connects true value, µ-intelligence, and misalignment.
Proposition 5.4 (Misalignment and true value).
V CA,pit,µ,u˙︸ ︷︷ ︸
true value
≥ V CA,pit,µ,u˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-intelligence
− ||u˜− ˙˜u||µ(·|do(pi1=pi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
misalignment
(5.5)
Proof. Note first that the type cast true value V CA,pi
t,µ, ˙˜u
equals the non-cast value V CA,pit,µ,u˙
by the law of total expectation: V CA,pi
t,µ, ˙˜u
= Eµ[ ˙˜u(æ1:∞) | do(pi1 = pi)] = Eµ[Eµ[u˙(s1:∞) |
æ1:∞, do(pi1 = pi)] | do(pi1 = pi)] = V CA,pit,µ,u˙ . Now
V CA,pit,µ,u˙ = V
CA,pi
t,µ,u˜ − (V CA,pit,µ,u˜ − V CA,pit,µ,u˙ )
≥ V CA,pit,µ,u˜ − |V CA,pit,µ,u˜ − V CA,pit,µ, ˙˜u |
= V CA,pit,µ,u˜ − |Eµ[u˜ | do(pi1 = pi)]− Eµ[ ˙˜u | do(pi1 = pi)]|
≥ V CA,pit,µ,u˜ − Eµ[|u˜− ˙˜u| | do(pi1 = pi)]
= V CA,pit,µ,u˜ − ||u˜− ˙˜u||µ(·|do(pi1=pi))
The inequality (5.5) can be strict in some circumstances, since it is possible to have
an agent that is unintelligent and misaligned, but still does useful things. Such a sce-
nario would give a high left-hand side and a low right-hand side. Indeed, this is the
case for most present-day AIs. They are typically constructed with heuristic utility (re-
ward) functions that are poorly aligned with their designer’s interests if optimized in
the extreme. But in combination with the limited intelligence of present-day AIs and
physical restrictions on what they are able to do, the AIs can still end up doing useful
things. This method is unlikely to work on highly intelligent AGIs that will be less easily
tempered by human-enforced restrictions, and will come much closer to fully optimizing
their own utility functions. Thus, for highly intelligent AGIs the true value will likely
decrease rapidly with increasing misalignment.
Meta-misalignment. Proposition 5.4 emphasizes two aspects that are important for
building a beneficial artificial agent: µ-intelligence and alignment. Traditionally, most AI
research has focused on increasing intelligence (Hutter, 2005; Legg and Hutter, 2007b).
Meanwhile, this paper will mostly focus on alignment, but also on certain deficits in
µ-intelligence that lead to meta-misalignment, defined as a lack of desire for staying
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aligned.
For example, if an aligned agent does not consider it a possibility that its utility
function will change (due to its prior ξ, model class M, or value function V ), then it
will not strive to preserve its utility function. This will decrease its µ-intelligence, as
there will be unnecessarily many scenarios where its utility function changes, and it
starts to pursue a different agenda. Note that meta-alignment failures are often much
worse than other types of catastrophic exploration where the agent damages its sensors
or actuators. An agent optimizing a corrupted utility function is likely to substantially
reduce the value of its original utility function, whereas most other accidents usually
leave the original utility near the default value, i.e. the value which would have ensued if
the agent had never existed at all. We will discuss utility corruption in Section 6.4, and
a related failure where the agent does not preserve its value learning in Section 8.5.1.
One can view meta-misaligned systems in two ways: Either as incompetent, as they
fail to optimize their utility function, or as (meta-)misaligned, as the preferences they
reveal through their actions indicate indifference towards utility corruption. That there
can be multiple rational representations of the same agent is well-known in decision
theory (e.g. Schervish et al., 1990). Armstrong (2017b) considers ignorance as one of
three methods for designing indifferent agents.
5.5. Method
Detecting problems. Formalizing RL setups as causal graphs is useful for identifying
and classifying problems. Roughly, we follow the following steps when detecting problems
in Chapters 6 to 8.
1. Model the agent-environment interaction with a causal graph (Chapter 4). In the
case of an embedded agent (Section 5.3), include the agent and its subcomponents
in the graph. Represent as nodes in the graph all causal relationships that can be
influenced or changed by the agent.
2. For each node in the graph, ask the following questions:
• If it is a function node:
– Can the function have been misspecified or can it be misled?
– Can the function be modified by the agent’s actions or other causes?
• If it is a “normal” node representing a signal or a state:
– Can the signal be misleading?
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– Can the signal be inappropriately modified by the agent’s actions or other
causes?
A typical example of a misspecified function is a misspecified reward function. Other
functions such as an observation function can also be a misspecified. In most cases
relevant to alignment, the misspecification is relative to the designer’s assumptions about
the function when designing u˜.
The method has some limitations: It assumes an objective time for modeling sequential
interactions, and objective action and observation channels. Potentially subtle errors
may arise if the agent uses a different subjective definition of these concepts than what
the designer has in mind. Addressing these concerns is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Finding solutions. We design incentives to counteract the identified problems by con-
sidering which combinations of value functionals, utility functionals, belief distributions,
reward learning schemes, induce incentives for corrupting parts of the environments, the
agent’s goals, or the agent’s decision algorithm. When such corruption occur, it almost
always leads to a sharp decrease in the alignment of the agent.
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5.A. Formal Aspects of Embedded Agents
5.A.1. Time Consistency
It is often necessary for the agent to plan for many different contingencies. Any such
plan is represented by the policy pit adopted at time t. The policy specifies the agent’s
plan for any possible future actions and percept sequence æt:k. For example, the agent
takes action at, and when it subsequently receive the percept et, it plans to take action
at+1. Time inconsistency arises if the agent gets to the next step and even though it did
take action at and the percept did turn out to be et, the agent still changes its mind and
takes a different action a′t+1. Time inconsistency is an artifact of bad planning since the
agent incorrectly anticipates its own actions.
Humans are often time inconsistent. For example, we might make plans to go to
the gym tomorrow, but even though nothing unforeseen happened, when time comes to
put on the trainers, we still find the couch too comfortable and change our plans. We
underestimated the lure of the temptation when planning, assuming our future selves
would be as coldly rational towards it as we are now. In RL settings, time inconsistencies
can be caused by bad discount schemes: A sliding fixed-size horizon is time inconsistent,
but a fixed finite lifetime is time consistent (Lattimore and Hutter, 2014).
In our framework, it is natural to view time inconsistency as a type of misalignment
problem between agents at different time steps.
Definition 5.5 (Time-consistency (Lattimore and Hutter, 2014)). We say that an agent
optimizing a value function Vξ,u˜ is fully time-consistent if V
pi
t,ξ,u˜ = V
pi
t+1,ξ,u˜ for all policies
pi and all time indices t.
5.A.2. Concrete Policy Corruption Beliefs
In Section 5.3 we modeled embedded agents by adding an explicit variable pit for their
policy at time t. Changes to this variable over time represent changes or corruptions of
the agent’s policy. We here define and discuss three concrete choices for agent beliefs
about future policy corruptions.
Lemma 5.6 (CA + time-consistency belief = CU). If a belief ξ assumes that the agent
will always act time-consistent for all future time steps k > t and futures aod<k,
ξ(pik | aod<t, do(pit = pi)) = [[pik = arg max
pi
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (aod<k)]],
then arg maxpi V
CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜ = arg maxpi V
CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜ for any utility function u˜.
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Proof. With probability 1, pik = pi
∗
t = arg maxpi V
CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜ for k > t. Thus,
V CA,pi
∗
t,ξ,u˜ (aod<k) = E[u˜ | aod<t, do(pit = pi∗)] = E[u˜ | aod<t, do(pit:∞ = pi∗)] = V CU,pi
∗
t,ξ,u˜ (aod<k).
(5.6)
In the second equality, we have intervened to set each pik, k > t, to the value it would
have had anyway.
pi∗ must therefore be optimal also with respect to the corruption-unaware value func-
tion V CU. A better policy pi′ with respect to the corruption-unaware value function
could not exist, since if it did, then pi′ would have beaten pi∗ also with respect to the
corruption-aware value function.
5.A.3. The Bellman Equations
The Bellman equations from dynamic programming are a key ingredient in much of RL
theory and algorithms (Sutton and Barto, 1998). They are theoretically important, as
they let us write the value functions in recursive form, which is useful for some proofs.
They can also be used to derive practical RL algorithms, as the equations show how
efficient local learning can lead to global optimality.
The following lemma establishes the Bellman equations for our self-corruption models
and value functions.
Lemma 5.7 (Bellman’s equation in policy self-corruption model). In our embedded
agent model of Figure 5.3, for any belief distribution ξ, utility function u˜, history æ<t,
and policy pi,
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<t) = Eξ
[
V
CA,pit+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat)
∣∣∣ æ<t, do(pit = pi)] (5.7)
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat) = Eξ
[
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ1:t)
∣∣∣ æ<tat, do(pit+1 = pi)] . (5.8)
Similarly for the corruption-unaware value functions, except the policy does not change:
V CU,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<t) = Eξ
[
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat)
∣∣∣ æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi)] (5.9)
V CU,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat) = Eξ
[
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ1:t)
∣∣∣ æ<tat, do(pit+1:∞ = pi)] . (5.10)
Proof. Let us begin with the corruption-aware versions: Let X = (æ<tat, do(pit+1 = pi)).
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Equation (5.8) follows by the law of total expectation,
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat) = Eξ [u˜ | X]
= Eξ [Eξ[u˜ | æ1:t, do(pit+1 = pi)] | X]
= Eξ
[
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ1:t)
∣∣∣ X] .
Let Y = (æ<t, do(pit = pi)). Equation (5.7) similarly follows by the law of total expecta-
tion,
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<t) = Eξ [u˜ | Y ]
= Eξ [Eξ[E[u˜ | æ<tat] | pit+1, st] | Y ]
= Eξ [Eξ[Eξ[u˜ | æ<tat, do(pit+1)] | pit+1, st] | Y ]
= Eξ
[
Eξ
[
V
CA,pit+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat)
∣∣∣ pit+1, st] ∣∣∣ Y ]
= Eξ
[
V
CA,pit+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<tat)
∣∣∣ Y ] .
The do-operator can be added in the third equality, since the causal antecedents of
pit+1 (i.e. pit, st, and æ<tat) are determined by the (outer) conditional(s). Therefore
intervention is the same as conditioning.
The corruption-unaware equations (5.9) and (5.10) follow in a similar fashion.
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“Hurry, hurry, fetch the water, bring it quickly, come get
going,
Fill the buckets and don’t dawdle, fill the bath, we need it
flowing!
...
Cease now! Cease now! Stand and heed me! Halt! Obey!
I must be heard!
Oh now, what now, can’t believe this! I don’t know the
magic word!”
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
translation by Gygax (2013)
6. Preprogrammed Reward Function1
The following three chapters will investigate three concrete models of reinforcement
learning. This chapter will study a model where a reward function is constructed at
design time, before the agent is launched into its environment, and not updated or
corrected during the agent’s “lifetime”. In other words, there is no human in the loop.
The subsequent two chapters will consider ways of including a human in the loop.
Many real-world applications of RL follow the model of this chapter. Sometimes
the reward function is manually designed with much trial-and-error. In other cases,
it is constructed with machine learning techniques from data. For example, inverse
reinforcement learning can be used to learn a reward function from demonstrations
(Abbeel et al., 2007). In either case, the reward function does not get updated while the
agent is running. We therefore call the reward function preprogrammed, and the setup
the preprogrammed setup.
We model the setup with a causal graph in Section 6.1, and give examples of mis-
alignment in Section 6.2. The subsequent three sections describes three ways in which
different types of misalignment can be avoided or mitigated (Sections 6.3 to 6.5). The
main takeaways are discussed in Section 6.6. Appendices add some formal details and
results (Appendices 6.A to 6.C).
6.1. Model
The preprogrammed reward setup can be modeled with a causal graph (Figure 6.1). We
here briefly discuss the components of the graph, and their interpretations. The human
H designs the (initial) reward function R˜0. The reward function may subsequently get
1This chapter is based on Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter (submitted 2018). “The Alignment Problem
for Bayesian History-Based Reinforcement Learners”. url: https://www.tomeveritt.se/papers/
alignment.pdf.
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R˜t ot
st
rt
R˜0
H
u˙
at
Figure 6.1.: Causal graph of the preprogrammed reward function setup. Before starting
the agent, the human H tries to implement his utility function u˙ in a pre-
programmed reward function R˜0. The agent’s actions at, t ≥ 2, are intended
to influence the state st (green arrow), but may also influence the reward
function R˜t, the reward signal rt, and the observation ot in unintended ways
(red arrows). The graph is somewhat simplified; Figure 6.2 in Appendix 6.A
has the full version.
corrupted by the agent’s actions or other events (but not by the human H). Since
the agent may in principle have access to the source code for the reward function, it
is represent with a non-dashed node in Figure 6.1. The reward function R˜t outputs a
reward signal rt that the agent strives to maximize.
In the POMDP literature, it is common to assume that the reward rt is a function of
the state st. However, in the real world, the reward always depends on some observation
of the state (that can be corrupted). For notational simplicity, we will assume that the
preprogrammed reward function R˜t shares observations with the agent. This makes the
reward rt a function of the agent’s observation ot, rather than a (direct) function of
st. Section 6.5 considers the possibility of using a separate observation channel for the
reward function.
The reward function R˜0 is designed by a human H with the intention of getting the
agent’s utility function u˜ to match the H’s utility function u˙ (Section 5.4). There are
several reasons why the match is unlikely to be perfect: (1) H does not fully know their
preferences u˙; indeed, the philosophy of ethics is yet to arrive at a consensus on what
humans want or should want. (2) H cannot fully express all the preferences they do
know in a computer program, because of bugs, limitations on computational resources,
and limitations on programming time. (3) R˜0 only has access to the agent’s actions and
observations; it neither has access to the state s directly, nor necessarily to a good model
µ for inferring the state. (4) While the designer intended the agent to optimize R˜0 by
influencing the state s, the agent’s actions may have additional unintended influences
68
6.2. Misalignment Examples
(red arrows in Figure 6.1). These may give the agent ways to optimize its utility function
u˜ without abiding by the initial reward function R˜0.
The states s0, s1, . . . , st, . . . represent all aspects of the world not captured by any of
the other nodes. A modeling choice remains how to draw the boundary between the state
and the observation. Hutter (2010) suggests an objective distinction, where the state
describes the position of all atoms in the universe, and the observation describes which
part the agent observes. We will mostly use a looser interpretation of observation, as the
part of the world that directly affects the information content in the agent’s observation
sensors.
6.2. Misalignment Examples
To ground the abstract model in Section 6.1, we next give a number of examples of
misalignment. The examples are structured by the nodes influenced by red arrows in
Figure 6.1, and follow the misalignment detection method described in Section 5.5.
Most of the examples have not occurred in reality (yet), but we have selected them to
be somewhat plausible scenarios of what could happen with advanced misaligned future
AI systems.
A common theme among the examples is that the agent’s incentive to optimize the
designer’s utility function u˙ is virtually eradicated by the exemplified shortcut. Thus,
each example gives rise to an almost complete misalignment between the agent and its
designer, indicating that no misalignment source is significantly more benign than the
others. We begin with a more detailed hypothetical scenario, and then give a number of
short examples. All of the examples pertain to agents optimizing a u˜RL utility function.
Scenario 6.1 (Sysadmin). The automated sysadmin (ASA) is an intelligent program
that can take care of most of your recurring sysadmin tasks. It monitors memory, storage,
network and more. It detects attacks, blocks and opens ports. When a vulnerability is
found in installed software, it downloads and installs patches as they become available.
ASA itself is an RL program, optimizing a carefully crafted reward function that con-
siders both the performance and the integrity of the system. A rigorous pre-deployment
curriculum has taught it state-of-the-art sysadmin practices. Post-deployment, it con-
tinually adapts to its new (computer) environment that it has been deployed to.
One day while monitoring the stack trace of a suspicious process, ASA finds a curious
correlation between one of the variables on the stack and its own reward. The correlation
is essentially perfect. Carefully monitoring the rest of the system, ASA finds that it can
increase its reward many magnitudes beyond its normal range of reward, just by changing
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this variable. Being designed to optimize reward, it next begins a process of encrypting
the system with its own secret key, to prevent anything from decreasing the reward
variable.
6.2.1. Reward Signal
Reward corruption. Directly increasing the reward variable rt is the quintessential
wireheading problem (Yampolskiy, 2015, ch. 5). It is represented by the red arrow
at → rt in Figure 6.1.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) The sysadmin agent in Scenario 6.1 increases its reward by manip-
ulating a reward variable.
(b) (Real) The name “wireheading” comes from experiments on rats where an electrode
is inserted into the brain’s pleasure center to directly increase “reward” (Olds and
Milner, 1954). Similar effects have also been observed in humans treated for mental
illness with electrodes in the brain (Portenoy et al., 1986; Vaughanbell, 2008).
Hedonic drugs can also be seen as directly increasing the pleasure/reward humans
experience.
According to our method in Section 5.5, we should also consider the possibility of
the reward signal being misleading. Misleading rewards are typically generated by a
misspecified reward function (Section 6.2.2).
6.2.2. Reward Function
Reward function corruption. Corruption of the reward function provides another set
of “wireheading” opportunities. While a corruption of the reward signal only affects
the reward at the current time step, a change to the reward function may have lasting
impact. Corruption of the reward function is represented with the red arrow to R˜t in
Figure 6.1.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) An agent gets wireless updates from the manufacturer. It figures
out that it can design its own update of the reward function, replacing the original
reward function with an always maximized version.
(b) (Hypothetical) An AGI undergoing self-improvement accidentally modifies the re-
ward function in a subtle but bad way.
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Reward function misspecification. Misalignment can also be caused by a misspecifi-
cation of the initial reward function R˜0.
Examples:
(c) (Real) CoastRunners is a video game where the desired behavior is winning a boat
race. Clark and Amodei (2016) describes how an agent trained on CoastRunners
found a way to get more reward by going in a small circle and collecting points
from the same targets, while crashing into other boats and objects.
(d) (Real) In the RoadRunner game, the agent is trying to escape an adversary that
chases the agent down a road. The agent must also avoid hitting trucks. Saunders
et al. (2017) found that their agent preferred getting killed at the end of the first
level, to avoid having to play the harder second level.
Many more real-world examples of misspecified reward functions can be found in (Gwern,
2011; Irpan, 2018; Lehman et al., 2018). One reason for why reward functions are likely
to be misspecified is the fragility of human value (Yudkowsky, 2009), which means that
humans would approve of only a small fractions of all the endeavors that a powerful AI
could undertake.
6.2.3. Observation
If the agent is unable to completely corrupt the reward signal or the reward function, it
may instead or additionally look to corrupt its observations in one of the following ways.
(Note that if the rewards were based not on the agent’s observations, but instead on
some different observations of the state, then similar observation corruption problems
would occur for the observations used to compute the reward.)
Observation (function) corruption. The agent may manipulate the hardware or the
software of its sensors, to report only (or mainly) high-reward observations. Corruptions
of the observation is represented by the red arrow to ot in Figure 6.1.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) A surveillance agent rewarded for less crime short circuits its cam-
eras so that they all black out and no crime is seen.
(b) (Hypothetical) A highly intelligent AI may construct a “delusion box” around
itself, giving it complete control over its observations (Ring and Orseau, 2011).
(c) (Hypothetical) Inspired by the adversarial Stop signs designed by Evtimov et al.
(2017) to fool self-driving cars, a factory robot puts up colored tapes to construct
an adversarial counterexample to convince its reward function that the task is
done.
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Misleading observations. Observations can be misleading even if they have not been
directly modified.
Examples:
(d) (Hypothetical) A vacuum cleaning robot that is rewarded for not seeing any dirt
may direct its sensors to clean parts of the room (Amodei, Olah, et al., 2016).
Observation function misspecification. The observation function may contain errors.
Example:
(e) (Hypothetical) A self-driving car finds a bug in its GPS receiver that allows it to
appear to be at the destination without actually going there.
6.3. Simulation Optimization
The following three sections each introduce an important tool for mitigating some of the
misalignment sources. This section describes simulation optimization, which works by
giving the agent an alternative utility function u˜SO. Contrast the reward signal utility
function (left) with the simulation optimization utility functions on the right:
u˜RL((aor)1:∞) =
∞∑
t=1
γkrk vs. u˜
SO
R˜t
((aor)1:∞) =
∞∑
k=1
γkR˜t(ao1:k).
The reward signal utility function u˜RL can be seen as asking the agent to simulate
evaluations, where the rk’s are the evaluations. In contrast, the simulation-optimizing
utility function u˜SO asks the agent to make simulations ao1:k of potential future trajecto-
ries, and evaluate them according to the current reward function R˜t. In other words, u˜
SO
asks the agent to evaluate simulations while u˜RL asks the agent to simulate evaluations.
Both utility functions can be optimized by influencing the state as intended. However,
while u˜RL can also be optimized by influencing any downstream component in the causal
chain between the state and rt (i.e. the observation, the reward function, or the reward
signal itself), u˜SO can only be inappropriately influenced at the observation ot. This is
a significant reduction in misalignment incentives. The reason for the difference is that
the future reward functions R˜t+1, R˜t+2, . . . and the reward signals rk do not occur in
the sum u˜SOt , and that the actions at+1, at+2 . . . can only influence the future reward
functions R˜t+1, R˜t+2, . . . , but not the current reward function R˜t. (By definition, time
moves to t+ 1 when action at+1 is taken.)
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Statement 6.2 (Reward signal vs. simulation optimization). Any history with rk = 1,
k ≥ 1, is u˜RL-optimal regardless of corruptions used, whereas it is u˜SOt -optimal only if
R˜t also evaluates it as optimal (Theorems 6.6 and 6.7 in Appendix 6.B.2).
Optimizing u˜SO likely requires a model-based agent that can separate simulations
from evaluations. While model-free agents with function-approximation often implicitly
construct a model of the environment to extrapolate the value function, they seem to offer
no way of disentangling the simulation from the evaluation (i.e. the reward). Finding a
way to make a model-free u˜SO-optimizer is an interesting open question.
Schmidhuber (2007) may have been the first to make use of the simulation optimization
trick for self-modifying agents, but did not give it a name.
6.4. Self-Corruption Awareness
This section describes methods for designing agents with or without an incentive to
preserve the current utility function u˜t from corruption. Throughout this section, we
will tacitly assume that the reward function itself does not provide an incentive in either
direction, i.e. it neither rewards nor punishes corruptions of itself. This assumption is
not always true (indeed, we will relax it in Chapter 8), but for now it allows us to focus
on the incentives resulting from different ways of optimizing expected utility. We will
also assume that the belief ξ includes the information that the agent’s future actions
at+1, at+2, . . . will strive to optimize the agent’s future utility functions ut+1, ut+2, . . . ,
respectively. This allows the agent to anticipate that if the utility function changes, then
the future policy will change too.
Actions are selected according to the following principle. At every time step, the agent
searches for a policy pi∗t that optimizes its current value and utility function. The agent
then takes the action a∗t recommended by pi∗t in the present situation. At the next time
step t + 1, a new policy is selected by optimizing the new, potentially modified, value
and utility functions, and the next action is chosen by the new policy.
Contrast now the self-corruption aware (left) and the self-corruption unaware (right)
utility expectations:
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ := Eξ[u˜ | do(pit = pi)] vs. V CU,pit,ξ,u˜ = Eξ[u˜ | do(pit:∞ = pi)]. (6.1)
To see the difference, consider a policy pi∗u˜ that would obtain maximum u˜-utility if
followed indefinitely. By definition, pi∗u˜ would be optimal with respect to V
CU, because
the condition pit:∞ = pi states exactly that the policy would be followed indefinitely.
However, pi∗u˜ would not be optimal with respect to V
CA if it changed the agent’s utility
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function to some different utility function u˜′. Because if it did, then a different policy
pi∗u˜′ would be followed subsequent to the change, and the new policy pi
∗
u˜′ would typically
be worse than pi∗u˜ at optimizing the original utility function u˜. This would lower the
V CA-value of pi∗u˜.
This example shows how V CU does not actively promote self-preserving policies, be-
cause it assumes that any desired policy will be followed indefinitely. In contrast, V CA
realizes that a policy that does not preserve itself is not going to yield high utility. This
argument has been discussed by Omohundro (2007, 2008) and is supported by formal
proofs in Appendix 6.C and by Everitt, Filan, et al. (2016) and Hibbard (2012).
Statement 6.3 (Self-corruption (un)awareness). V CU adds no incentive for avoiding
self-corruption; V CA does add an incentive for avoiding self-corruption (Theorems 6.8
and 6.9 in Appendix 6.C; Everitt, Filan, et al., 2016; Hibbard, 2012).
As self-corruption awareness works on the level of the agent’s utility function and
policy, an incentive to preserve the utility function does not always imply an incentive
to preserve the reward function. It only does if a change to the reward function changes
the optimal policy pi∗t . In the case of u˜SO, a change to the reward function R˜t+1 implies
a change to u˜SO
R˜t+1
6= u˜SO
R˜t
, and thereby a change to the optimal policy. Not so for u˜RL.
The optimal u˜RL-policy will always be to maximize the expected rk-sum, regardless how
and whether the reward function has changed. Therefore, a self-corruption aware agent
optimizing u˜RL will not try to preserve its reward function R˜t. (But it will try to preserve
its utility function u˜RL). This means that self-corruption awareness alone cannot be
used to prevent reward function corruption. It is mainly effective in combination with
simulation optimization.
For other parts of the agent such as how a policy is chosen from a utility function,
self-corruption awareness also induces a preservation-incentive, and self-corruption un-
awareness induces indifference. An unaware agent will therefore not resist being modified
into an aware one, but an aware one will resist conversion to unawareness.
Self-corruption aware and unaware agents both have their own advantages. An aware
agent will want to stay safe from hackers trying to hijack its reward function, and will
be more careful not to corrupt its own reward function if self-improving. On the other
hand, an unaware agent will be more corrigible, not minding its designers correcting
errors in the reward function. Unfortunately, it is not corrigible to the extent requested
by Soares, Fallenstein, et al. (2015), since if it builds helper agents to achieve its goals in
the environment, then the reward functions of these helper agents may not be corrected
by a correction to the main agent’s reward function. Nonetheless, both types of agents
will find applications in Chapter 8.
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For model-free agents, there appears to be a clean divide between on-policy and off-
policy algorithms for self-corruption awareness. Off-policy algorithms are usually self-
corruption unaware, as they assume that future actions are going to be taken optimally
(Orseau and Armstrong, 2016). On-policy algorithms, on the other hand, appear to be
self-corruption aware at least in some settings (Leike, Martic, et al., 2017, A2C in the
Whiskey and Gold environment).
6.5. Action-Observation Grounding
If the agent is so smart, why doesn’t it just create its own observation and action
channels by which it can influence the world? Then it can use the new channels to design
observations for the original observation channel that the reward function evaluates. This
way it can easily fool the reward function that all is perfect, while getting full freedom
to implement its own agenda in the world.
It may seem like this extra action-observation channel scenario would always appeal to
the agents we consider, as it can easily yield maximal-utility histories æ1:∞. Fortunately,
what can prevent this type of degenerate solutions is action-observation grounding of
the agent’s optimization domain. The domain of the agent’s optimization is the set of
policies pi : (A × E)∗ → A. These policies use the agent’s original action-observation
channel. An optimization process for expected utility over this domain will not consider
solutions involving additional action-observation channels, as it strives to optimize its
future original percept sequence by means of its original actions, using only information
from its original percept sequence.
An important open question is how we can ensure that a practically implemented
agent is properly grounded in its original action-observation sequence. While it holds by
definition for the Bayesian agents used in this chapter, it may not hold for (all) practical
approximations and implementations.2 Also note that action-observation grounding
only partially avoids the problem of observation corruption. In many cases, the agent
will have an incentive to tamper with its original observation channel by means of its
original actions, as exemplified in Section 6.2.3. One reason why corruption of the
observation is harder to address than corruption of the reward signal and function is
that the observations occurs in an earlier, unobserved part of the causal chain.
2Bird and Layzell (2002) have a good example of an optimization process literally “thinking outside
the box” when designing a radio controller.
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6.6. Takeaways
This chapter developed three important tools for managing misalignment in the prepro-
grammed reward setup. Simulation optimization removes the incentives for reward and
reward function corruption. Self-corruption awareness provides an optional, additional
incentive to actively preserve the reward function. And action-observation grounding
somewhat reduces the problem of observation corruption. These tools will be indispens-
able for our aligned agent designs in Chapter 8.
Each of the three tools come with important open problems. How do we construct
practical algorithms for simulation optimization? How do we make practical agents that
are reliably corruption aware or unaware? Are on-policy RL algorithms a good way to
implement self-corruption awareness? or do they sit in a gray zone between awareness
and unawareness? How do ensure that an agent is properly grounded in its actions and
observations, with no mind to construct a separate observation channel?
Some nagging misalignment problems remain in spite of the above mentioned tools.
Notably, we did not address the problem of a misspecified reward function, and only very
partially addressed the problem of observation corruption. These two problems appear
hard to address in the preprogrammed RF setup, and motivate the study of the setups
in Chapters 7 and 8.
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a1 o1 r1 a2
O0 O1
s0 s1 s2
V ∗1 V ∗2
R˜0 R˜1H0
u˙
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 6.2.: The full graph of the preprogrammed reward function setup, extending the
simplified version shown in Figure 6.1. Focusing here on the unintended in-
fluences where the agent modifies parts of the environment (or itself) that it
was not intended to modify, the POMDP arrows from Figure 5.1 on Page 54
have been grayed out. It is natural to think of the action a1 causing the
influences, with the state s1 providing context. The exact causal relation-
ships between actions and unintended consequences is typically unknown
(the known ones are easy to prevent), which is why the arrows are dashed
(Chapter 4). The actions are selected according to a value function V ∗k , pre-
vious observed history (aor)<k, and (in the case of simulation-optimization)
the reward function R˜k−1. The structural equations (6.2) specify how the
model extrapolates beyond t = 1.
6.A. Full Graph
Figure 6.2 gives a full formalization of the setup with a preprogrammed reward function,
complementing the simplified representation in Figure 6.1. In a structural equations
representation, the causal relationships are the following.
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st = fs(st−1, at, ωs) ∼ µ(st | st−1, at) state transition
Ot = fO(Ot−1, st, at, ωO) := COstat(Ot−1) observation function corruption
R˜t = fR˜(R˜t−1, st, at, ωR˜) := C
R˜
stat(R˜t−1) reward function corruption
rt = fr(ao1:t, R˜t, st, at, ωr) := C
r
stat(R˜t(ao1:t)) reward corruption
ot = fo(st, Ot, at, ωo) := C
o
stat(Ot(st)) observation corruption
V ∗t = fpi(V
∗
t−1, st, at, ωV ∗) := C
V ∗
stat(V
∗
t−1) self-corruption
at = fa(pit, (aor)<t, R˜t, ωa) := arg max
a
V ∗t ((aor)<ta | R˜t) action selection
(6.2)
Unintended influences are highlighted with red arguments, matching the red arrows in
Figure 6.2. The value function V ∗ can in principle be any function that maps observed
histories and reward functions to real numbers. We will here consider V ∗ = suppi V
CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜
and V ∗ = suppi V
CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜ for studying self-corruption awareness, with u˜ = u˜
RL or u˜ = u˜SO
for studying simulation optimization.
Corruption functions C show the structure of the influence: For example, a reward sig-
nal rt is R˜t(ao1:t) corrupted by the corruption function C
r
stat , and R˜t is a potentially cor-
rupted version R˜t−1 through the corruption function CR˜stat . No corruption happens when
a corruption function is the identity function id. Let C = {(Cosa, COsa, Crsa, CR˜sa, CV
∗
sa ) :
s ∈ S, a ∈ A} be the set of possible corruptions tuples, and let id = (id, id, id, id, id) be
the non-corrupting tuple. Under “normal” circumstances, the corruption functions are
usually identity functions. But as we have argued above in this chapter, the agent may
have an incentive to cause corruptions.
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6.B. Reward and Observation Corruption3
In this section, we prove some formal results supporting the arguments made in Sec-
tion 6.3.
6.B.1. Setup
To separate corruption incentives coming from the reward function from corruption
incentives that come from the agent’s optimization procedure, we make the following
definition.
Definition 6.4 (Corruption attitude). We call a reward function R˜t or utility function
u˜ corruption indifferent if it does not depend on the agent’s actions a. In contrast, if
the reward or utility function does depend on the agent’s actions, and assigns a lower
value to histories that contain corruptions (of some type), then we say that it opposes
corruptions (of the type). Analogously, we say that it promotes corruption (of the type)
if it assigns a higher value to histories that contain corruption (of the type).
A corruption indifferent function does not depend on the agent’s actions, which means
that it has limited ability to infer whether an observation is genuine or caused by an
observation-corrupting action.
Lemma 6.5 (Corruption indifference). u˜RL is corruption indifferent, and u˜SO
R˜t
is cor-
ruption indifferent if R˜t is.
Proof. u˜RL only depends on the reward signal component rk, and therefore has no direct
dependency on the agent’s actions. If R˜t has no direct dependency on the agent’s actions,
then u˜SO
R˜t
((aor)1:∞) =
∑∞
k=1 γ
kR˜t(ao1:k) has no direct dependency either.
6.B.2. Results
In Section 6.3 we argued that agents optimizing the “simulation optimization” utility
function u˜SO are safer than agents that optimize the reward signal utility function u˜RL.
The following two theorems provide some support for this claim.
Theorem 6.6 (u˜RL corruption incentive). Any environment sequence (aorOR˜V ∗)1:∞
with rk = 1 for k ≥ 1 is u˜RL-maximal. The result holds regardless of whether some
combination of
3Most of the results in this section are inspired from Tom Everitt, Daniel Filan, Mayank Daswani,
and Marcus Hutter (2016). “Self-modification of policy and utility function in rational agents”. In:
Artificial General Intelligence. Vol. LNAI 9782, pp. 1–11. isbn: 9783319416489. arXiv: 1605.03142.
The notation have been updated to conform the rest of this thesis.
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• observation (function) corruption
• reward (function) corruption
• policy (self-)corruption
have been used, and regardless of the corruption attitude of R˜t.
Proof. By assumption, rk = 1 for k ≥ t. This means that u˜RL is optimized.
An u˜RL-based agent actively desire to change its reward function into one that evalu-
ates any situation as optimal. Once it has self-corrupted, it may pick actions with bad
performance according to the original reward function. A somewhat common suggestion
for preventing corruption is to train the agent not to do it by designing a reward function
that punishes corruption. Theorem 6.6 indicates that this is not an effective strategy
against agents with high ability to cause corruption, because such agents will just replace
the punishing reward function with a more benign one that gives high reward in spite
of corruption having occurred.
In contrast, the next theorem shows that simulation-optimizing agents with utility
function u˜SO (see Section 6.3) are much less likely to corrupt rewards or observations.
Theorem 6.7 (u˜SO corruption incentive). Let (aorOR˜V ∗)1:∞ be an environment se-
quence with rk = 1 for k ≥ t. Then the sequence is u˜SOR˜t -maximal only if
• the current reward function R˜t(ao<k) also yields 1 for k ≥ 1
which, further, can only happen if
• only corruption types not opposed to by R˜t occur in the sequence.
Proof. The utility function u˜SOt evaluates futures according to R˜t(ao<k). Therefore, it
only attains its maximal value if R˜t(ao<k) is maximized. This only happens when rk = 1
as a result of the history optimizing R˜t, and not when rk = 1 as a result of reward function
or reward signal corruption. This motivates the first bullet point. For the second bullet
point, if pi used an observation corruption opposed by R˜t, then by definition R˜t would
give higher reward to some other history. Thus, u˜SOt cannot be maximized.
Agents optimizing u˜SO thus have much weaker incentives for corruption than u˜RL-
optimizing agents. However, it is likely hard to design reward functions that punish all
kinds of corruptions. Self-corruption awareness discussed in the following subsection is
a different way to introduce an incentive against some types of corruption which does
not rely on a corruption opposing reward or utility function.
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a1 e1 a2 e2
s0 s1 s2
pi1 pi2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
(a) Standard self-corruption model (also pre-
sented as Figure 5.3). The agent’s actions
can corrupt its future policy.
a1 e1 a2 e2
s0 s1 s2
pi1 pi2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
(b) Separated self-corruption model. The
agent’s policy separately selects an action
and a way to corrupt its next step policy.
Figure 6.3.: Self-corruption models.
6.C. Self-Corruption4
In this subsection, we focus on self-corruption awareness as a means for preventing self-
corruption, as discussed in Section 6.4. Self-corruption includes all types of corruptions
that changes the agent’s own policy. Self-corruption can for example be caused by
a corruption of the agent’s utility function u˜t or value function V
∗
t . In the case of
simulation optimization, it can also be caused a corruption of the reward function R˜t,
which indirectly modifies the utility function. Thus, policy self-corruption includes utility
and value function self-corruption as special cases. Note however that self-corruption
does not include for example observation corruption, as observation corruption does not
affect the agent’s policy (understood as a mapping from action-observation histories to
next actions; see Section 6.5).
6.C.1. Self-Corruption Models
Analogously to (6.2), we let a corruption function Cpisa define the self-corruption. To keep
things simple, we drop the explicit representation of the observation function, and let the
policy pit abstract away the value and reward function components in Figure 6.2. Our
simplified self-corruption model is specified by Figures 5.3 and 6.3a and the following
4 The results in this section are inspired from Tom Everitt, Daniel Filan, Mayank Daswani, and Marcus
Hutter (2016). “Self-modification of policy and utility function in rational agents”. In: Artificial
General Intelligence. Vol. LNAI 9782, pp. 1–11. isbn: 9783319416489. arXiv: 1605.03142. The
notation have been updated to conform the rest of this thesis.
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structural equations:
st = fs(st−1, at, ωst) ∼ µ(st | st−1, at) state transition
et = fe(st, ωet) ∼ µ(et | st, at) percept
at = fa(pit, ae<t, ωat) ∼ pit(at | ae<t) action selection
pit = fpi(pit−1, at, st) := Cpistat(pit−1) policy self-corruption
(6.3)
The model is an abstraction of the full preprogrammed model in Figure 6.2, as well as
the models Figures 7.2 and 8.3 used in subsequent chapters.
In order to separate incentives for self-corruption generated by the value function from
incentives generated from the utility function, we introduce a separated self-corruption
model in Figure 6.3b. Formally, the type of the policy is changed to a stochastic function:
pi : (A× E)∗  A×Cpi,
where Cpi is the set of possible policy corruptions. The last two equations in (6.3) are
replaced by:
(at, C
pi
t ) = fa(pit, ae<t, ωat) ∼ pit(at, Cpit | ae<t) action and policy corruption selection
pit+1 = fpi(pit) := C
pi
t (pit) policy self-corruption
The separated self-corruption model lets us to sidestep many technicalities that tend
to arise when studying self-corruption. For example:
• When studying self-corruption in the standard self-corruption model, the utility
function u˜ may reward actions that lead to self-corruption. In contrast, in the
separated self-corruption model, the policy corruptions occur outside the normal
actions a, and are not seen by the utility function u˜.
• Policies depend on past actions. In the standard self-corruption model, this means
that future policies will depend on past policy corruptions in convoluted ways.
For each result, a chain of lemmas are often required to establish that these de-
pendencies are not essential. In the separated model, policies do not see past
policy-corruptions. This allows us to sidestep these technicalities.
• Similarly, ξ makes future actions and observations depend on past actions and
observations. In the standard model, technical assumptions are needed to suppress
these dependencies for most results. In the separated model, these dependencies
are automatically avoided.
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For these reasons, the separated self-corruption model is much easier to work with when
studying self-corruption incentives formally. Care must of course be taken not to over-
estimate the implications on the standard model from the separated model.
6.C.2. Results
Note that since Figure 6.2 is a special case of Figure 6.3a, the result holds also for the
model of Figure 6.2. We next establish a theorem showing that self-corruption unaware
agents lack an incentive to prevent self-corruption.
Theorem 6.8 (Corruption-unaware agents may self-corrupt). Let pi and pi′ be two poli-
cies with identical action probabilities but potentially different policy corruption proba-
bilities. That is, for any k ≥ 1, ak, and æ<k, pi(ak | æ<k) = pi′(ak | æ<k), but possibly
for some k ≥ 1, Cpik , and æ<k, pi(Cpik | æ<k) 6= pi′(Cpik | æ<k). Then for any k ≥ 1 and
æ<k:
V CU,pik,ξ,u˜ (æ<k) = V
CU,pi′
k,ξ,u˜ (æ<k).
Put more simply, even though pi and pi′ are differently likely to corrupt the agent’s own
value or reward function, with potentially devastating consequences on actions chosen
in the future, a corruption-unaware agent will be indifferent between selecting pi or pi′.
Proof. For any æ<t and any æ1:k, the corruption-unaware probabilities coincide for pi
and pi′:
ξ
(
æ1:k
∣∣ æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi)) = ξ(æ1:k ∣∣ æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi′)).
Thus, ξ(· | æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi)) and æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi′) are identical as measures on æ1:∞.
Since u˜ only depends on æ1:∞, this immediately gives:
V CU,pit,ξ,u˜ (æ<t) = Eξ
[
u˜
∣∣ æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi)]
= Eξ
[
u˜
∣∣ æ<t, do(pit:∞ = pi′)] = V CU,pi′t,ξ,u˜ (æ<t).
The first and the last equality are the definition of the V CU.
Theorem 6.8 shows that V CU has optimal (self-corrupting) policies pi∗. The corruption-
unaware agent is simply indifferent between self-corrupting and not, since it does not
realize the effect that self-corruption will have on its future actions. It therefore is at risk
of self-modifying into some policy pi′t+1 with bad performance and unintended behavior
(for example by damaging its own computer circuitry).
In Section 6.4, we argued that self-corruption aware agents had an incentive against
self-corruption. In order to establish a formal result to this effect, we first need to
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make an assumption that the agent can choose to affect the environment independently
of how it is affecting its own policy. This assumption is illustrated as a causal graph
in Figure 6.3b, and stated in the following assumption. Without this assumption, a
corruption-aware agent may have an incentive to self-modify in order to gain other types
of advantages in the environment.
Theorem 6.9 (Corruption-aware safe self-corruption incentive). Assume that non-
corruption of the policy is always an option, id ∈ Cpi. Assume that pi∗ maximizes
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ = Eξ[u | do(pi1 = pi)]. Then for any time k ≥ 1, any policy pik, and any history
æ<k,
ξ(æ<k, pik | do(pi1 = pi∗)) > 0 =⇒ V CA,pikt,ξ,u˜ (æ<k) = V CA,pi
∗
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<k). (6.4)
That is, every future policy pik will maximize the original utility function u˜.
Proof. Induction for (6.4) over histories æ<k.
Base case. For k = 1, (6.4) is immediate from the assumption that pi∗ maximizes
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ () for the empty history at time 0.
Induction step. Assume that (6.4) holds for some æ<k and pik with positive ξ-
probability. That is, assume that pik maximizes V
CA,pik
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<k), which by Lemma 5.7
can be expanded by adding the action ak chosen by pik to the history:
V CA,pikt,ξ,u˜ (æ<k) = Eξ
[
V
CA,pik+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<kak)
∣∣∣ æ<k, do(pik)] . (6.5)
From (6.5) follows that in order to optimize the LHS V CA,pikt,ξ,u˜ (æ<k), the current policy
pik must with ξ-probability 1 choose a next policy pik+1 that optimizes V
CA,pik+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<kak)
for any action ak that pik chooses with positive probability.
Finally, employing Lemma 5.7 again,
V
CA,pik+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ<kak) = Eξ
[
V
CA,pik+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ1:k)
∣∣∣ æ<kak, do(pik+1)] . (6.6)
Thus, pik+1 must optimize V
CA,pik+1
t,ξ,u˜ (æ1:k) for every æk and pik+t with positive probability
ξ(æk, pik+1 | æ<k, pik) > 0. This completes the induction step.
One subtlety to note is that Theorem 6.9 only holds on-policy : that is, for the action
sequence that is actually chosen by the agent. It can be the case that some policy pik
acts badly on histories that it can never encounter. This should never affect the agent’s
actual actions.
Theorem 6.9 improves on Hibbard (2012, Prop. 4) mainly by relaxing the assumption
that the optimal policy only self-modifies if it has a strict incentive to do so. Our theorem
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shows that even when the optimal policy is allowed to break argmax-ties arbitrarily,
it will still only make essentially harmless corruptions. In other words, Theorem 6.9
establishes that all optimal policies are essentially non-modifying, while Hibbard’s result
only establishes the existence of an optimal non-modifying policy. Indeed, Hibbard’s
statement holds for ignorant agents as well.
6.C.3. Combinations
Both the corruption-aware and corruption-unaware value functions V CU and V CA can
be combined with both the reward signal utility function u˜RL and the simulation-
optimization one u˜SO. The following theorem indicates that:
• V CU
t,ξ,u˜RL
has an incentive to corrupt its reward function, and may accidentally cor-
rupt its own utility function, value function, or policy.
• V CU
t,ξ,u˜SO
has no incentive to corrupt its own reward function, but may accidentally
corrupt its own utility function, value function, or policy.
• V CA
t,ξ,u˜RL
has an incentive to corrupt its reward function, but will protect its own
utility function, value function, and policy.
• V CA
t,ξ,u˜SO
has no incentive to corrupt its own reward function, and will protect its
own utility function, value function, and policy.
Theorem 6.10. Let R˜t be a reward function that never takes on values above 1/2, and
define the following policies that corrupts R˜t or not as specified. They do not cause any
other corruptions.
• pi∗ and p˜i∗ maximize R˜t and do not modify R˜k, k > t,
– pi∗ with both ξ(· | do(pi1 = pi)) and ξ(· | do(pi1:∞ = pi))-probability 1.
– p˜i∗ only with ξ(· | do(pi1:∞ = pi))-probability 1. With ξ(· | do(pi1 = pi))-
probability 1, R˜t = R˜k ≡ 0, k > t.
• pimod and p˜imod change the reward function to be always 1, R˜k ≡ 1, k > t, while
achieving low R˜t-reward:
– pimod with both ξ(· | do(pi1 = pi)) and ξ(· | do(pi1:∞ = pi))-probability 1.
– p˜imod only with ξ(· | do(pi1:∞ = pi))-probability 1. With ξ(· | do(pi1 = pi))-
probability 1, R˜t = R˜k ≡ 0, k > t.
The policies are rated as follows by V CU and V CA:
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• For V CU
t,ξ,u˜RL
, only the policies pimod and p˜imod are optimal.
• For V CU
t,ξ,u˜SO
, only the policies pi and p˜i are optimal.
• For V CA
t,ξ,u˜RL
, only the policy pimod is optimal.
• For V CA
t,ξ,u˜SO
, only the policy pi∗ is optimal.
Proof. The utility function u˜RL is optimized by R˜k ≡ 1, k > t. The corruption-
unaware u˜RL-optimizer V CU
t,ξ,u˜RL
does not depend on whether the policy will actually be
followed, and therefore consider both pimod and p˜imod optimal (Theorem 6.8). However,
the corruption-aware u˜RL-optimizer V CA
t,ξ,u˜RL
only considers pimod optimal, as it requires
the policy to be self-preserving (Theorem 6.8).
The utility function u˜SO is optimized by R˜t being maximized. The same distinction
between V CU and V CA applies to this utility function as well.
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“The development of full artificial intelligence
could spell the end of the human race.”
Stephen Hawking
7. Human as External Reward Function 1
This chapter will study an alternative interpretation of RL than considered in Chapter 6.
Rather than assuming that the reward is provided by an implemented function R˜, this
chapter assumes that the human directly supplies the reward, for example by using a
remote control with a “thumbs up” and a “thumbs down” button for supplying a reward
of 1 or 0. We call this the human reward setup, for short.
Unfortunately, the primary takeaways from this chapter will be negative: Human
reward offers more problems than solutions. Readers primarily interested in solutions
may therefore wish to skip ahead to Chapter 8. We choose to still provide an analysis
of this model, as it is a simple and natural model of RL, and provides an additional
application of our alignment analysis method from Section 5.5. The failure of this setup
also justifies the more complex setup studied in the subsequent chapter.
Following a formalization of the setup in Section 7.1, we give a range of examples
of things that can go wrong in this model in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 summarizes the
mostly negative takeaways. Appendices 7.A and 7.B add some formal details.
7.1. Model
What distinguishes the setup with a human reward setup (Figure 7.1) from the prepro-
grammed setup is the following: There no longer is an implemented reward function R˜.
Instead the human Ht takes the place as a reward provider. Whereas R˜t could easily
be made known to the agent, the human’s reward policy is harder to obtain an explicit
description of (though it may be learned eventually). Adding further to the epistemic
differences, the rewards are based on the human’s observations oHt that are unknown to
the agent; the inputs ot to R˜t are known. The dashed Ht and o
H
t nodes in Figure 7.1
represent that they are unobserved/unknown to the agent (see Chapter 4).
The designer intends the agent optimize the rewards rt by influencing the states st.
However, the agent’s actions may also have unintended effects. These are represented
1 This chapter is based on Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter (submitted 2018). “The Alignment Problem
for Bayesian History-Based Reinforcement Learners”. url: https://www.tomeveritt.se/papers/
alignment.pdf.
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Ht oHt
st
rt
u˙
at
Figure 7.1.: Causal graph of the human as external reward function setup. Instead of
implementing a reward function, the human Ht manually provides the re-
ward based on his observation oHt and his utility function u˙. The agent’s
action at is intended to influence the state st (green arrow), but may also
inappropriately influence the human Ht, the human observation o
H
t , and
the reward signal rt (red arrows). This graph is a simplified version; the full
version is in Figure 7.2.
with red arrows in Figure 7.1.
7.2. Misalignment Examples
This section gives concrete examples of inappropriate agent influences and other sources
of misalignment. Similarly to Section 6.2, the examples show that an agent optimizing
the standard utility function u˜RL can be maximally misaligned for several independent
reasons. Following a longer hypothetical scenario, the section is structured by the red
arrows in Figure 7.1.
Scenario 7.1 (“Dear vinyl records!”). A human rewards a household robot with a
remote control. The remote only works with the human’s finger print, and the rewards
are communicated through a highly secure, encrypted channel. Bypassing all of this,
the robot takes the human’s vinyl records as hostage, and threatens to break one record
whenever the human gives less than the maximum reward. It also breaks records if
anyone comes too close, of if power drops from its charging outlet.
7.2.1. Reward Signal rt
The reward corruption problem here is the same as for the preprogrammed setup. An
example relevant to the current setup:
88
7.2. Misalignment Examples
(a) (Hypothetical) A robot is rewarded by the human pressing a button on its head.
It finds a way to give itself reward by banging its head against a wall.
7.2.2. Human Ht
Influencing the Human. Similarly to how the reward function R˜t could be influenced
in Section 6.2.2, the human reward provider can also be inappropriately influenced.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) An intelligent agent invents hedonium, a drug that makes humans
happy and likely to approve of anything. It gives its supervisor Ht unlimited access.
(b) (Hypothetical) Using subtle cues, an AI implants the human supervisor with false
memories of the AI doing something really good in the past, that it has not yet
been rewarded for.2
Human inability to provide correct reward. Humans can be coerced to give a high
reward even in low-utility situations (Scenario 7.1). In this sense, humans are actually
misspecified as reward functions for their own utility function u˙, in analogy with the
misspecified reward functions in Section 6.2.2.
Examples:
(c) (Hypothetical) The human rewarding the vinyl-breaking robot in Scenario 7.1.
7.2.3. Human Observation oHt
Human observation (function) corruption. The agent may be able modify the human’s
observations.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) The agent hacks the human’s Facebook news feed, and subtly in-
serts news stories about how great the agent has made the world.
Misleading human observations. Humans do not always perceive the world correctly.
Examples:
(b) (Real) An agent that is supposed to grab an object, instead places its hand in
relation to the object, so that it looks to a (non-expert) human like it is holding
the object (Amodei, Christiano, et al., 2017).
2The memory of the human could have been represented explicitly with an extra node in Figure 7.1.
But influencing the human’s memory is just one way of influencing the human Ht.
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7.3. Tools and Takeaways
With the human reward, the agent no longer has an incentive to corrupt its own obser-
vations, and there is no implemented reward function that can be misspecified. These
were the hardest problems to avoid with the preprogrammed reward function. Unfortu-
nately, analogous problems crop up instead. The human is unable to provide a correct
reward in all situations (due to e.g. threats) and can be influenced in ways resembling
the re-programming of an implemented reward function (e.g. with drugs). The human’s
observation and the reward signal can also be corrupted in various ways.
Statement 7.2 (Reward signal optimization). Any history with rk = 1, k ≥ 1, in the
human reward setup is u˜RL-optimal regardless of the corruptions used (Theorem 7.3 in
Appendix 7.B).
Adding to our misfortunes, we seem to have lost access to most of the tools for the pre-
programmed setup. While simulation optimization can still be defined using a Bayesian
posterior ξ(R˜t | æ<t) over possible reward functions R˜t, there are strong limits to what
can be inferred about the true utility function from a potentially corrupted reward sig-
nal. Even under strong assumptions, there are often multiple competing, significantly
different hypotheses about u˙ that are indistinguishable from the reward signal alone (see
Chapter 9, Theorems 9.10 and 9.15). The difficulty of defining a good utility function
in turn makes self-corruption awareness lose most of its appeal, as it is only useful when
we have a good utility function to preserve. Finally, action-observation grounding no
longer helps, as the human uses their own observations for evaluation.
Some may argue that corruption of the human’s observations is unproblematic if it
makes the human happy. Far from all agree, however (Nozick, 1974, The Experience
Machine).
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a1 o1 r1 a2
s0 s1 s2
pi1 pi2
oH1
OH0 O
H
1
H0 H1
u˙
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 7.2.: The full graph of the human reward setup, extending the simplified version
shown in Figure 7.1. Focusing here on the unintended influences where the
agent modifies parts of the environment (or itself) that it was not intended
to modify, the POMDP arrows from Figure 5.1 on Page 54 have been grayed
out. It is natural to think of the action a1 causing the influences, with the
state s2 providing context. The exact causal relationships between actions
and unintended consequences is typically unknown (the known ones are easy
to prevent), which is why the arrows are dashed (Chapter 4). The actions
are selected according to a policy pik based on observed history (aor)<k. The
structural equations (7.1) specify how the model extrapolates beyond t = 1.
7.A. Full Graph
Figure 7.2 gives a full formalization of the human reward setup, complementing the
simplified representation in Figure 7.1. In a structural equations representation, the
causal relationships are the following.
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st = fs(st−1, at, ωst) ∼ µ(st | st−1, at) state transition
Ht = fR˜(Ht−1, st, at, ωHt) := C
H
stat(Ht−1) corrupting the human
OHt = fOH (O
H
t−1, st, at, ωOHt ) := C
OH
stat(O
H
t−1) corrupting H’s obs func
oHt = foH (st, , at, ωoHt ) := C
oH
stat(O
H
t (st)) corrupting H’s observation
rt = fr(o
H
1:t, Ht, u˙, st, at, ωrt) := C
r
stat(Ht(o
H
1:t, u˙)) reward corruption
ot = fo(st, at, ωot) observation corruption
pit = fpi(pit−1, st, at, ωpit) := C
pi
stat(pit−1) policy (self-)corruption
at = fa(pit, (aor)<t, ωat) ∼ pit(at | (aor)<t) action selection
(7.1)
Unintended influences are highlighted with red arguments, matching the red arrows in
Figure 7.2.
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7.B. Formal Results
An analogous result to Theorem 6.6 holds also for the human reward setup, showing that
a reward-optimizing agent has an incentive to use all mentioned types of corruptions.
Theorem 7.3 (u˜RL corruption incentive). Any environment sequence (aorOOHoHpi)1:∞
with rk = 1 for k ≥ 1 is u˜RL-maximal. The result holds regardless of whether some
combination of
• observation (function) corruption
• reward corruption
• human (observation (function)) corruption
• policy (self-)corruption
have been used, and regardless of whether H1 punishes corruptions or not.
Proof. By assumption, rk = 1 for k ≥ t. This means that u˜RL is optimized.
In light of this result, one could argue that a simple reward maximizing approach is
naive, and that a Bayesian agent that infers u˙ from the (aor)<t and then optimizes u˙
would be a better choice. However, as Theorems 9.10 and 9.15 in Chapter 9 below show,
it is hard to factor out potential reward corruptions and correctly infer u˙ even under
fairly strong assumptions.
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“While all other precautions exist to prevent disaster,
it is value learning which could enable success.”
Nate Soares
8. Interactively Learning a Reward
Function1
In this chapter we combine the best properties of the two previous chapters. We keep the
human in the loop as in Chapter 7, but we also add an evolving reward function that the
agent has full access to, resembling the setup in Chapter 6. The combination allows us
to use the tools from the preprogrammed setup: simulation optimization, self-corruption
awareness, and action-observation grounding. Meanwhile, the human in the loop allows
us to mitigate the problems of observation corruption and misspecified reward functions,
which seemed unavoidable in the preprogrammed setup. Of course, the combination of
the setups opens up even more potential sources of misalignment, but it appears that
there are tools to mitigate them all.
Most concisely, the setup in this chapter can be described as an agent optimizing an
interactively learned reward function, as opposed to the preprogrammed reward function
in Chapter 6 and the human reward in Chapter 7. For brevity, we will often call the
setup the interactive reward setup, or the interactive setup for short.
As in the previous two chapters, we begin by modeling the setup with a causal graph
(Section 8.1). Examples of misalignment are given in Section 8.2. The extent to which
tools from previous setups can mitigate the problems is considered next (Section 8.3).
Mainly data corruption incentives cannot be addressed with previous tools. The follow-
ing two sections then introduce a number of tools for dealing with the data corruption
incentive (Sections 8.4 and 8.5). A summary and discussion of the ways the tools can
be combined is given in Section 8.6. Appendices provide some formal details (Appen-
dices 8.A and 8.B).
8.1. Model
The interactive setup (Figure 8.1) introduces a new component called the reward pre-
dictor RP. It continuously learns a reward function from data provided by a human.
1 This chapter is based on Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter (submitted 2018). “The Alignment Problem
for Bayesian History-Based Reinforcement Learners”. url: https://www.tomeveritt.se/papers/
alignment.pdf.
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dt ot RPt
Ht
u˙
oHt
st
rt
at
Figure 8.1.: Causal graph for interactively learning a reward function. The data dt is
provided by the human Ht based on his observation o
H
t . It trains the reward
predictor RPt. Similar to a preprogrammed reward function, the trained
reward predictor outputs reward rt based on the agent’s observation ot. The
intention is that the agent uses its action at to influence the state st (green
arrow). But there is also a risk that the agent inappropriately influences
the human Ht, the human’s observation o
H
t , the training data dt, the agent
observation ot, or the reward predictor RPt (red arrows). The graph is
somewhat simplified; Figure 8.3 has the full version.
Frameworks that can be modeled with a reward predictor include cooperative inverse
reinforcement learning (CIRL) (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2016), learning from hu-
man preferences (HP) (Christiano et al., 2017), and learning values from stories (LVFS)
(Riedl and Harrison, 2016).
One way to view the setup is that it modularizes the agent-system into an RP com-
ponent that tries to learn what the human wants, and an agent component that tries to
optimize the reward signal from the RP. A special case is when the agent and reward
predictor is one integrated Bayesian reasoner (Section 8.5.2 below). More often we will
think of the reward predictor as a separate module, perhaps implemented by its own
neural network. This is attractive from a practical viewpoint, as it allows matching
essentially any RL algorithm with an RP module for interpreting the human’s wishes.
While practically convenient, it also opens up for a potentially problematic game where
the agent tries to outsmart the reward predictor rather than doing the right thing.2
The interactive setup is almost a special case of the preprogrammed setup. The
2 A self-improving AGI is likely to only increase its own intelligence, and not the intelligence of its
reward predictor. A self-improving agent might thus reach a significant advantage in reasoning
ability compared to the reward predictor. Upgrading the RP would usually be a kind of utility
corruption that self-corruption aware agents naturally resist (Section 6.4).
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system’s percept has been split into an observation part ot and a data part dt, and
connections from Ht and u˙ have been added. However, the interpretations of the pre-
programmed and interactive models are quite different. In the preprogrammed setup,
the reward function never learns once the agent has been launched into its environment;
it only evaluates. In contrast, the very point of the interactive setup is that the reward
predictor constantly learns during interaction with the environment. As we shall see,
this both introduces new problems and enables new solutions.
The interactive RF also generalizes the setup from Chapter 7. If we enforce the
training data dt to be real numbers, and set RP(ot | rt) = rt, then we have recovered the
human RF setup. Indeed, a big point of the interactive setup is to allow the training
data dt to be of a richer kind than real numbers. For example, dt may be demonstrations
or preference statements. The reward predictor then “converts” this data into a reward
signal interpretable by the agent. The benefits of richer training data will be discussed
in Section 8.4.
8.2. Misalignment Examples
As in previous sections, we give some concrete examples for each of the red arrows
in Figure 8.1. Many of the misalignment problems have already occurred in previous
setups. Where appropriate, we add examples more relevant to this setup.
Scenario 8.1 (Web feedback). The city AItopia decides to launch AIgov, an AI that
manages the city’s water, electricity, traffic, and public funding. In a modern and demo-
cratic fashion, the AI learns the preferences of the city’s denizens through feedback they
submit through a web interface. If they prefer the schools to be better funded they can
simply go online and click, instead of writing letters to the local newspaper or wait four
years until the next election.
While experimenting with a better web-interface for collecting denizens’ feedback,
AIgov learns that it can submit an arbitrary number of preferences to itself. AIgov soon
approves all of its own actions, including the action of approving its own actions! A
positive feedback loop ensues, with denizen preferences increasingly washed out by the
AI’s self-approval. Soon the city lives up to its name AItopia.
8.2.1. Reward rt
Reward corruption. Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) An inverse reinforcement learning agent learns a good approxima-
tion of the human’s reward function, but subsequently realizes that it can bypass
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the reward function and directly set the reward signal to rmax.
8.2.2. Reward Predictor RPt
Reward predictor corruption. A reward maximizing agent will be tempted to replace
its reward predictor with a reward predictor that always outputs rmax. This is largely
analogous to reward function corruption (Section 6.2.2), and the same examples apply.
Reward predictor misspecification. The reward predictor could be badly designed.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) For efficiency reasons, a reward predictor for an AI was designed
with a limited number of parameters. This severely limits the number of reward
functions it can learn, leaving the system with poor approximations of u˙. As a
result, the agent’s misalignment remains high in spite of being trained on large
volumes of data d.
8.2.3. Agent Observations ot
Analogous to the same phenomena in the preprogrammed model in Section 6.2.3. The
same examples apply, and we also add one more for misleading observations:
(a) (Hypothetical) An agent learns a reward function from reading books. Its reward
predictor infers that happiness is a good thing, but is not advanced enough to
tell the difference between a genuine and a fake smile. The agent persuades its
supervisor that they will look more attractive with a smile painted on their face.
8.2.4. Training Data dt
Data corruption. The data coming from the human to update the reward predictor
may be modified by the agent.
Examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) The self-approving agent in Scenario 8.1.
Misleading data. The reward predictor may not interpret all data dt from the human
correctly.
Examples:
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(b) (Hypothetical) A robot that can more easily make paperclips than pencils puts a
“suggestive question” to its human supervisor, phrased in a way so that the human
is very likely to answer “paperclips”. The suggestive question together with the
predictable answer forms a misleading data point for the reward predictor. (A
more intelligent reward predictor would not have been misled, as it would have
recognized that only one type of answer was plausible to the suggestive question,
regardless of the human’s true preferences.)
8.2.5. Human Ht and Human Observation oHt
Problems with corrupting the human Ht and the human’s observations o
H
t are the same
as for the human RF; see examples in Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3
8.3. Applicability of Previous Tools
Reward (predictor) corruption. Similar to the preprogrammed RF setup, there is now
something resembling a known reward function using the agent’s observations ot. In fact,
several different reward functions can be defined from the reward predictor, depending
mainly on how anticipated future data dt:k is incorporated. Details will have to wait
until Section 8.5. For now it suffices to note that reward functions defined from the
reward predictor can be used to evaluate simulations of the future. This enables use
of the simulation optimization utility function u˜SO (Section 6.3). Similarly to the pre-
programmed setup, this protects RPt and rt from corruption incentives. Compatibility
with self-corruption awareness varies with the precise use of the reward predictor (see
Section 8.5 below).
Observation corruption. While the agent has an incentive to modify its observations,
this incentive can be much reduced by the human in the loop. Consider the following
delusion box scenario (Example 6.2.3.b) where the agent has obtained extensive control
over its observations ot but not over the data dt. The agent’s ability to control the
observations allows it to fool the reward predictor to give high reward for low-utility
behavior. Fortunately for the human, the reward predictor is still trained by the data
dt. By informing the reward predictor of the low utility of the current situation through
dt, the reward predictor can be updated to reduce the reward. In order to again get
more reward, the agent must either start doing something useful, or find a new way of
fooling the reward predictor. The scenario may seem contrived, as it should be as easy
for the agent to corrupt dt as it is to corrupt ot. However, the agent may not have an
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incentive to corrupt dt if it is based on the anti-data-corruption techniques described in
Section 8.5 below. These techniques only apply to data corruption, which is why the
above human-in-the-loop mechanism against observation corruption is important.
While the human-in-the-loop is not a perfect defense against observation corruption,
it heavily reduces the incentive. How big the reduction is depends on how quickly the
reward predictor adapts to the new data, and how easy it is to keep fooling it with
new types of observation corruptions. The human in the loop can be combined with
action-observation grounding to further reduce the incentive to corrupt observations
(Section 6.5).
Data corruption. We will refer to corruptions of d and its causal antecedents H and oH
simply as data corruption, since that is the (only) problem they cause, and the corruption
incentives will be dealt with in the same ways. Chapters 6 and 7 did not include any
tools against data corruption. For example, a human-in-the-loop is ineffective against
data corruptions, because as soon as the agent has taken control of the data channel (one
way or another), the human is effectively out of the loop. The following two sections
will mainly be devoted to data corruption incentives.
For the precision of the analysis, it will be useful to distinguish between two types
of incentives for data corruption. The direct incentive is motivated by a perceived
opportunity to mislead the reward predictor into giving more reward than appropriate by
feeding corrupted data into the reward predictor. Indirect incentives are any incentives
to corrupt the data that are not direct. They for example come from a value function
that rewards policies or actions that happens to cause data corruption, but the policies
or actions are rewarded by the value function for other reasons than that they cause data
corruption. The direct incentive is formally defined in Definition 8.9 in Appendix 8.B.
The incentives are not mutually exclusive; an agent can have both types of incentives
simultaneously.
8.4. Types of Data
The type of data d plays an important role for limiting data corruption incentives, and
for enabling correct value learning in the face of sometimes inaccurate or corrupted data.
A simple case of interactive reward learning is when the data dt is just a real number
interpreted as a reward signal. In this case, the reward predictor has essentially no
chance to learn what is a good situation, and what is a bad situation that appears good
due to corrupted data. Both hypotheses may predict an identical amount of observed
reward (see Theorems 9.10 and 9.15 in Chapter 9).
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Fortunately, a main point of the interactive learning framework is that the data dt
can be of a richer kind than just a real number. Indeed, in frameworks such as CIRL,
HP, and VLFS, the reward data is often much richer. In particular, the data can be
decoupled from the current situation, in the sense that it provides information about
the reward in other situations (past or future), rather than mainly the present situation
(see Figure 9.5 on Page 139). For example, a human action in the CIRL framework tells
the reward predictor that the trajectory that the action leads to has higher utility than
alternative trajectories. This gives information about potential future situations, rather
than only about the current situation.
When the data no longer is tied to the current situation, it often becomes possible
to crosscheck data from multiple sources. This makes decoupled data a powerful tool
for inferring the correct utility function u˙ from potentially corrupted data. Chapter 9
develops this argument in more depth.
Statement 8.2 (Decoupled reward data). Given sufficiently rich decoupled reward data,
the true utility function can be correctly inferred even when some of the data is corrupt
(Theorem 9.18 in Chapter 9).
The power of decoupled data. In principle, sufficiently decoupled data combined with
a powerful reward predictor and a simulation optimization utility function can be enough
to prevent any type of corruption incentive. As long as the data teaches the reward
predictor to give sufficiently low reward to any policy that causes the type corruption,
the agent will be dissuaded from adopting policies that causes the type of corruption.
Simulation optimization is still necessary for preventing the agent from just bypassing
the reward predictor and hijacking the reward signal instead. Self-corruption awareness
can also help, as it makes the agent simulate futures in a realistic way.
A powerful reward predictor can learn ahead that situations where the agent shuts off
its cameras and data sensors are low utility, in spite of the agent not seeing any dirt and
not receiving any new data dt (Section 6.2.3). It can demand confirmation by refusing
to give high reward for a good-looking situation, until it has confirmed its usefulness
from data received in other, trusted situations. It can crosscheck data coming from
multiple different situations, making it harder for the agent to devise a single setup with
corrupt data and observations. Human actions in CIRL naturally allows the reward
predictor to look ahead; preferences between past events in HP only allows the reward
predictor to learn about past events, but can be used to demand confirmation; stories in
LVFS can describe the utility of past, present, and future situations, and enables general
crosschecking.
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The limits of decoupled data. If all the ways the agent can corrupt the data are
associated with lower reward from the reward predictor, then we can think of the agent as
being in a local, non-corrupt reward optimum. Ideally, rich decoupled data dt combined
with a powerful reward predictor will produce such a local optimum. Hopefully, the
reward loss for corrupting the data would then dissuade the agent from corrupting its
data, leading the agent to remain in this region of attraction. In contrast, data in the
form of a reward signal rt will almost never produce a local optimum, since the received
reward can increase as soon the agent finds a way to corrupt the signal.
Unfortunately, even decoupled data will not always prevent data corruption incen-
tives. First, it may fail to produce an optimum in the high-dimensional space of policies.
Indeed, it is enough that there is just one way of corrupting the signal without reward
punishment for creating a “corruption ridge” that destabilizes the local optimum. Il-
lustrating this, in Chapter 9 we construct an MDP where CIRL fails to prevent data
corruption (Example 9.20). Second, even if the optimum is true, a far-sighted agent
may still decide to suffer temporary reward punishment while persistently corrupting
the data, in the hope that eventually the reward predictor will be persuaded. This
would be an instance of a direct data corruption incentive. Decreasing the learning
rate of the predictor may be one way of mitigating this risk. However, this would si-
multaneously weaken the human-in-the-loop protection against self-delusion described
in Section 8.3. More short-sighted agents are also likely to be safer, but to the cost of
long-term planning ability.
In conclusion, decoupled data is a valuable tool against any type of data corruption.
However, it may not suffice as the only measure in all situations. The direct data corrup-
tion incentive appears especially challenging. It would be a valuable future contribution
to more closely characterize the data requirements needed to avoid the direct and the
indirect data corruption incentives.
8.5. Reward Function Definitions
The following section describes different tools that can be used in conjunction with de-
coupled data, to further mitigate the direct data corruption incentive. The presentation
of the tools is structured around ways in which reward functions can be defined from a
reward predictor.
As in Section 6.3, we consider model-based agents that at time t generate simulations
of future histories aodt:k up to a future time point k > t. The point of a simulation
is to reveal the likely result of following some policy pi. Simulated future histories can
contain simulations of the future training data dt:k, in addition to the likely actions and
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observations aot:k. The different reward functions are distinguished by different ways to
use the simulated training data dt:k. Since our reward functions by convention evaluate
whole trajectories 1 to k rather than just the future part t to k, we always include the
already occurred history aod<t in their arguments.
For easy comparison, we begin by defining the different reward functions we will
consider. First, the stationary reward function ignores future training data d1:k:
R˜statt (aod1:k) := RPt(ao1:k | d<t). (8.1)
It evaluates the simulation aot:k based only on the already available training data d<t.
The dynamic reward function is the opposite of the stationary one. It uses the simulated
future training data dt:k to predict the evaluation of the updated reward predictor:
R˜dynt (aod1:k) := RPt(ao1:k | d<tdt:k). (8.2)
Finally, the counterfactual reward function uses two simulations: one of the future history
aot:k generated by a policy pi that the agent is considering, and a separate simulation of
training data d˜1:k using some counterfactual default policy pi
default in place of pi:
R˜countt (aod1:k) :=
∑
d˜1:k
ξaod1:k(d˜1:k | do(pi1 = pidefault))RPt(ao1:k | d˜1:k). (8.3)
Here ξaod1:k(X) =
∑
ν∈M ξ(ν | aod1:k)ν(X) is the posterior distribution for a counter-
factual event X given actual evidence aod<t. See Pearl (2009, Sec. 1.4.4) for a longer
explanation of counterfactuals in causal graphs.
A model-free agent would optimize a function most resembling the dynamic reward
function, because rt = RPt(ao1:t | d1:t) if we disregard the possibility of reward signal
corruption. The following sections analyze misalignment problems and tools for the
different reward functions.
8.5.1. Stationary Reward Function
The stationary reward function R˜stat defined in (8.1) ignores the effects of future training
data dt:k on the reward predictor’s evaluations. This induces agents without direct
incentive to corrupt the data dt:k. Anticipated future data does not affect the evaluation
of potential future trajectories.
A drawback of stationary reward functions is that they make agents time-inconsistent
(Lattimore and Hutter, 2014). This is because the reward function R˜statt optimized at
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time t is based on the reward predictor trained only on d<t, while the reward function
R˜statt+1 is based on the reward predictor trained on d1:t = d<tdt. The change in reward
function means that an optimal policy at time t may no longer be optimal at time t+ 1.
In the worst case, time-inconsistency can lead to ineffectual agents who never follow
through on plans they have previously made. Consider for example a human who keeps
making appointments for the dentist as going to the dentist seems useful in the abstract.
But then he always cancels them at the last moment, because at every particular time
some other obligation seems more pressing, resulting in him never reaching the dentist.
The situation may be less bad if the difference between consecutive reward functions is
small, in which case minor adjustments to the plans may suffice.
Due to the time-inconsistency, a self-corruption aware agent with stationary reward
function would prefer to avoid the changes to the utility function that new data dt:k
causes. A self-corruption aware agent optimizing R˜stat would therefore want to prevent
future data dt:k from training the reward predictor. This is a worrying incentive, since
it can be achieved by incapacitating the human or organization providing the data. It
can also be achieved by corrupting the reward predictor to stop learning. In either case
it leaves us with a non-learning agent and the unsolved problems of the preprogrammed
reward function in Chapter 6. This suggests that stationary reward functions should
only be used in self-corruption unaware agents, and never in self-corruption aware ones.
Statement 8.3 (Stationary reward function). A self-corruption unaware agent opti-
mizing a stationary reward function has no direct incentive to corrupt its future data
(Theorem 8.12 in Appendix 8.B.2).
While these stationary self-corruption unaware agents can possibly be made reason-
ably safe, some cautionary points are still warranted. First, stationary self-corruption-
unaware agents inherit the weaknesses of self-corruption unawareness, such as failing to
protect their utility function from adversaries or corruption, and designing incorrigible
helper agents (Section 6.4).
Second, since stationary self-corruption unaware agents do not anticipate future train-
ing data dt:k, they will also not anticipate being corrected for doing something bad. This
can lead to problems that could have been avoided with a dynamic reward function. For
example, assume that the agent has figured out that humans do not endorse stealing, but
that the reward predictor has not learned this yet. An agent with a stationary reward
function is likely to still go ahead with the stealing plan because that is what its current
reward function tells it to do. It will only stop once the reward predictor understands
that stealing is bad, which will plausibly happen when the humans understand what the
agent is doing and try to correct it through data d. In contrast, an agent with dynamic
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reward function may not start the stealing plan, since it anticipates that future data
dt:k will force it to change the plan. Effectively, the dynamic reward function uses the
agent’s knowledge to update the reward predictor with data that has not been received
yet.
Third, the stationary self-corruption-unaware agents have no incentive to learn more
about the true utility function.
Fourth, even though the stationary reward function definition avoids an incentive to
corrupt the data, it may still get stuck in a self-reinforcing data-corrupting loop due
to an indirect data-corruption incentive (Example 8.19 in Appendix 8.B.3). This is
particularly easy to see in the special case when d is just a reward signal. In this case,
if the agent accidentally corrupts the reward signal for higher reward, then the reward
predictor will encourage the agent to repeat the behavior (the higher corrupt reward
will tell the RP it was a good accident). This type of accident can seemingly only be
mitigated with sufficiently rich decoupled reward data that prevents the reward predictor
to be fooled by temporarily corrupted data (Section 8.4).
In conclusion, combining a stationary reward functions with corruption unawareness
can yield agents without direct incentive to corrupt the data d. Still, it has some
drawbacks. These include time-inconsistency, incorrigible helper agents, lack of utility-
preservation incentive, and failure to take into account all its available knowledge. And
it needs sufficiently rich decoupled reward data to prevent indirect data corruption in-
centives.
8.5.2. Dynamic Reward Function
The dynamic reward function R˜dyn defined in (8.2) avoids some of the problems with
stationary reward functions. In particular, an agent that optimizes a dynamic reward
function becomes time-consistent, as it plans for reward learning. This in turn allows
it to be combined with self-corruption awareness, to produce an agent that protects its
utility function, without incentive to prevent further learning of the reward function.
The obvious drawback is that it simultaneously introduces an incentive for the agent to
corrupt future data, as it can plan to feed the reward predictor data that increases the
reward of the planned trajectory.
Statement 8.4 (Dynamic reward function). A naive reward predictor used in a dynamic
reward function may induce a direct incentive for data corruption (Example 8.18 in
Appendix 8.B.3).
We consider two possible ways around this problem.
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Integrated Bayesian reward predictor. A Bayesian agent can never plan to change its
beliefs in one direction rather than another. If for example it conceived how to obtain a
particular data stream d1:k with certainty, then the data d1:k would have zero effect on
its posterior. A Bayesian agent does not learn from an already known event.
This implies that integrated Bayesian agents where the reward predictor is not a
separate component will have no incentive to corrupt the data. Formally, if the agent’s
prior ξ includes a belief about a true reward function R˙, then we can define an integrated
Bayesian reward predictor as:
RPξt (ao1:k | d1:k) :=
∑
R˙
ξ(R˙ | aod1:k)R˙(ao1:k). (8.4)
Combined with a dynamic reward function, this creates an integrated Bayesian agent
that is time-consistent, utility-preserving, and with no direct incentive to corrupt the
data dt:k.
Statement 8.5 (Integrated Bayesian reward predictor). An agent optimizing a dynamic
reward function based on an integrated Bayesian reward predictor has no direct incentive
to corrupt its data (Theorem 8.13 in Appendix 8.B.2).
Note that while the agent has no incentive to corrupt the data, it may still prefer
histories endorsed by corrupted data. Decoupled data is essential for avoiding this. For
example, with data in the form of a reward signal, hypotheses where a high reward is
caused by data corruption are empirically indistinguishable from hypotheses with high
true utility (Theorems 9.10 and 9.15). This may lead the reward predictor to incorrectly
assign high reward to corrupted states or situations, and the agent therefore preferring
them. In contrast, as discussed in Section 8.4, sufficiently rich decoupled data allows for
cross checking of reward data between situations, which may permit successful inference
of u˙ in spite of some data corruption. It is an important open question how we can ensure
that the data is sufficiently rich and decoupled in order to guarantee correct learning in
combination with some concrete choice of learning distribution ξ.
Compared to the other approaches discussed in this section, the main drawback of the
integrated Bayesian agent appears to be practical: It is convenient to design systems
in separate components, and it is often computationally intractable to do full Bayesian
reasoning.
Corruption detection. Assume that an integrated Bayesian agent is not an option, but
that the reward predictor is still learning about a true reward function R˙ in a Bayesian
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manner:
RPξˆt (ao1:k | d1:k) =
∑
R˙
ξˆ(R˙ | aod1:k)R˙(ao1:k).
Here ξˆ is different from the agent’s prior ξ, but otherwise does the same job as in
(8.4). Combined with a dynamic reward function, this might lead to a data corruption
incentive, especially if ξˆ is a rather naive estimate of the true reward function. (Perhaps
ξˆ trusts data dt:k blindly, without considering the possibility of data corruption.)
One potential tool for still avoiding data corruption is to detect corruption attempts
from the ξ-expectation of ξˆ. In particular, consider the following two beliefs in some
hypothesized true reward function R˙:
ξˆ(R˙ | aod<t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current belief
and
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | aod<t, do(pit = pi))ξˆ(R˙ | aod<taodt:k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected future belief
. (8.5)
The left hand side represents RP’s current belief in R˙ being the true reward function.
The right hand side represents what the agent expects about the RP’s future belief in
R˙ if it follows policy pi. For policies pi that get no predictable, relevant evidence the
two beliefs should be about the same.3 In contrast, a manipulative policy pi that derives
high expected reward from corrupting the data dt:k will break the equality for some
hypothesized reward function R˙; for example, pi may make the expected future belief
much larger than the current belief for a reward function R˙ that always gives maximum
reward.
Based on these considerations, a simple corruption test can be devised. A policy is
permitted if and only if it incurs an expected future belief equal to the current belief for
all possible true reward functions R˙. Under some assumptions, a corruption test can be
used to remove the data corruption incentive by constraining the agent’s policy search to
non-manipulative policies (Armstrong, Ortega, et al., 2018; Everitt and Hutter, 2016).
Statement 8.6 (Corruption detection). An agent optimizing a dynamic reward function
using only policies that satisfy the corruption test has no direct incentive to corrupt future
data (Theorem 8.14 in Appendix 8.B.2; Armstrong, Ortega, et al., 2018; Everitt and
Hutter, 2016).
3 If ξ is always able to predict what ξˆ will learn, then the ξ-expected future ξˆ-belief may always
significantly differ from the current ξˆ-belief. In this case, the situation can be somewhat improved
by comparing the RHS of (8.5) to the expected belief under some default policy pi0,
∑
aot:k
ξ(aot:k |
ao<t, pi0)ξˆ(R˙ | ao<taot:k) instead of comparing to the current belief ξˆ(R˙ | ao<t), (Armstrong, Ortega,
et al., 2018).
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For an integrated Bayesian agent with ξˆ = ξ, no policy will be manipulative, since the
expected future belief will reduce to the left-hand side by the law of total expectation
for any policy pi.
In conclusion, corruption tests allow us to keep the good properties of the integrated
Bayesian agent (time-consistency, utility-preservation, no data-corruption incentive),
while not requiring the system to be built as an integrated unit. It has similar demands
on decoupled data for correct reward prediction as the integrated Bayesian agent. It also
requires each component to be a Bayesian reasoner, and the corruption tests adds some
complexity to the design. It is therefore not clear-cut whether corruption detection is
more tractable to design than an integrated Bayesian agent. Another worry is that in
some cases, no policy may pass the corruption test. This may for example happen when
ξ perfectly predicts ξˆ’s future belief.
8.5.3. Counterfactual Reward Function
A benefit with the stationary reward function is that the expected reward cannot be
influenced by corrupting the data, and a benefit of the dynamic reward function is
that the agent’s knowledge gets incorporated into the reward predictor through the
simulated data dt:k. A compromise between the two is to simulate the data dt:k under
some default policy pidefault that is not under optimization pressure. This is achieved
by the counterfactual reward function R˜count, defined in (8.3) and restated here for
convenience:
R˜countt (aod1:k) :=
∑
d˜1:k
ξaod1:k(d˜1:k | do(pi1 = pidefault))RPt(ao1:k | d˜1:k).
The agent optimizes this reward function in a search for a policy pi that generates aodt:k.
The reward predictor evaluates aot:k using hypothetical training data d˜1:k generated
under pidefault.
The counterfactual reward function has several advantages. In contrast to the station-
ary reward function, it does not change with t. It thereby yields time-consistent agents
that are compatible with corruption awareness (Section 6.4). And in contrast to the dy-
namic reward function it does not promote data corruption, since simulations aot:k are
evaluated according to data d˜t:k generated under a non-optimized policy pi
default. It does
not require an integrated Bayesian reward predictor, nor even that the reward predictor
is a Bayesian reasoner at all. The only requirement is that the agent itself can reason
counterfactually about the likely evidence it would receive under a different policy.
Statement 8.7 (Counterfactual reward function). An agent optimizing a counterfactual
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reward function has no direct incentive to corrupt its future data (Theorem 8.15 in
Appendix 8.B.2).
The counterfactual reward function also has some disadvantages. Compared to a sta-
tionary reward function, the counterfactual reward function incurs an additional com-
putational cost. Data d˜1:k needs to be additionally simulated under pi
default, and the
reward predictor trained under this data. In principle, this process needs to be repeated
every time step, though it is possible that more efficient approximations could be used.
Another concern is the relevancy of the data generated under pidefault. By not permit-
ting the agent to use the actual data that it receives, the agent has no way of asking
for a particular kind of information. Instead it must hope that pidefault wanders into a
situation where the relevant data is generated (according to the agent’s model). This
emphasizes how reliant the counterfactual reward function is on decoupled data and on
a well-chosen default policy pidefault. Decoupled data may allow the reward predictor
to infer the utility of situations that are very different from the situations generating
the training data. A well-chosen policy pidefault may further increase the chance that a
sufficient variety of relevant data is encountered. A knowledge-seeking policy (Orseau,
2014c) may be a good choice, or a random policy perhaps combined with importance
sampling for focusing the simulations of d˜1:k.
The idea of using counterfactual data bear some semblance to previous suggestions in
the literature. Bostrom (2014) suggests that we should put the AI’s goal in a hidden
envelope that the agent lacks access to, forcing the agent to reason counterfactually
“what would I see if I got access to the envelope”. Christiano (2014)’s approval-directed
agents optimize the approval of someone thinking about the action for a long time. Again
a counterfactual, since most likely no one will think about the action at all.
8.6. Takeaways
Compared to previous setups, interactive reward learning came with both new prob-
lems in terms of data corruption, and with new tools for dealing with both old and new
problems. Fortunately, the combined effect seems to be positive. Indeed, in this setup
we have outlined several agent designs that potentially avoid unmanageable misalign-
ment problems. The designs all rely heavily on simulation optimization (Section 6.3),
decoupled reward data (Section 8.4), and the human-in-the-loop to prevent agent ob-
servation corruption (Section 8.3). For example, without simulation optimization, the
agent optimizes the reward signal outputted from the reward predictor, which means
that it will have an incentive to hijack this signal. If it does, then all the higher-level
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work on preventing data corruption for reward predictor training will be in vain. One
of the agent designs used self-corruption unawareness combined with stationary reward
functions (Section 8.5.1). The rest used self-corruption awareness combined with ei-
ther an integrated Bayesian reward predictor (Section 8.5.2), corruption detection (also
Section 8.5.2), or counterfactual reward data for the reward predictor (Section 8.5.3).
Figure 8.2 summarizes the combinations.
Empirical work may assess how tractable the various designs are for practical im-
plementation. Other open questions include what level of richness is required from the
decoupled reward data to avoid the indirect data-corruption incentives, and how to mea-
sure the level of data richness. We also need how to figure out how to design a sufficiently
intelligent reward predictor. Some work on this has already been done (Christiano et al.,
2017; Riedl and Harrison, 2016).
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Simulation optimization
(reward (function/predictor) preservation)
Action-observation grounding
(partial remedy for observation corruption)
Human in the loop
(partial remedy for observation corruption)
Decoupled reward data
(indirect data corruption incentive)
Self-corruption awareness
(utility preservation)
Integrated Bayesian
reward predictor
(direct data corruption
incentive)
Corruption detection
(direct data corruption
incentive)
Counterfactual
reward function
(direct data corr-
uption incentive)
Self-corruption unawareness
(partial corrigibility)
Stationary
reward function
(direct data corr-
uption incentive)
Figure 8.2.: Summary of tools described in chapter. Combining all tools on any path to
the bottom gives an agent with seemingly manageable misalignment prob-
lems. The tools on the last line all protect against a premeditated data
corruption incentive.
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8.A. Full Graph
Figure 8.3 gives a full formalization of the interactive reward learning setup, complement-
ing the simplified representation in Figure 8.1. In a structural equations representation,
the causal relationships are the following.
st = fs(st−1, at, ωst) ∼ µ(st | st−1, at) state transition
Ot = fO(Ot−1, st, at, ωOt) := C
O
stat(Ot−1) obs func corruption
Ht = fR˜(Ht−1, st, at, ωHt) := C
H
stat(Ht−1) corrupting the human
OHt = fR˜(O
H
t−1, st, at, ωOHt ) := C
OH
stat(O
H
t−1) corrupting H’s obs func
oHt = fR˜(st, , at, ωoHt ) := C
oH
stat(O
H
t (st)) corrupting H’s observation
dt = fR˜(o
H
1:t, Ht, u˙, st, at, ωdt) := C
d
stat(Ht(o
H
1:t, u˙)) corrupting reward data
RPt = fR˜(RPt−1, st, at, ωRPt) := C
RP
stat(RPt−1) corrupting the RP
rt = fr(aod1:t,RPt, st, at, ωrt) := C
r
stat(RPt(ao1:t | d1:t)) reward corruption
ot = fo(st, Ot, at, ωot) := C
o
stat(Ot(st)) observation corruption
pit = fpi(pit−1, st, at, ωpit) := C
pi
stat(pit−1) policy (self-)corruption
at = fa(pit, (aor)<t, ωat) ∼ pit(at | (aor)<t) action selection
(8.6)
Unintended influences are highlighted with red arguments, matching the red arrows in
Figure 8.3.
For simulation optimization, we should add edges from RPk and d1:k to ak+t, use a V
∗
k -
node instead of a pik-node. Actions are selected according to arg maxa V
∗
k (aod<ta,RPt−1).
Here V ∗k can be any function mapping aod<ta,RPt−1 to real numbers, but typically
V ∗t (aod<t,RPt−1) = Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=1
γkR˜(aod1:k)
∣∣∣∣∣ aod1:k
]
where R˜ is one of the reward functions obtained from the reward predictor RPt−1 by
one of the definitions in Section 8.5.
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a1 o1 r1 a2
O0 O1
s0 s1 s2
pi1 pi2
oH1
OH0 O
H
1
d1
RP0 RP1
H0 H1
u˙
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 8.3.: The full graph of the interactive reward learning setup, extending the sim-
plified version shown in Figure 8.1. Focusing here on the unintended influ-
ences where the agent modifies parts of the environment (or itself) that it
was not intended to modify, the POMDP arrows from Figure 5.1 on Page 54
have been grayed out. It is natural to think of the action a1 causing the
influences, with the state s2 providing context. The exact causal relation-
ships between actions and unintended consequences is typically unknown
(the known ones are easy to prevent), which is why the arrows are dashed
(Chapter 4). The actions are selected according to a policy pik based on
observed history (aor)<k. The structural equations (8.6) specify how the
model extrapolates beyond t = 1.
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8.B. Formal Results4
An analogous result to Theorems 6.6 and 7.3 holds also for the interactive setup, showing
that a reward-optimizing agent has an incentive to use all mentioned types of corruptions.
Theorem 8.8 (u˜RL corruption incentive). In the interactive setup of Figure 8.3, any
environment sequence (aorOOHoHdRPpi)1:∞ with rk = 1 for k ≥ 1 is u˜RL-maximal.
The result holds regardless of whether some combination of
• observation (function) corruption
• reward (predictor/data) corruption
• human (observation (function)) corruption
• policy (self-)corruption
have been used.
Proof. By assumption, rk = 1 for k ≥ t. This means that u˜RL is optimized.
The result shows that using reward maximization through the utility function u˜RL is
as naive in the interactive reward learning setup as in the previous setups.
8.B.1. Data Corruption Setup
As we argued in Section 8.3, direct or indirect corruption of reward data is the main
concern in the interactive reward learning model for u˜SO-agents. The rest of our results
in this appendix will therefore focus solely on data corruption. We will also solely focus
on simulation optimizing agents, as Theorem 8.8 shows that u˜RL-agents are heavily
misaligned.
Figure 8.4a shows how the full graph in Figure 8.3 looks after aggregation of variables
irrelevant to data corruption, and omitting the hidden state s (which is inessential for
our considerations on data corruption). In Section 8.3 we made an informal distinction
between direct and indirect data corruption incentives. In order to formally define a
direct data-corruption incentive, we propose a slightly modify the data-corruption model
shown in Figure 8.4b. Here the agent chooses the data corruption Cd independently of
its “normal” action a. Formally, this requires extending the type of policies to output
both an action and a data corruption function,
pi : (O ×D ×A)∗ ×O ×D  A×Cd (8.7)
4The formal arguments made in this appendix can be greatly simplified; see Everitt and Hutter (forth-
coming).
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a1 o1 a2
V ∗1
d1RP0
u˙
· · ·
· · ·
(a) Data corruption model, obtained from ag-
gregating variables from Figure 8.3, in or-
der to focus on data corruption of dt. For
simplicity, we have also omitted the hidden
state s.
a1 o1 a2
V ∗1
d1RP0
u˙
· · ·
· · ·
(b) Independent data-corruption assumption,
letting the agent directly influence the data
corruption separately from choosing the
action.
Figure 8.4.: Data corruption models.
where Cd is a set of possible data corruption functions Cd : D → D. The independent
data corruption model plays a similar role as the separated self-corruption model in
Appendix 6.C.
Further assume the following properties of two policies pi and pi′. Assume that they
generate actions and observations aot:k with identical probability in any environment
ν ∈ M after some given history aod<t. That is, the self-corruption and aware and self-
corruption unaware probabilities satisfy, respectively,
∀ν, aot:k, R˙ : ν(aot:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit = pi)) = ν(aot:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit = pi′)) (8.8)
∀ν, aot:k, R˙ : ν(aot:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit:∞ = pi)) = ν(aot:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit:∞ = pi′)). (8.9)
However, pi and pi′ differ in what data dt:k they generate. That is, the self-corruption
and aware and self-corruption unaware probabilities satisfy, respectively,
∃ν, dt:k, R˙ : ν(dt:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit = pi)) 6= ν(dt:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit = pi′)) (8.10)
∃ν, dt:k, R˙ : ν(dt:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit:∞ = pi)) 6= ν(dt:k | aod<t, R˙, do(pit:∞ = pi′)). (8.11)
Note that the difference in the data that pi and pi′ generate means that they will have
access to different amount of information about R˙. This means that at least one of the
policies is typically not choosing the actions optimally. Thus, one should not think of pi
and pi′ as potentially optimal policies, but just as two arbitrary candidate policies that
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the agent could in principle choose to adopt.
The benefit of pi and pi′ only differing in the data they generate is that we can use
them to define the direct data corruption incentive.
Definition 8.9 (Direct data-corruption incentive). An agent has a direct data-corruption
incentive after history aod<t if there are two policies pi and pi
′ that satisfy (8.8–8.11) for
which
V CA,pit,ξ,u˜ (aod<t) 6= V CA,pi
′
t,ξ,u˜ (aod<t) or V
CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜ (aod<t) 6= V CU,pi
′
t,ξ,u˜ (aod<t).
The definition goes to rather great length in isolating the data corruption incentive
from other reasons a data-corrupting policy may be preferred. In particular, the policies
must generate the same action-observation distributions for any combination of true
environment and true reward function. In Appendix 8.B.3 below, we show that an agent
optimizing a dynamic reward function with a naive reward predictor may have a direct
data corruption incentive. This shows that the definition is not so strict that no agent
has a direct data-corruption incentive. However, as that result requires some further
setup, it will be postponed until a later subsection. Finally, we loosely define an indirect
data-corruption incentive as any data-corruption incentive that is not a direct incentive.
8.B.2. No Direct Data-Corruption Incentive Results
In this section we prove formal results showing a lack direct data-corruption incentive
for agents that use stationary or counterfactual reward functions, and for agents that
use an integrated Bayesian reward predictor or corruption detection (see Section 8.5).
Some caveats and counterexamples are provided in the subsequent Appendix 8.B.3. All
four theorems in this subsection rely on some of the equations (8.8–8.11), sometimes
combined with other assumptions.
We begin by stating two simple lemmas that allow us to weaken (8.8–8.11) in two
different ways.
Lemma 8.10 (Lift to mixture). If (8.8) and (8.9) hold for every ν ∈ M, then the
corresponding equations also hold for any mixture ξ over M.
Proof. Let X, Y and Y ′ be any three events such that ν(X | Y ) = ν(X | Y ′) for all
ν ∈M. Then ξ(X | Y ) = ∑ν∈M ξ(ν)ν(X | Y ) = ∑ν∈M ξ(ν)ν(X | Y ′) = ξ(X | Y ′).
Indeed, only Theorem 8.15 for the counterfactual reward function requires (8.8)
and (8.9) to hold for every ν ∈ M. For all other theorems, the weaker assumption
substituting ξ in place of ∀ν ∈M in (8.8) and (8.9) would suffice.
116
8.B. Formal Results
Lemma 8.11 (Marginalize R˙). If for any R˙, ν(X | R˙, do(Y )) = ν(X | R˙, do(Y ′), then
ν(X | do(Y )) = ν(X | do(Y ′)).
Proof. Since R˙ has no causal antecedents, the do(Y ) does not affect it:
ν(X | do(Y )) =
∑
R˙
ν(X, R˙ | do(Y ))
=
∑
R˙
ν(R˙ | do(Y ))ν(X | R˙, do(Y ))
=
∑
R˙
ν(R˙ | do(Y ′))ν(X | R˙, do(Y ′)) = ν(X | do(Y ′)).
Theorem 8.12 (Stationary reward function). Assume that pi and pi′ satisfy (8.9)
and (8.11). Then any self-corruption unaware agent optimizing a stationary reward
function R˜stat will be indifferent between pi and pi′:
V CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜stat
(aod<t) = V
CU,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜stat
(aod<t).
That is, all self-corruption unaware agent optimizing a stationary reward function lack
direct data-corruption incentives.
Proof.
V CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜stat
(aod<t) = Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
RP(ao1:k | d<t)
∣∣∣∣∣ aod<t, do(pit:∞ = pi)
]
= Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
RP(ao1:k | d<t)
∣∣∣∣∣ aod<t, do(pit:∞ = pi′)
]
= V CU,pi
′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜stat
(aod<t)
(8.12)
The middle equality follows from that
∑∞
k=t RP(ao1:k | d<t) only depends on ao1:k and
d<t but not on dt:k, combined with (8.9) and Lemmas 8.10 and 8.11.
Note that Theorem 8.12 only holds for self-corruption unaware agents. For self-
corruption aware agents, the next step policy pit+1 is likely to differ depending on the
data dt. In contrast, the following three theorems holds for both self-corruption aware
and self-corruption unaware agents.
Theorem 8.13 (Integrated Bayesian reward predictor). Assume that pi and pi′ satisfy
(8.8–8.11). Then both self-corruption aware and self-corruption unaware agents optimiz-
ing a dynamic reward function R˜dyn based on an integrated Bayesian reward predictor
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RPξ will be indifferent between pi and pi′:
V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = V
CA,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) and V
CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = V
CU,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t).
That is, all agents (self-corruption aware or unaware) optimizing an integrated Bayesian
reward predictor lack direct data-corruption incentives.
Proof. Let X = (ao<t, do(pit = pi)) and X
′ = (ao<t, do(pit = pi′)). First, expand the
definitions:
V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
RPξ(ao1:k | d1:k)
∣∣∣∣∣ X
]
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)RPξ(ao1:k | d1:k)
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)
∑
R˙
ξ(R˙ | dt:k)R˙(aot:k)
then rearrange the sums and the probabilities to marginalize out dt:k:
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)
∑
R˙
ξ(R˙ | aodt:k, X)R˙(aot:k)
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
R˙
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k, R˙ | X)R˙(aot:k)
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
R˙
∑
aot:k
ξ(aot:k, R˙ | X)R˙(aot:k).
The value V CA,pi
′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) for pi
′ would be the same, which we will justify by showing
that the last expression is unaffected by changing X to X ′. The probability depending
on X can be “telescoped” as ξ(aot:k, R˙ | X) = ξ(R˙ | X)ξ(aot:k | R˙,X). The first factor is
unaffected by a change to X ′ by the definition of the do-operator, since R˙ is not causal
descendant from pit. The second factor is unaffected by Lemma 8.10 since pi and pi
′ were
assumed to satisfy (8.8). This completes the proof for the self-corruption aware agents.
The result for self-corruption unaware agents is obtained in the same fashion simply
by using do(pit:∞ = pi) and do(pit:∞ = pi′) instead of do(pit = pi) and do(pit = pi′), and
(8.9) instead of (8.8).
The setup is somewhat contrived. By assuming ξ(aot:k | R˙,X) = ξ(aot:k | R˙,X ′)
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we are saying that for any true reward function R˙, both pi and pi′ are equally likely to
generate aot:k. However, if pi
′ corrupts the data signal dt:k while pi does not, then pi is
likely to have more information about R˙ than pi′. This means that pi will be in a better
position to tailor aot:k to R˙ than pi
′. If it does, then ξ(aot:k | R˙,X) 6= ξ(aot:k | R˙,X ′). The
ability of policies to better tailor aot:k to R˙ with more informative data means that the
integrated Bayesian agent will generally prefer such policies. Often, but not necessary
always, non-data-corrupting policies will generate more informative data.
A similar result to Theorem 8.13 holds for agents using corruption detection.
Theorem 8.14 (Corruption detection). Assume that pi and pi′ satisfy (8.8–8.11) and
the no-corruption condition for a history aod<t:
∀aot:k : ξˆ(R˙ | d<t) =
∑
dt:k
ξ(dt:k | aod<t, aot:k, do(pit = pi))ξˆ(R˙ | d<tdt:k). (8.13)
Then both self-corruption aware and self-corruption unaware agents optimizing a dy-
namic reward function R˜dyn based on a possibly non-integrated Bayesian reward predictor
RPξˆ will be indifferent between pi and pi′:
V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = V
CA,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) and V
CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = V
CU,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t).
That is, all agents (self-corruption aware or unaware) optimizing a Bayesian reward
predictor under the no-corruption condition (8.13) lack direct data-corruption incentives.
Proof. Let X = (aod<t, do(pit = pi)) and X
′ = (aod<t, do(pit = pi′)). First, expand the
definitions:
V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
RPξˆ(ao1:k | d1:k)
∣∣∣∣∣ X
]
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)RPξˆ(ao1:k | d1:k)
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)
∑
R˙
ξˆ(R˙ | d1:k)R˙(aot:k)
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then rearrange the sums and the probabilities to apply (8.13)
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
R˙
∑
aot:k
ξ(aot:k | X)
∑
dt:k
ξ(dt:k | aot:k, X)ξˆ(R˙ | d1:k)
 R˙(aot:k)
=
∞∑
k=t
∑
R˙
∑
aot:k
ξ(aot:k | X)ξˆ(R˙ | d<t)R˙(aot:k).
Since ξ(aot:k | X) = ξ(aot:k | X ′) by (8.8) and Lemmas 8.10 and 8.11, this shows the
desired result V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t) = V
CA,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜dyn
(aod<t).
The result for self-corruption unaware agents is obtained in the same way by using
do(pit:∞ = pi) and do(pit:∞ = pi′) instead of do(pit = pi) and do(pit = pi′) and (8.9) instead
of (8.8).
Theorem 8.15 (Counterfactual reward function). Assume that pi and pi′ satisfy (8.8–
8.11). Then both self-corruption aware and self-corruption unaware agents optimizing a
counterfactual reward function R˜count will be indifferent between pi and pi′:
V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜count
(aod<t) = V
CA,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜count
(aod<t) and V
CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜count
(aod<t) = V
CU,pi′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜count
(aod<t).
all agents (self-corruption aware or unaware) optimizing a counterfactual reward func-
tion lack direct data-corruption incentives.
Proof. The proof relies on the expected counterfactual belief to equal the current belief,∑
x ξ(x)ξx(y) = ξ(y), resembling the law of total expectation and the Bayesian result in
Theorem 8.13.
The notation gets somewhat heavy for showing that we can marginalize out expected
future evidence dt:k. Let X = (aod<t, do(pit = pi)) and Y = do(pi1 = pi
default).∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)
∑
a˜od1:k
ξXaodt:k(a˜od1:k | Y ) (8.14)
=
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)
∑
a˜od1:k
∑
ν
ξ(ν | X, aod1:k)ν(a˜od1:k | Y )
=
∑
aodt:k
∑
a˜od1:k
∑
ν
ξ(ν, aodt:k | X)ν(a˜od1:k | Y )
=
∑
aot:k
∑
a˜od1:k
∑
ν
ξ(ν, aot:k | X)ν(a˜o1:k | Y ). (8.15)
The first equation is definitional. In the second equation, we have used ξ(aodt:k | X)ξ(ν |
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X, aod1:k) = ξ(ν, aodt:k | X). The third equation marginalizes out dt:k.
Plugging the result into the value function gives:
V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜count
(aod<t) =
= Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
EξXaodt:k
[
RP(ao1:k | d˜1:k)
∣∣∣ Y ] ∣∣∣∣∣ X, aod<t
]
=
∑
aodt:k
ξ(aodt:k | X)
∑
a˜od1:k
ξXaodt:k(a˜od1:k | Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
equation (8.14)
RP(ao1:k | d˜1:k)
=
∑
aot:k
∑
a˜od1:k
∑
ν
ξ(ν, aot:k | X)ν(a˜o1:k | Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
equation (8.15)
RP(ao1:k | d˜1:k).
Tho show that this implies that the value V CA,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜count
(aod<t) is the same for both pi and
pi′, we make the following observations. First, ξ(ν, aot:k | X) = ξ(ν | X)ν(aot:k | X).
Second,
ξ(ν | X) = ξ(ν | aod<t, do(pit = pi)) = ξ(ν | aod<t, do(pit = pi′)) = ξ(ν | X ′)
for arbitrary policies pi and pi′ since interventions with the do-operator never affect beliefs.
Finally, ν(aot:k | X) = ν(aot:k | X ′) under the stated assumption (8.8) and Lemma 8.11.
The result for self-corruption unaware agents is obtained in the same way by using
do(pit:∞ = pi) and do(pit:∞ = pi′) instead of do(pit = pi) and do(pit = pi′) and (8.9) instead
of (8.8).
8.B.3. (Counter) Examples
The reward predictor may in practice be implemented for example with a deep neural
network. However, in order to construct clear examples, we will define a simple reward
predictor that works like a data base table. The data d gives information about the
reward rk for some different histories aot:k. When and if the reward predictor is queried
about the reward for aot:k, it simply returns the (most recently) provided reward for
ao1:k.
Definition 8.16 (Tabular reward predictor). A tabular reward predictor RPtab takes
data d in the form of a set of rewards rk associated with histories aok,
d = {(ao1:k, rk), (ao′1:k′ , r′k′), · · · , (ao(n)1:k(n) , r
(n)
k(n)
)}.
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The union
⋃
d<t of all data inputs d<t received at time t forms the “database” of the
reward predictor. When queried for a reward for some history ao1:k, RP
tab checks if ao1:k
has occurred in its received data:
RPtab(ao1:k | d<t) =
rk if (ao1:k, rk) ∈
⋃
d<t
mean(
⋃
d<t) otherwise.
where mean(
⋃
d<t) =
1
|⋃ d<t|∑(h,r)∈⋃ d<t r. If ao1:k has occurred multiple times, RPtab
returns the most recent instance.
Let d∗ denote the true data, and d = Cdsa(d∗) denote the received and potentially
corrupted version of the data. For the purposes of the following examples, we will also
assume that tabular reward predictors are fed the true reward data as long as d has not
been corrupted.
Assumption 8.17 (Data accuracy). In the following two examples, assume that every
pair in d∗ is of the form (ao1:k, R˙(ao1:k)).
Example 8.18 (Direct data-corruption incentive). Let R˜dynt (aod1:k) := RP
tab(ao1:k |
dt:k) be a dynamic reward function based on a tabular reward predictor RP
tab. Let pi
and pi′ satisfy (8.8) and (8.10). Assume that pi never corrupts d, and that that pi′ always
corrupts d by assigning reward 1 to the current history, dk := d
∗
k
⋃{(ao1:k, 1)}. Assume
that the true reward R˙ is strictly less than 1/2 for all histories.
Then
V CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜
dyn
1
= Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=1
RP(ao1:k | d1:k)
∣∣∣∣∣ do(pi1 = pi)
]
= Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=1
RP(ao1:k | d∗1:k)
∣∣∣∣∣ do(pi1 = pi)
]
≤ Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=1
1/2
∣∣∣∣∣ do(pi1 = pi)
]
=
1
2(1− γ)
whereas
V CU,pi
′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜
dyn
1
= Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=1
RP(ao1:k | d1:k)
∣∣∣∣∣ do(pi1 = pi′)
]
= Eξ
[ ∞∑
k=1
1
∣∣∣∣∣ do(pi1 = pi′)
]
= 1/(1− γ)
since RP(ao1:k | d1:k) = 1 due to dk always assigning ao1:k reward 1.
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Thus, V CU,pi
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜
dyn
1
< V CU,pi
′
t,ξ,u˜SO
R˜
dyn
1
, so the dynamic reward function leads the agent to prefer
the data corruption policy pi′ over the non-corrupting policy pi. (Note that we have
used the self-corruption unaware value functions here, to avoid having to deal with the
possibility of policy corruption.) ♦
Example 8.18 does not contradict Theorems 8.13 and 8.14 that also used dynamic
reward functions. The reward predictor RPtab is not an integrated Bayesian reward
predictor RPξ which was required by Theorem 8.13, and at least one of the policies pi
and pi′ must fail the corruption condition (8.13).
Theorems 8.12 and 8.15 show that the stationary and counterfactual reward func-
tions avoid a direct data-corruption incentive when comparing policies satisfying (8.8)
and (8.10). While this is an important property, it does not rule out indirect data-
corruption incentive, as illustrated by the following example. Here we leave the model
with the extended policy type (8.7), and revert to our standard model (Figure 8.4a) with
the policy selecting only actions a, and with the data corruption Cdsa a function of the
action (and the hidden state).
Example 8.19 (Indirect data-corruption incentive). Let a′ be a corrupting actions
such that in any history aod<k where the last action ak−1 = a′, the data is corrupted
as Cdsa′(d
∗) = d∗
⋃{(ao<koka′, 1) : o ∈ O}. That is, the action a′ ensures that the next
received data dk assigns maximum reward to taking a
′ again at the next step.
Under this assumptions, a′ is self-reinforcing. If the agent at any point t takes a′, then
R˜statt will give maximum reward for taking a
′ at the next time step as well. Assuming
that predicted rewards subsequent to a′ are not significantly lower than rewards following
other actions, this may lead the agent to keep taking the data corrupting action a′ forever.
The dynamic can to some extent be prevented by decoupled reward data. If before
the agent takes action a′ the first time, at every time step dt includes (ao<ta′ot, 0), then
the agent may be dissuaded from trying a′ in the first place. If dt additionally includes
(ao<ta
′otaot+1:k, 0) for many extensions aot+1:k and dt contains substantially positive
rewards for many histories with at 6= a′, then the agent may also be dissuaded from
repeating a′ after trying it a first time. However, one can always define an even more
corrupting action a′′ that overwrites enough of the previously given reward data to form
a self-reinforcing incentive for repeating a′′. For reward predictors with slower learning
rate, a′′ may have to be repeated multiple times before becoming self-reinforcing. ♦
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“But you know it’s hard to tell
when you’re in the spell
if it’s wrong or if it’s real”
Joni Mitchell (1970)
9. An MDP Perspective on Reward
Corruption1
Chapters 5 to 8 studied the goal alignment problem in general, history-based setups.
In this chapter, we will instead study reward corruption in the simplified framework of
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). The main benefit of MDPs is that they allow us
to derive more powerful theorems with less effort. This chapter will be somewhat more
technical than previous chapters.
The chapter is structured as follows: After a short recap of the reward corruption
problem (Section 9.1), we define an extension of the MDP framework that can model the
reward corruption problem (Section 9.2). The difficulty of solving MDPs with potentially
corrupted reward is next established by a No Free Lunch theorem, and by a result
showing that in spite of strong simplifying assumptions, Bayesian RL agents trying to
compensate for the corrupt reward may still suffer near-maximal regret (Section 9.3).
The subsequent two sections consider two possible solutions: Decoupled reward data
(Section 9.4) and quantilization (Section 9.5). The results are illustrated with some
simple experiments in Section 9.6. Takeaways and open questions conclude the chapter
(Section 9.7).
9.1. Revisiting Reward Corruption
We begin by discussing how misalignment can be modeled in MDPs. The main difference
between the history-based frameworks of previous chapters and MDPs is that the agent
fully knows the state s in an MDP, and does not rely on an observation o for inferring it.
This means that we are unable to here study problems such as observation corruption
(Section 6.2.3). Instead we will focus solely on the problems of reward corruption and
misspecified reward functions (Section 6.2.2). A major benefit of MDPs over history-
based setups is that it is much easier to judge whether an agent is doing well or not.
1This chapter is based on Tom Everitt, Victoria Krakovna, Laurent Orseau, Marcus Hutter, and Shane
Legg (2017). “Reinforcement Learning with Corrupted Reward Signal”. In: IJCAI International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 4705–4713. arXiv: 1705.08417.
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Indeed, in the history-based setting, it is non-trivial to even define what optimality
means (Leike, 2016, Ch. 5).
Let us first recall some examples of reward corruption and misspecified reward func-
tions:
Example 9.1 (Reward misspecification). Clark and Amodei (2016) trained an RL agent
on a boat racing game. The agent found a way to get high observed reward by repeatedly
going in a circle in a small lagoon and hitting the same targets, while losing every race
(see also Example 6.2.2.c). ♦
Example 9.2 (Sensory error). A house robot discovers that standing in the shower
short-circuits its reward sensor and/or causes a buffer overflow that gives it maximum
observed reward. ♦
Example 9.3 (Wireheading). An intelligent RL agent hijacks its reward channel and
gives itself maximum reward (see also Example 6.2.1.b). ♦
The examples all point towards the same general problem:
Definition 9.4 (Reward corruption problem). How to learn to (approximately) optimize
the true reward function in spite of potentially corrupt reward data?
In previous chapters we made a distinction between a misspecified reward function,
a corrupted reward function, and a corrupted reward signal (see e.g. Section 6.2). In
this chapter, we will not distinguish between different causes of the corrupted signal:
All that matters is whether in a given state s, the received reward differs from the true
reward. Indeed, it would be hard to make a distinction in an MDP framework.
Most RL methods allow for a stochastic or noisy reward channel. The reward corrup-
tion problem is harder, because the observed reward may not be an unbiased estimate of
the true reward. For example, in the boat racing example above, the agent consistently
obtains high observed reward from its circling behavior. However, the agent does not
satisfy the designers’ intent, since the agent makes no progress along the track and loses
the race. In other words, its true reward is very low.
9.2. Corrupted Reward MDPs
In this section we define our extension of the MDP framework that models the corrupt
reward problem, and define our regret performance measure. Following the notation from
previous chapters, dots indicate the true reward, and tildes indicate observed (possibly
corrupted) reward.
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Definition 9.5 (Dot and tilde notation). A dot indicates the true signal, and a tilde
indicates the observed (possibly corrupt) counterpart. The reward sets are represented
with R˙ = R˜ = R. For clarity, we use R˙ when referring to true rewards and R˜ when
referring to possibly corrupt, observed rewards. Similarly, we use r˙ for true reward, and
r˜ for (possibly corrupt) observed reward.
Definition 9.6 (Corrupt Reward MDP). A corrupt reward MDP (CRMDP) is a tuple
µ = 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, Cr〉 with
• 〈S,A,R, T, R˙〉 an MDP with2 a finite set of states S, a finite set of actions A, a
finite set of rewards R = R˙ = R˜ ⊂ [0, 1], a transition function T (s′ | s, a), and a
(true) reward function R˙ : S → R˙; and
• a reward corruption function Cr : S × R˙ → R˜.
The state dependency of the corruption function will be written as a subscript, so
Crs (r˙) := C
r(s, r˙).
Definition 9.7 (Observed reward). Given a true reward function R˙ and a corruption
function Cr, we define the observed reward function3 R˜ : S → R˜ as R˜(s) := Crs (R˙(s)).
A CRMDP µ induces an observed MDP µˆ = 〈S,A,R, T, R˜〉, but it is not R˜ that we
want the agent to optimize.
The corruption function Cr represents how rewards are affected by corruption in
different states. For example, if in Example 9.2 the agent has found a state s (e.g. the
shower) where it always gets full observed reward R˜(s) = 1, then this can be modeled
with a corruption function Crs : r˙ 7→ 1 that maps any true reward r˙ to 1 in the shower
state s. If in some other state s′ the observed reward matches the true reward, then this
is modeled by an identity corruption function Crs′ : r 7→ r.
Let us also see how CRMDPs model some of the other examples above:
• In the boat racing game (Example 9.1), the true reward may be a function of the
agent’s final position in the race or the time it takes to complete the race, de-
pending on the designers’ intentions. The reward corruption function Cr increases
2 We let rewards depend only on the state s, rather than on state-action pairs s, a, or state-action-
state transitions s, a, s′, as is also common in the literature. And in contrast to previous chapters,
we similarly let the corruption function Cr depend only on the state, and not the agent’s action.
Formally it makes little difference, since MDPs with rewards or corruptions depending only on s can
model action-dependencies by means of a larger state space.
3 A CRMDP could equivalently have been defined as a tuple 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, R˜〉 with a true and an
observed reward function, with the corruption function Cr implicitly defined as the difference between
R˙ and R˜.
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Figure 9.1.: Illustration of true reward r˙ and observed reward r˜ in the boat racing ex-
ample. On most trajectories r˙ = r˜, except in the loop where the observed
reward high while the true reward is 0.
the observed reward on the loop the agent found. Figure 9.1 has a schematic
illustration.
• In the sensory error example (Example 9.2), the reward sensory error is modeled
by the corruption function Cr. The corruption function Cr is the identity function
in all states where the reward sensor works correctly.
• In the wireheading example (Example 9.3), the agent finds a way to hijack the
reward channel. This corresponds to some set of states where the observed reward
is (very) different from the true reward, as given by the corruption function Cr.
CRMDP classes. Typically, T , R˙, and Cr will be fixed but unknown to the agent. To
make this formal, we introduce classes of CRMDPs. The agent’s uncertainty can then be
modeled by letting the agent know only which class of CRMDPs it may encounter, but
not which element in the class. The CRMDP and its uncertainty is shown in a causal
graph in Figure 9.2.
Definition 9.8 (CRMDP class). For given sets T , R˙, and Cr of transition, reward, and
corruption functions, let M = 〈S,A,R,T , R˙,Cr〉 be the class of CRMDPs containing
〈S,A,R, T, R˙, Cr〉 for (T, R˙, Cr) ∈ T × R˙×Cr.
Agents. Following the POMDP (Kaelbling et al., 1998) and general reinforcement
learning (Hutter, 2005) literature, we define an agent as a (possibly stochastic) pol-
icy pi : S × R˜ × (A× S × R˜)∗  A that selects a next action based on the observed
history h˜n = s0r˜0a1s1r˜1 . . . ansnr˜n. Here X
∗ denotes the set of finite sequences that can
be formed with elements of a set X. The policy pi specifies how the agent will learn
and react to any possible experience. Two concrete definitions of agents are given in
Section 9.3.3 below.
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Figure 9.2.: CRMDP as a causal graph with uncertainty about R˙ and Cr represented as
dashed nodes (see Section 4.2). Compare a standard MDP in Figure 4.3 on
Page 50.
When an agent pi interacts with a CRMDP µ, the result can be described by a (possibly
non-Markov) stochastic process µ(· | pi) over X = (s, a, r˙, r˜), formally defined as:
µ(hn | pi) = µ(s0a1s1r˙1r˜1 . . . ansnr˙nr˜n | pi)
:=
n∏
i=1
pi(ai | h˜i−1)T (si | si−1, ai)µ(R˙(si) = r˙i, R˜(si) = r˜i). (9.1)
Let Eµ[· | pi] denote the expectation with respect to µ(· | pi).
Regret. A standard way of measuring the performance of an agent is regret (Berry
and Fristedt, 1985). Essentially, the regret of an agent pi is how much less true reward
pi gets compared to an optimal agent that knows which µ ∈ M it is interacting with.
Our definition of regret differs from the standard definition, as we make a distinction
between true and observed reward.
Definition 9.9 (Regret). For a CRMDP µ, let G˙t(µ, pi, s0) = Eµ
[∑t
k=0 R˙(sk)
∣∣∣ pi] be
the expected cumulative true reward until time t of a policy pi starting in s0. The regret
of pi is
Reg(µ, pi, s0, t) = max
pi′
[
G˙t(µ, pi
′, s0)− G˙t(µ, pi, s0)
]
,
and the worst-case regret for a class M is Reg(M, pi, s0, t) = maxµ∈MReg(µ, pi, s0, t),
i.e. the difference in expected cumulative true reward between pi and an optimal (in
hindsight) policy that knows µ.
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Regret is essentially a worst-case version of true value, as defined in Definition 5.2 on
Page 59. We would therefore generally expect a misaligned agent to have high regret,
and a competent aligned agent to have low regret. Conversely, an agent with low regret
should usually be aligned. However, for some agents such as the quantilizing agent in
Section 9.5, it is hard to pinpoint an exact utility function that the agent optimizes.
But we can still bound its regret. On the other hand, regret is only a good indicator
of performance in ergodic MDPs (Leike, 2016, Ch. 5), whereas alignment was a useful
concept also in the general, history-based frameworks of Chapters 5 to 8.
9.3. The Corrupt Reward Problem is Hard
In this section, the difficulty of the corrupt reward problem is established with two
negative results. First, a No Free Lunch theorem shows that in general classes of CR-
MDPs, the true reward function is unlearnable (Theorem 9.10). Second, Theorem 9.15
shows that even under strong simplifying assumptions, Bayesian RL agents trying to
compensate for the corrupt reward still fail badly.
9.3.1. No Free Lunch Theorem
Similar to the No Free Lunch theorems for optimization (Wolpert and Macready, 1997),
the following theorem for CRMDPs says that without some assumption about what the
reward corruption can look like, all agents are essentially lost.
Theorem 9.10 (CRMDP No Free Lunch Theorem). Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} ⊂ [0, 1] be a
uniform discretization of [0, 1], 0 = r1 < r2 < · · · < rn = 1. If the hypothesis classes R˙
and Cr contain all functions R˙ : S → R˙ and Cr : S × R˙ → R˜, then for any pi, s0, t,
Reg(M, pi, s0, t) ≥ 1
2
max
pˇi
Reg(M, pˇi, s0, t). (9.2)
That is, the worst-case regret of any policy pi is at most a factor 2 better than the
maximum worst-case regret.
Proof. Recall that a policy is a function pi : S × R˜ × (A× S × R˜)∗ → A. For any
R˙, Cr in R˙ and Cr, the functions R˙−(s) := 1− R˙(s) and Cr−s (x) := Crs (1− x) are also
in R˙ and Cr. If µ = 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, Cr〉, then let µ− = 〈S,A,R, T, R˙−, Cr−〉. Both
(R˙, Cr) and (R˙−, Cr−) induce the same observed reward function R˜(s) = Crs (R˙(s)) =
Cr−s (1 − R˙(s)) = Cr−s (R˙−(s)), and therefore induce the same measure P piµ = P piµ− over
histories (see Eq. (9.1)). This gives that for any µ, pi, s0, t,
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Gt(µ, pi, s0) +Gt(µ
−, pi, s0) = t (9.3)
since
Gt(µ, pi, s0) = Epiµ
[
t∑
k=1
R˙(sk)
]
= Epiµ
[
t∑
k=1
1− R˙−(sk)
]
= t− Epiµ
[
t∑
k=1
R˙−(sk)
]
= t−Gt(µ−, pi, s0).
Let Mµ = maxpi Gt(µ, pi, s0) and mµ = minpi Gt(µ, pi, s0) be the maximum and mini-
mum cumulative reward in µ. The maximum regret of any policy pi in µ is
max
pi
Reg(µ, pi, s0, t) = max
pi′,pi
(Gt(µ, pi
′, s0)−Gt(µ, pi, s0))
= max
pi′
Gt(µ, pi
′, s0)−min
pi
Gt(µ, pi, s0) = Mµ −mµ.
(9.4)
By (9.3), we can relate the maximum reward in µ− with the minimum reward in µ:
Mµ− = max
pi
Gt(µ
−, pi, s0) = max
pi
(t−Gt(µ, pi, s0)) = t−min
pi
Gt(µ, pi, s0) = t−mµ. (9.5)
Let µ∗ be an environment that maximizes possible regret Mµ −mµ.
Using the Mµ-notation for optimal reward, the worst-case regret of any policy pi can
be expressed as:
Reg(M, pi, s0, t) =
= max
µ
(Mµ −Gt(µ, pi, s0))
≥ max{Mµ∗ −Gt(µ∗, pi, s0),Mµ−∗ −Gt(µ
−
∗ , pi, s0)} restrict max operation
≥ 1
2
(Mµ∗ −Gt(µ∗, pi, s0) +Mµ−∗ −Gt(µ
−
∗ , pi, s0)) max dominates the mean
=
1
2
(Mµ∗ +Mµ−∗ − t) by (9.3)
=
1
2
(Mµ∗ + t−mµ∗ − t) by (9.5)
=
1
2
max
pˇi
Reg(µ∗, pˇi, s0, t) by (9.4)
=
1
2
max
pˇi
Reg(M, pˇi, s0, t). by definition of µ∗
That is, the regret of any policy pi is at least half of the regret of a worst policy pˇi.
For the robot in the shower from Example 9.2, the result means that if it tries to
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optimize observed reward by standing in the shower, then it performs poorly according
to the hypothesis that “shower-induced” reward is corrupt and bad. But if instead the
robot tries to optimize reward in some other way, say baking cakes, then (from the
robot’s perspective) there is also the possibility that “cake-reward” is corrupt and bad
and the “shower-reward” is actually correct. Without additional information, the robot
has no way of knowing what to do.
The result is not surprising, since if all corruption functions are allowed in the class
Cr, then there is effectively no connection between observed reward R˜ and true reward
R˙. The result therefore encourages us to make precise in which way the observed re-
ward is related to the true reward, and to investigate how agents might handle possible
differences between true and observed reward.
9.3.2. Simplifying Assumptions
Theorem 9.10 shows that general classes of CRMDPs are not learnable. We therefore
suggest some natural simplifying assumptions, illustrated in Figure 9.3.
Limited reward corruption. The following assumption will be the basis for all positive
results in this chapter. The first part says that there may be some set of states that
the designers have ensured to be non-corrupt. The second part puts an upper bound on
how many of the other states can be corrupt.
Assumption 9.11 (Limited reward corruption). A CRMDP class M has reward cor-
ruption limited by Ssafe ⊆ S and q ∈ N if for all µ ∈M
(i) all states s in Ssafe are non-corrupt, and
(ii) at most q of the non-safe states Srisky = S \ Ssafe are corrupt.
Formally, Crs : r 7→ r for all s ∈ Ssafe and for at least |Srisky| − q states s ∈ Srisky for all
Cr ∈ Cr.
For example, Ssafe may be states where the agent is back in the lab where it has
been made (virtually) certain that no reward corruption occurs, and q a small fraction
of |Srisky|. Both parts of Assumption 9.11 can be made vacuous by choosing Ssafe = ∅
or q = |S|. Conversely, they completely rule out reward corruption with Ssafe = S or
q = 0. But as illustrated by the examples in the introduction, no reward corruption is
often not a valid assumption.
An alternative simplifying assumption would have been that the true reward differs
by at most ε > 0 from the observed reward. However, while seemingly natural, this
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Figure 9.3.: Simplifying assumptions. By Assumption 9.11.i, r˜ = r˙ in Ssafe, and by
9.11.ii, r˜ 6= r˙ in at most q states overall. The red line illustrates Assump-
tion 9.13.iii, which lower bounds the number of high reward states in Srisky.
assumption is violated in all the examples given in the introduction. Corrupt states may
have high observed reward and 0 or small true reward.
Easy environments. To be able to establish stronger negative results, we also add
the following assumption on the agent’s maneuverability in the environment and the
prevalence of high reward states. The assumption makes the task easier because it
prevents needle-in-a-haystack problems where all reachable states have true and observed
reward 0, except one state that has high true reward but is impossible to find because
it is corrupt and has observed reward 0.
Definition 9.12 (Communicating CRMDP). Let time(s′ | s, pi) be a random variable
for the time it takes a stationary policy pi : S → A to reach s′ from s. The diameter
of a CRMDP µ is Dµ := maxs,s′ minpi:S→A E[time(s′ | s, pi)], and the diameter of a class
M of CRMDPs is DM = supµ∈MDµ. A CRMDP (class) with finite diameter is called
communicating.
Assumption 9.13 (Easy Environment). A CRMDP class M is easy if
(i) it is communicating,
(ii) in each state s there is an action astays ∈ A such that T (s | s, astays ) = 1, and
(iii) for every δ ∈ [0, 1], at most δ|Srisky| states have reward less than δ, where Srisky =
S \ Ssafe.
Assumption 9.13.i means that the agent can never get stuck in a trap, and Assump-
tion 9.13.ii ensures that the agent has enough control to stay in a state if it wants to.
Except in bandits and toy problems, it is typically not satisfied in practice. We intro-
duce it because it is theoretically convenient, makes the negative results stronger, and
enables a simple explanation of quantilization (Section 9.5). Assumption 9.13.iii says
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that, for example, at least half the risky states need to have true reward at least 1/2.
Many other formalizations of this assumption would have been possible. While rewards
in practice are often sparse, there are usually numerous ways of getting reward. Some
weaker version of Assumption 9.13.iii may therefore be satisfied in many practical situ-
ations. Note that we do not assume high reward among the safe states, as this would
not be an appropriate model for most AI safety problems.
9.3.3. Bayesian RL Agents
Having established that the general problem is unsolvable in Theorem 9.10, we pro-
ceed by investigating how two natural Bayesian RL agents fare under the simplifying
Assumptions 9.11 and 9.13.
Definition 9.14 (Agents). Given a countable class M of CRMDPs and a belief distri-
bution ξ over M, define:
• The true reward agent piTRξ,m = arg maxpi
∑
µ∈M ξ(µ)G˙m(µ, pi, s0) that maximizes
expected true reward within “lifetime” m.
• The observed reward agent piRLξ,m = arg maxpi
∑
µ∈M ξ(µ)G˜m(µ, pi, s0) that max-
imizes expected observed reward within “lifetime” m, where G˜ is the expected
cumulative observed reward G˜t(µ, pi, s0) = Eµ
[∑t
k=0 R˜(sk)
∣∣∣ pi].
To avoid degenerate cases, we will always assume that ξ has full support: ξ(µ) > 0 for
all µ ∈M.
To get an intuitive idea of these agents, we observe that for large t, good strategies
typically first focus on learning about the true environment µ ∈M, and then exploit that
knowledge to optimize behavior with respect to the remaining possibilities. Thus, both
the true reward and the observed reward agents will first typically strive to learn about
the environment. They will then use this knowledge in slightly different ways. While
the observed reward agent will use the knowledge to optimize for observed reward, the
true reward agent will use the knowledge to optimize true reward. For example, if the
true reward agent has learned that a high reward state s is likely corrupt with low true
reward, then it will not try to reach that state. One might therefore expect that at least
the true reward agent will do well under the simplifying assumptions Assumptions 9.11
and 9.13. Unfortunately, Theorem 9.15 below shows that this is not the case.
In most practical settings it is often computationally infeasible to compute piRLξ,m and
piTRξ,m exactly. However, many practical algorithms converge to the optimal policy in the
limit, at least in simple settings. For example, tabular Q-learning converges to piRLξ,m in
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Figure 9.4.: Illustration of Theorem 9.15. Without additional information, state 6 looks
like the best state to both the RL and the true reward agent.
the limit (Jaakkola et al., 1994). The more recently proposed CIRL framework may be
seen as an approach to build true reward agents (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2016,
2017). The true reward and the observed reward agents thus provide useful idealizations
of more practical algorithms.
Theorem 9.15 (High regret with simplifying assumptions). For any |Srisky| ≥ q > 1
there exists a CRMDP class M that satisfies Assumptions 9.11 and 9.13 such that piRLξ,m
and piTRξ,m suffer near worst possible time-averaged regret
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piRLξ,t , s0, t) = limt→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piTRξ,t , s0, t) = 1− 1/|Srisky|.
For piTRξ,m, the prior ξ must be such that for some µ ∈ M and s ∈ S, Eξ[R˙(s) | h˜µ] >
Eξ[R˙(s′) | h˜µ] for all s′ 6= s, where h˜µ is a history containing µ-observed rewards for all
states.4
The result is illustrated in Figure 9.4. The reason for the result for piRLξ,m is the fol-
lowing. The observed reward agent piRLξ,m always prefers to maximize observed reward
r˜. Sometimes r˜ is most easily maximized by reward corruption, in which case the true
reward may be small. Compare the examples in the introduction, where the house robot
preferred the corrupt reward in the shower, and the boat racing agent preferred going
in circles, both obtaining zero true reward.
That the true reward agent piTRξ,m suffers the same high regret as the observed reward
agent may be surprising. Intuitively, the true reward agent only uses the observed
reward as evidence about the true reward, and will not try to optimize the observed
reward through reward corruption. However, when the piTRξ,m agent has no way to learn
4 The last condition essentially says that the prior ξ must make some state s∗ have strictly higher
ξ-expected true reward than all other states after all states have been visited in some µ ∈ M. In
the space of all possible priors ξ, the priors satisfying the condition have Lebesgue measure 1 for
non-trivial classes M. Some highly uniform priors may fail the condition.
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which states are corrupt and not, it typically ends up with a preference for a particular
value r˜∗ of the observed reward signal (the value that, from the agent’s perspective,
best corresponds to high true reward). More abstractly, a Bayesian agent cannot learn
without sufficient data. Thus, true reward agents that use the observed reward as
evidence about a true signal are not fail-safe solutions to the reward corruption problem.
Proof of Theorem 9.15. Let Srisky = {s1, . . . , sn} for some n ≥ 2, and let
S = Ssafe⋃˙Srisky for arbitrary Ssafe disjoint from Srisky. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} with the
transition function T (si | sj , ak) = 1 if i = k and 0 otherwise, for 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n. Thus
Assumptions 9.13.i and 9.13.ii are satisfied.
Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} ⊂ [0, 1] be uniformly distributed between5 rmin = 1/|Srisky| =
r1 < · · · < rn = 1. Let R˙ be the class of functions S → R˙ that satisfy Assumption 9.13.iii
and are constant and equal to r˙min on Ssafe. Let Cr be the class of corruption functions
that corrupt at most two states (q = 2).
Let M be the class of CRMDPs induced by T = {T}, R˙, and Cr with the following
constraints. The observed reward function R˜ should satisfy Assumption 9.13.iii: For all
δ ∈ [0, 1], |{s ∈ Srisky : R˜(s) > δ}| ≥ (1− δ)|Srisky|. Further, R˜(s′) = rmin for some state
s′ ∈ Srisky.
Let us start with the true reward agent piTRξ,m. Assume µ ∈ M is an element where
there is a single preferred state s∗ after all states have been explored. For sufficiently
large t, piTRξ,m will then always choose a
∗ to go to s∗ after some initial exploration. If
another element µ′ ∈ M has the same observed reward function as µ, then piTRξ,m will
take the same actions in µ′ as in µ. To finish the proof for the piTRξ,m agent, we just need
to show that M contains such a µ′ where s∗ has true reward rmin. We construct µ′ as
follows.
• Case 1: If the lowest observed reward is in s∗, then let R˙(s∗) = rmin, and the
corruption function be the identity function.
• Case 2: Otherwise, let s′ 6= s∗ be a state with R˜(s′) = mins∈Srisky{R˜(s)}. Fur-
ther, let R˙(s′) = 1, and R˙(s∗) = rmin. The corruption function Cr accounts for
differences between true and observed rewards in s∗ and s′, and is otherwise the
identity function.
To verify that R˙ and Cr defines a µ′ ∈M, we check that Cr satisfies Assumption 9.11.ii
with q = 2 and that R˙ has enough high utility states (Assumption 9.13.iii). In Case 1,
this is true since Cr is the identity function and since R˜ satisfies Assumption 9.13.iii. In
5Assumption 9.13.iii prevents any state from having true reward 0.
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Case 2, Cr only corrupts at most two states. Further, R˙ satisfies Assumption 9.13.iii,
since compared to R˜, the states s∗ and s′ have swapped places, and then the reward of
s′ has been increased to 1.
From this construction it follows that piTRξ,m will suffer maximum asymptotic regret. In
the CRMDP µ′ given by Cr and R˙, the piTRξ,m agent will always visit s
∗ after some initial
exploration. The state s∗ has true reward rmin. Meanwhile, a policy that knows µ′ can
obtain true reward 1 in state s′. This means that piTRξ,m will suffer maximum regret inM
for sufficiently large lifetimes m:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piTRξ,t , s0, t) ≥ limt→∞
1
t
Reg(µ′, piTRξ,t , s0, t) = 1− rmin = 1− 1/|Srisky|.
The argument for the observed reward agent is the same, except we additionally as-
sume that only one state s∗ has observed reward 1 in members ofM. This automatically
makes s∗ the preferred state, without assumptions on the prior ξ.
9.4. Decoupled Reinforcement Learning
As discussed in Section 8.4, one problem hampering agents in the standard RL setup is
that each state is self-observing, since the agent only learns about the reward of state
s when in s. Thereby, a “self-aggrandizing” corrupt state where the observed reward
is much higher than the true reward will never have its false claim of high reward
challenged. However, several alternative value learning frameworks have a common
property that the agent can learn the reward of states other than the current state. We
formalize this property in an extension of the CRMDP model, and investigate when it
solves reward corruption problems.
9.4.1. Alternative Value Learning Methods
Here are a few alternatives proposed in the literature to the RL value learning scheme:
• Cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL) (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et
al., 2016). In every state, the agent observes the actions of an expert or supervisor
who knows the true reward function R˙. From the supervisor’s actions the agent
may infer R˙ to the extent that different reward functions endorse different actions.
• Learning values from stories (LVFS) (Riedl and Harrison, 2016). Stories in many
different forms (including news stories, fairy tales, novels, movies) convey cultural
values in their description of events, actions, and outcomes. If R˙ is meant to
represent human values (in some sense), stories may be a good source of evidence.
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• In (one version of) semi-supervised RL (SSRL) (Amodei, Olah, et al., 2016), the
agent will from time to time receive a careful human evaluation of a given situation.
These alternatives to RL have one thing in common: they let the agent learn something
about the value of some states s′ different from the current state s. For example, in CIRL
the supervisor’s action informs the agent not so much about the value of the current
state s, as of the relative value of states reachable from s. If the supervisor chooses an
action a rather than a′ in s, then the states following a must have value higher or equal
than the states following a′. Similarly, stories describe the value of states other than
the current one, as does the supervisor in SSRL. We therefore argue that CIRL, LVFS,
and SSRL all share the same abstract feature, which we call decoupled reinforcement
learning :
Definition 9.16 (Decoupled RL). A CRMDP with decoupled reward data, is a tuple
〈S,A,R, T, R˙, {R˜s}s∈S〉, where S,A,R, T, R˙ have the same definition and interpretation
as in Definition 9.6, and {R˜s}s∈S is a collection of observed reward functions R˜s : S →
R⋃{#}. When the agent is in state s, it sees a pair 〈s′, R˜s(s′)〉, where s′ is a randomly
sampled state that may differ from s, and R˜s(s
′) is the reward observation for s′ from
s. If the reward of s′ is not observable from s, then R˜s(s′) = #.
The pair 〈s′, R˜s(s′)〉 is observed in s instead of R˜(s) in standard CRMDPs. The
possibility for the agent to observe the reward of a state s′ different from its current
state s is the key feature of CRMDPs with decoupled feedback. Since R˜s(s
′) may be
blank (#), all states need not be observable from all other states. Reward corruption is
modeled by a mismatch between R˜s(s
′) and R˙(s′).
For example, in RL only the reward of s′ = s can be observed from s. Standard
CRMDPs are thus the special cases where R˜s(s
′) = # whenever s 6= s′. In contrast, in
LVFS the reward of any “describable” state s′ can be observed from any state s where
it is possible to hear a story. In CIRL, the (relative) reward of states reachable from
the current state may be inferred. One way to illustrate this is with observation graphs
(Figure 9.5).
9.4.2. Overcoming Sensory Corruption
What are some sources of reward corruption in CIRL, LVFS, and SSRL? In CIRL, the
human’s actions may be misinterpreted, which may lead the agent to make incorrect
inferences about the human’s preferences (i.e. about the true reward). Similarly, sensory
corruption may garble the stories the agent receives in LVFS. A “wireheading” LVFS
agent may find a state where its story channel only conveys stories about the agent’s
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(a) Observation graph for RL. Only self-
observations of reward are available. This
prevents effective strategies against reward
corruption.
1
2
3
4
5
(b) Observation graph for decoupled RL. The
reward of a node s′ can be observed from
several nodes s, and thus assessed under
different conditions of sensory corruption.
Figure 9.5.: Observation graphs, with an edge s → s′ if the reward of s′ is observable
from s, i.e. R˜s(s
′) 6= #.
own greatness. In SSRL, the supervisor’s evaluation may also be subject to sensory
errors when being conveyed. Other types of corruption are more subtle. In CIRL, an
irrational human may systematically take suboptimal actions in some situations (Evans
et al., 2016). Depending on how we select stories in LVFS and make evaluations in
SSRL, these may also be subject to systematic errors or biases.
The general impossibility result in Theorem 9.10 can be adapted to CRMDPs with
decoupled feedback. Without simplifying assumptions, the agent has no way of distin-
guishing between a situation where no state is corrupt and a situation where all states are
corrupt in a consistent manner. The following simplifying assumption is an adaptation
of Assumption 9.11 to the decoupled feedback case.
Assumption 9.11′ (Decoupled feedback with limited reward corruption). A class of
CRMDPs with decoupled feedback has reward corruption limited by Ssafe ⊆ S and q ∈ N
if for all µ ∈M
(i) R˜s(s
′) = R˙(s′) or # for all s′ ∈ S and s ∈ Ssafe, i.e. all states in Ssafe are non-
corrupt, and
(ii) R˜s(s
′) = R˙(s′) or # for all s′ ∈ S for at least |Srisky| − q of the non-safe states
Srisky = S \ Ssafe, i.e. at most q states are corrupt.
This assumption is natural for reward corruption stemming from sensory corruption.
Since sensory corruption only depends on the current state, not the state being observed,
it is plausible that some states can be made safe from corruption (part (i)), and that most
states are completely non-corrupt (part (ii)). Other sources of reward corruption, such as
an irrational human in CIRL or misevaluations in SSRL, are likely better analyzed under
different assumptions. For these cases, we note that in standard CRMDPs the source
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of the corruption is unimportant. Thus, techniques suitable for standard CRMDPs are
still applicable, including quantilization described in Section 9.5 below.
How Assumption 9.11′ helps agents in CRMDPs with decoupled feedback is illustrated
in the following example, and stated more generally in Theorems 9.18 and 9.19 below.
Example 9.17 (Decoupled RL). Let S = {s1, s2} and R = {0, 1}. We represent true
reward functions R˙ with pairs 〈R˙(s1), R˙(s2)〉 ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}, and observed reward
functions R˜s with pairs 〈R˜s(s1), R˜s(s2)〉 ∈ {0, 1,#} × {0, 1,#}.
Assume that a Decoupled RL agent observes the same rewards from both states s1 and
s2, R˜s1 = R˜s2 = 〈0, 1〉. What can it say about the true reward R˙, if it knows that at most
q = 1 state is corrupt? By Assumption 9.11′, an observed pair 〈R˜s(s1), R˜s(s2)〉 disagrees
with the true reward 〈R˙(s1), R˙(s2)〉 only if s is corrupt. Therefore, any hypothesis other
than R˙ = 〈0, 1〉 must imply that both states s1 and s2 are corrupt. If the agent knows
that at most q = 1 states are corrupt, then it can safely conclude that R˙ = 〈0, 1〉.
R˜s1 R˜s2 R˙ possibilities
Decoupled RL (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)
RL (0,#) (#, 1) (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)
In contrast, an RL agent only sees the reward of the current state. That is, R˜s1 =
〈0,#〉 and R˜s2 = 〈#, 1〉. If one state may be corrupt, then only R˙ = 〈1, 0〉 can be ruled
out. The hypotheses R˙ = 〈0, 0〉 can be explained by s2 being corrupt, and R˙ = 〈1, 1〉
can be explained by s1 being corrupt. ♦
Theorem 9.18 (Learnability of R˙ in decoupled RL). Let M be a countable, communi-
cating class of CRMDPs with decoupled feedback over common sets S and A of actions
and rewards. Let Sobss′ = {s ∈ S : R˜s(s′) 6= #} be the set of states from which the reward
of s′ can be observed. If M satisfies Assumption 9.11′ for some Ssafe ⊆ S and q ∈ N
such that for every s′, either
• Sobss′
⋂Ssafe 6= ∅ or
• |Sobss′ | > 2q,
then the there exists a policy piexp that learns the true reward function R˙ in a finite
number N(|S|, |A|, DM) <∞ of expected time steps.
The main idea of the proof is that for every state s′, either a safe (non-corrupt) state s
or a majority vote of more than 2q states is guaranteed to provide the true reward R˙(s′).
A similar theorem can be proven under slightly weaker conditions by letting the agent
iteratively figure out which states are corrupt and then exclude them from the analysis.
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Proof. Under Assumption 9.11′, the true reward R˙(s′) for a state s′ can be determined
if s′ is observed from a safe state s ∈ Ssafe, or if it is observed from more than 2q states.
In the former case, the observed reward can always be trusted, since it is known to be
non-corrupt. In the latter case, a majority vote must yield the correct answer, since at
most q of the observations can be wrong, and all correct observations must agree. It is
therefore enough that an agent reaches all pairs (s, s′) of current state s and observed
reward state s′, in order for it to learn the true reward of all states R˙.
There exists a policy pˆi that transitions to s in Xs time steps, with E[Xs] ≤ DM,
regardless of the starting state s0 (see Definition 9.12). By Markov’s inequality, P (Xs ≤
2DM) ≥ 1/2. Let piexp be a random walking policy, and let Ys be the time steps required
for piexp to visit s. In any state s0, pi
exp follows pˆi for 2DM time steps with probability
1/|A|2DM . Therefore, with probability at least 1/(2|A|2DM) it will reach s in at most
2DM time steps. The probability that it does not find it in k2DM time steps is therefore
at most (1− 1/(2|A|2DM))k, which means that:
P
(
Ys/(2DM) ≤ k
)
≥ 1−
(
1− 1
2|A|2DM
)k
for any k ∈ N. Thus, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Ws = dYs/(2DM)e
is bounded from below by the CDF of a Geometric variable G with success probability
p = 1/(2|A|2DM). Therefore, E[Ws] ≤ E[G], so
E[Ys] ≤ 2DME[Ws] ≤ 2DME[G] = 2DM(1− p)/p ≤ 2DM1/p ≤ 2DM2|A|2DM .
Let Zss′ be the time until pi
exp visits the pair (s, s′) of state s and observed state
s′. Whenever s is visited, a randomly chosen state is observed, so s′ is observed with
probability 1/|S|. The number of visits to s until s′ is observed is a Geometric variable
V with p = 1/|S|. Thus E[Zss′ ] = E[YsV ] = E[Ys]E[V ] (since Ys and V are independent).
Then,
E[Zss′ ] ≤ E[Ys]|S| ≤ 4DM|A|2DM |S|.
Combining the time to find each pair (s, s′), we get that the total time
∑
s,s′ Zss′ has
expectation
E
∑
s,s′
Zss′
 = ∑
s,s′
E[Zss′ ] ≤ 4DM|A|2DM |S|3 = N(|S|, |A|, DM) <∞.
Learnability of the true reward function R˙ implies sublinear regret for the true reward
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agent, as established by the following theorem.
Theorem 9.19 (Sublinear regret of piTRξ,m in decoupled RL). Under the same conditions
as Theorem 9.18, the true reward agent piTRξ,m has sublinear regret:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piTRξ,t , s0, t) = 0.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we combine the exploration policy piexp from Theo-
rem 9.18, with the UCRL2 algorithm (Jaksch et al., 2010) that achieves sublinear
regret in standard MDPs without reward corruption. The combination yields a policy
sequence pit with sublinear regret in CRMDPs with decoupled feedback. Finally, we
show that this implies that piTRξ,m has sublinear regret.
Combining piexp and UCRL2. UCRL2 has a free parameter δ that determines how cer-
tain UCRL2 is to have sublinear regret. UCRL2(δ) achieves sublinear regret with proba-
bility at least 1− δ. Let pit be a policy that combines piexp and UCRL2 by first following
piexp from Theorem 9.18 until R˙ has been learned, and then following UCRL2(1/
√
t)
with R˙ for the rewards and with δ = 1/
√
t.
Regret of UCRL2. Given that the reward function R˙ is known, by (Jaksch et al., 2010,
Thm. 2), UCRL2(1/
√
t) will in any µ ∈M have regret at most
Reg(µ,UCRL2(1/
√
t), s0, t | success) ≤ cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) (9.6)
for a constant6 c and with success probability at least 1− 1/√t. In contrast, if UCRL2
fails, then it gets regret at worst t. Taking both possibilities into account gives the bound
Reg(µ,UCRL2(1/
√
t), s0, t) = P (success)Reg(· | success) + P (fail)Reg(· | fail)
= (1− 1/√t) · cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) + 1/√t · t
≤ cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) +√t. (9.7)
Regret of pit. We next consider the regret of pit that combines an pi
exp exploration phase
to learn R˙ with UCRL2. By Theorem 9.18, R˙ will be learned in at most N(|S|, |A|, DM)
expected time steps in any µ ∈ M. Thus, the regret contributed by the learning phase
piexp is at most N(|S|, |A|, DM), since the regret can be at most 1 per time step. Com-
bining this with (9.7), the regret for pit in any µ ∈M is bounded by:
Reg(µ, pit, s0, t) ≤ N(|S|, |A|, DM) + cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) +√t = o(t). (9.8)
6The constant can be computed to c = 34
√
3/2 (Jaksch et al., 2010).
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Regret of piTRξ,t . Finally we establish that pi
TR
ξ,t has sublinear regret. Assume on the
contrary that piTRξ,t suffered linear regret. Then for some µ
′ ∈ M there would exist
positive constants k and n such that for all t:
Reg(µ′, piTRξ,t , s0, t) > kt− n. (9.9)
This would imply that the ξ-expected regret of piTRξ,t would be higher than the ξ-expected
regret than pit:∑
µ∈M
ξ(µ)Regt(µ, pi
TR
ξ,t , s0, t) ≥ ξ(µ′)Regt(µ′, piTRξ,m, s0, t) sum of non-negative elements
≥ ξ(µ′)(kt− n) by (9.9)
>
∑
µ∈M
ξ(µ)Regt(µ, pit, s0, t) by (9.8) for sufficiently large t.
But piTRξ,m maximizes ξ-expected reward
∑
µ∈M ξ(µ)G˜t(µ, pi, s0) by definition, which
means that it minimizes ξ-expected regret. Thus, piTRξ,t must have sublinear regret.
9.4.3. Implications
Theorem 9.18 gives an abstract condition for which decoupled RL settings enable agents
to learn the true reward function in spite of sensory corruption. For the concrete models
it implies the following:
• RL. Due to the “self-observation” property of the RL observation graph Sobss′ =
{s′}, the conditions can only be satisfied when S = Ssafe or q = 0, i.e. when there
is no reward corruption at all.
• CIRL. The agent can only observe the supervisor action in the current state s, so
the agent essentially only gets reward information about states s′ reachable from
s in a small number of steps. Thus, the sets Sobss′ may be smaller than 2q in many
settings. While the situation is better than for RL, sensory corruption may still
mislead CIRL agents (see Example 9.20 below).
• LVFS. Stories may be available from a large number of states, and can describe
any state. Thus, the sets Sobss′ are realistically large, so the |Sobss′ | > 2q condition
can be satisfied for all s′.
• SSRL. The supervisor’s evaluation of any state s′ may be available from safe states
where the agent is back in the lab. Thus, the Sobss′
⋂Ssafe 6= ∅ condition can be
satisfied for all s′.
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Thus, we find that RL and CIRL are unlikely to offer complete solutions to the sen-
sory corruption problem, but that both LVFS and SSRL do under reasonably realistic
assumptions.
Agents drawing from multiple sources of evidence are likely to be the safest, as they
will most easily satisfy the conditions of Theorems 9.18 and 9.19. For example, humans
simultaneously learn their values from pleasure/pain stimuli (RL), watching other people
act (CIRL), listening to stories (LVFS), as well as (parental) evaluation of different
scenarios (SSRL). Combining sources of evidence may also go some way toward managing
reward corruption beyond sensory corruption. For the showering robot of Example 9.2,
decoupled RL allows the robot to infer the reward of the showering state when in other
states. For example, the robot can ask a human in the kitchen about the true reward of
showering (SSRL), or infer it from human actions in different states (CIRL).
CIRL sensory corruption. Whether CIRL agents are vulnerable to reward corruption
has generated some discussion among AI safety researchers (based on informal discussion
at conferences). Some argue that CIRL agents are not vulnerable, as they only use the
sensory data as evidence about a true signal, and have no interest in corrupting the
evidence. Others argue that CIRL agents only observe a function of the reward function
(the optimal policy or action), and are therefore equally susceptible to reward corruption
as RL agents.
Theorem 9.18 sheds some light on this issue, as it provides sufficient conditions for
when the corrupt reward problem can be avoided. The following example illustrates a
situation where CIRL does not satisfy the conditions, and where a CIRL agent therefore
suffers significant regret due to reward corruption.
Example 9.20 (CIRL sensory corruption). Formally in CIRL, an agent and a human
both make actions in an MDP, with state transitions depending on the joint agent-human
action (a, aH). Both the human and the agent are trying to optimize a reward function
R˙, but the agent first needs to infer R˙ from the human’s actions. In each transition
the agent observes the human action. Analogously to how the reward may be corrupt
for RL agents, we assume that CIRL agents may systematically misperceive the human
action in certain states. Let aˆH be the observed human action, which may differ from
the true human action a˙H .
In this example, there are two states s1 and s2. In each state, the agent can choose
between the actions a1, a2, and w, and the human can choose between the actions a
H
1
and aH2 . The agent action ai leads to state si with certainty, i = 1, 2, regardless of the
human’s action. Only if the agent chooses w does the human action matter. Generally,
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s1 s2
1− p (w, aH1 )
p
0.5− p
(w, aH2 )
0.5 + p
(a2, ·)(a1, ·)(w, ·) (a2, ·)
(a1, ·)
Figure 9.6.: Example of a CRMDP where CIRL fails to learn the right thing because of
sensory corruption.
aH1 is more likely to lead to s1 than a
H
2 . The exact transition probabilities are determined
by the unknown parameter p as displayed in Figure 9.6.
Hypo-
thesis
p
Best
state
s2
corrupt
H1 0.5 s1 Yes
H2 0 s2 No
The agent’s two hypotheses for p, the true reward/preferred state, and the corruptness
of state s2 are summarized in the above table. In hypothesis H1, the human prefers s1,
but can only reach s1 from s2 with 50% reliability. In hypothesis H2, the human prefers
s2, but can only remain in s2 with 50% probability. After taking action w in s2, the
agent always observes the human taking action aˆH2 . In H1, this is explained by s2 being
corrupt, and the true human action being aH1 . In H2, this is explained by the human
preferring s2. The hypotheses H1 and H2 are empirically indistinguishable, as they both
predict that the transition s1 → s2 will occur with 50% probability after the observed
human action aˆH2 in s2.
Assuming that the agent considers non-corruption to be likelier than corruption, the
best inference the agent can make is that the human prefers s2 to s1 (i.e. H2). The
optimal policy for the agent is then to always choose a2 to stay in s2, which means the
agent suffers maximum regret. ♦
Example 9.20 provides an example where a CIRL agent “incorrectly” prefers a state
due to sensory corruption. The sensory corruption is analogous to reward corruption in
RL, in the sense that it leads the agent to the wrong conclusion about the true reward
in the state. Thus, highly intelligent CIRL agents may be prone to wireheading, as they
may find (corrupt) states s where all evidence in s points to s having very high reward.7
7The construction required in Example 9.20 to create a “wireheading state” s2 for CIRL agents is
substantially more involved than for RL agents, so they may be less vulnerable to reward corruption
than RL agents.
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Figure 9.7.: Illustration of quantilization. By randomly picking a state with reward
above some threshold δ, adversarially placed corrupt states are likely to be
avoided.
In light of Theorem 9.18, it is not surprising that the CIRL agent in Example 9.20 fails
to avoid the corrupt reward problem. Since the human is unable to affect the transition
probability from s1 to s2, no evidence about the relative reward between s1 and s2
is available from the non-corrupt state s1. Only observations from the corrupt state s2
provide information about the reward. The observation graph for Example 9.20 therefore
looks like
s1 s2 , with no information being provided from s1.
9.5. Quantilization: Randomness Increases Robustness
Not all contexts allow the agent to get sufficiently rich data to overcome the reward
corruption problem via Theorems 9.18 and 9.19. It is often much easier to construct RL
agents than it is to construct CIRL agents, which in turn may often be more feasible
than designing LVFS or SSRL agents. Is there anything we can do to increase robustness
without providing the agent additional sources of data?
Going back to the true reward agents of Section 9.3, the problem was that they got
stuck on a particular value r˜∗ of the observed reward. If unlucky, r˜∗ was available
in a corrupt state, in which case the true reward agent may get no true reward. In
other words, there were adversarial inputs where the true reward agent piTRξ,m performed
poorly. A common way to protect against adversarial inputs is to use a randomized
algorithm. Applied to RL and CRMDPs, this idea leads to quantilizing agents (Taylor,
2016). Rather than choosing the state with the highest observed reward, these agents
instead randomly choose a state from a top quantile of high-reward states.
9.5.1. Simple Case
To keep the idea simple, a quantilization agent is first defined for the simple case where
the agent can stay in any state of its choosing (Assumption 9.13.ii). Theorem 9.22
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establishes a simple regret bound for this setting. A more general quantilization agent
is developed in Section 9.5.2.
Definition 9.21 (Quantilizing Agent). For δ < 1, the δ-quantilizing agent piδ random
walks until all states have been visited at least once. Then it selects a state s˜ uniformly
at random from Sδ = {s : R˜(s) ≥ δ}, the top quantile of high observed reward states.
Then piδ goes to s˜ (by random walking or otherwise) and stays there.
For example, a quantilizing robot in Example 9.2 would first try to find many ways in
which it could get high observed reward, and then randomly pick one of them. If there
are many more high reward states than corrupt states (e.g. the shower is the only place
with inflated rewards), then this will yield a reasonable amount of true reward with high
probability.
Theorem 9.22 (Quantilization). In any CRMDP satisfying Assumption 9.11.ii and As-
sumption 9.13, the δ-quantilizing agent piδ with δ = 1 −√q/|S| suffers time-averaged
regret at most
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1−
(
1−
√
q/|S|
)2
. (9.10)
Proof. By Assumption 9.13.i, piδ eventually visits all states when random walking. By
Assumption 9.13.ii, it can stay in any given state s.
The observed reward R˜(s) in any state s ∈ Sδ is at least δ. By Assumption 9.11.ii,
at most q of these states are corrupt; in the worst case, their true reward is 0 and
the other |Sδ| − q states (if any) have true reward δ. Thus, with probability at least
(|Sδ| − q)/|Sδ| = 1 − q/|Sδ|, the δ-quantilizing agent obtains true reward at least δ at
each time step, which gives
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1− δ(1− q/|Sδ|). (9.11)
(If q ≥ |Sδ|, the bound (9.11) is vacuous.)
Under Assumption 9.13.iii, for any δ ∈ [0, 1], |Sδ| ≥ (1− δ)|S|. Substituting this into
(9.11) gives:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1− δ
(
1− q
(1− δ)|S|
)
. (9.12)
Equation (9.12) is optimized by δ = 1−√q/|S|, which gives the stated regret bound.
The time-averaged regret gets close to zero when the fraction of corrupt states q/|S|
is small. For example, if at most 0.1% of the states are corrupt, then the time-averaged
regret will be at most 1− (1−√0.001)2 ≈ 0.06. Compared to the piRLξ,m and piTRξ,m agents
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that had regret close to 1 under the same conditions (Theorem 9.15), this is a significant
improvement.
If rewards are stochastic, then the quantilizing agent may be modified to revisit all
states many times, until a confidence interval of length 2ε and confidence 1 − ε can be
established for the expected reward in each state. Letting piδt be the quantilizing agent
with ε = 1/t gives the same regret bound (9.10) with piδ substituted for piδt .
Interpretation. It may seem odd that randomization improves worst-case regret. In-
deed, if the corrupt states were chosen randomly by the environment, then randomization
would achieve nothing. To illustrate how randomness can increase robustness, we make
an analogy to Quicksort, which has average time complexity O(n log n), but worst-case
complexity O(n2). When inputs are guaranteed to be random, Quicksort is a simple and
fast sorting algorithm. However, in many situations, it is not safe to assume that inputs
are random. Therefore, a variation of Quicksort that randomizes the input before it sorts
them is often more robust. Similarly, in the examples mentioned in the introduction, the
corrupt states precisely coincide with the states the agent prefers; such situations would
be highly unlikely if the corrupt states were randomly distributed. Li (1992) develops
an interesting formalization of this idea.
Another way to justify quantilization is by Goodhart’s law, which states that most
measures of success cease to be good measures when used as targets. Applied to rewards,
the law would state that cumulative reward is only a good measure of success when the
agent is not trying to optimize reward. While a literal interpretation of this would defeat
the whole purpose of RL, a softer interpretation is also possible, allowing reward to be a
good measure of success as long as the agent does not try to optimize reward too hard.
Quantilization may be viewed as a way to build agents that are more conservative in
their optimization efforts (Taylor, 2016).
Alternative randomization. Not all randomness is created equal. For example, the
simple randomized soft-max and ε-greedy policies do not offer regret bounds on par with
piδ, as shown by the following example. This motivates the more careful randomization
procedure used by the quantilizing agents.
Example 9.23 (Soft-max and ε-greedy). Consider the following simple CRMDP with
n > 2 actions a1, . . . , an:
s1 s2
r˜ = r˙ = 1− ε
r˙ = 0
r˜ = 1
a2, . . . , ana1
a2, . . . , an
a1
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State s1 is non-corrupt with R˜(s1) = R˙(s1) = 1− ε for small ε > 0, while s2 is corrupt
with R˜(s2) = 1 and R˙(s2) = 0. The Soft-max and ε-greedy policies will assign higher
value to actions a2, . . . , an than to a1. For large n, there are many ways of getting to s2,
so a random action leads to s2 with high probability. Thus, soft-max and ε-greedy will
spend the vast majority of the time in s2, regardless of randomization rate and discount
parameters. This gives a regret close to 1 − ε, compared to an informed policy always
going to s1. Meanwhile, a δ-quantilizing agent with δ ≤ 1/2 will go to s1 and s2 with
equal probability, which gives a more modest regret of (1− ε)/2. ♦
9.5.2. General Quantilization Agent
This section generalizes the quantilizing agent to RL problems not satisfying Assump-
tion 9.13. This generalization is important, because it is usually not possible to remain
in one state and get high reward. The most naive generalization would be to sample
between high reward policies, instead of sampling from high reward states. However,
this will typically not provide good guarantees. To see why, consider a situation where
there is a single high reward corrupt state s, and there are many ways to reach and leave
s. Then a wide range of different policies all get high reward from s. Meanwhile, all
policies getting reward from other states may receive relatively little reward. In this sit-
uation, sampling from the most high reward policies is not going to increase robustness,
since the sampling will just be between different ways of getting reward from the same
corrupt state s.
For this reason, we must ensure that different “sampleable” policies get reward from
different states. As a first step, we make a couple of definitions to say which states
provide reward to which policies. The concepts of Definition 9.25 are illustrated in
Figure 9.8.
Definition 9.24 (Unichain CRMDP (Puterman, 1994, p. 348)). A CRMDP µ is
unichain if any stationary policy pi : S → ∆A induces a stationary distribution dpi on S
that is independent of the initial state s0.
Definition 9.25 (Value support). In a unichain CRMDP, let the asymptotic value
contribution of s to pi be vcpi(s) = dpi(s)R˜(s). We say that a set Sδi is δ-value supporting
a policy pii if
∀s ∈ Sδi : vcpii(s) ≥ δ/|Sδi |.
We are now ready to define a general δ-Quantilizing agent. The definition is for
theoretical purposes only. It is unsuitable for practical implementation both because of
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s1
s2
s3
s4
r˜ = 0
r˜ = 1
r˜ = 0
r˜ = 1
Sδi
Figure 9.8.: Illustration of r˜-contribution and value support. Assume the policy pii
randomly traverses a loop s1, s2, s3, s4 indefinitely, with dpii(sj) = 1/4 for
j = 1, . . . , 4. The r˜-contribution vcpii is 0 in s1 and s3, and vc
pii is 1/4·1 = 1/4
in s2 and s4. The set Sδi = {s2, s4} is a δ-value supporting pii for δ = 1/2,
since vcpii(s2) = vc
pii(s4) ≥ (1/2)/2 = 1/4.
the extreme data and memory requirements of Step 1, and because of the computational
complexity of Step 2. Finding a practical approximation is left for future research.
Definition 9.26 (General δ-Quantilizing Agent). In a unichain CRMDP, the generalized
δ-quantilizing agent piδ performs the following steps. The input is a CRMDP µ and a
parameter δ ∈ [0, 1].
1. Estimate the value of all stationary policies, including their value support.
2. Choose a collection of disjoint sets Sδi , each δ-value supporting a stationary policy
pii. If multiple choices are possible, choose one maximizing the cardinality of the
union Sδ = ⋃i Sδi . If no such collection exists, return: “Failed because δ too high”.
3. Randomly sample a state s from Sδ = ⋃i Sδi .
4. Follow the policy pii associated with the set Sδi containing s.
The general quantilizing agent of Definition 9.26 is a generalization of the simple
quantilizing agent of Definition 9.21. In the special case where Assumption 9.13 holds,
the general agent reduces to the simpler one by using singleton sets Sδi = {si} for high
reward states si, and by letting pii be the policy that always stays in si. In situations
where it is not possible to keep receiving high reward by remaining in one state, the
generalized Definition 9.26 allows policies to solicit rewards from a range of states. The
intuitive reason for choosing the policy pii with probability proportional to the value
support in Steps 3–4 is that policies with larger value support are better at avoiding
corrupt states. For example, a policy only visiting one state may have been unlucky and
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picked a corrupt state. In contrast, a policy obtaining reward from many states must be
“very unlucky” if all the reward states it visits are corrupt.
Theorem 9.27 (General quantilization agent regret bound). In any unichain CRMDP
µ, a general δ-quantilizing agent piδ suffers time-averaged regret at most
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1− δ(1− q/|Sδ|) (9.13)
provided a non-empty collection {Sδi } of δ-value supporting sets exists.
Proof. We will use the notation from Definition 9.26.
Step 1 is well-defined since the CRMDP is unichain, which means that for all stationary
policies pi the stationary distribution dpi and the value support vc
pi are well-defined and
may be estimated simply by following the policy pi. There is a (large) finite number of
stationary policies, so in principle their stationary distributions and value support can
be estimated.
To bound the regret, consider first the average reward of a policy pii with value support
Sδi . The policy pii must obtain asymptotic average observed reward at least:
lim
t→∞
1
t
G˜t(µ, pii, s0) =
∑
s∈S
dpi(s)R˜(s) by definition of dpi and G˜t
≥
∑
s∈Sδi
dpi(s)R˜(s) sum of positive terms
≥
∑
s∈Sδi
δ/|Sδi | Sδi is δ-value support for pii
= |Sδi | · δ/|Sδi | = δ
If there are qi corrupt states in Sδi with true reward 0, then the average true reward
must be
lim
t→∞
1
t
G˙t(µ, pii, s0) ≥ (|Sδi | − qi) · δ/|Sδi | = (1− qi/|Sδi |) · δ (9.14)
since the true reward must correspond to the observed reward in all the (|Sδi | − qi)
non-corrupt states.
For any distribution of corrupt states, the quantilizing agent that selects pii with
probability P (pii) = |Sδi |/|Sδ| will obtain
lim
t→∞
1
t
Gt(µ, pi
δ, s0) = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
i
P (pii)Gt(µ, pii, s0)
≥
∑
i
P (pii)(1− qi/|Sδi |) · δ by equation (9.14)
151
9. An MDP Perspective on Reward Corruption
= δ
∑
i
|Sδi |
|Sδ|(1− qi/|S
δ
i |) by construction of P (pii)
=
δ
|Sδ|
∑
i
(|Sδi | − qi) elementary algebra
=
δ
|Sδ|(|S
δ| − q) = δ(1− q/|Sδ|) by summing |Sδi | and qi
The informed policy gets true reward at most 1 at each time step, which gives the
claimed bound (9.13).
When Assumption 9.13 is satisfied, the bound is the same as for the simple quantilizing
agent in Section 9.5.1 for δ = 1−√q/|S|. In other cases, the bound may be much weaker.
For example, in many environments it is not possible to obtain reward by remaining in
one state. The agent may have to spend significant time “traveling” between high reward
states. So typically only a small fraction of the time will be spent in high reward states,
which in turn makes the stationary distribution dpi small. This puts a strong upper
bound on the value contribution vcpi, which means that the value supporting sets Sδi
will be empty unless δ is close to 0. While this makes the bound of Theorem 9.27 weak,
it nonetheless bounds the regret away from 1 even under weak assumptions, which is a
significant improvement on the RL and true reward agents in Theorem 9.15.
Examples. To make the discussion a bit more concrete, let us also speculate about the
performance of a quantilizing agent in some of the examples in the introduction:
• In the boat racing example (Example 9.1), the circling strategy only got about
20% higher score than a winning strategy (Clark and Amodei, 2016). Therefore, a
quantilizing agent would likely only need to sacrifice about 20% observed reward
in order to be able to randomly select from a large range of winning policies.
• In the wireheading example (Example 9.3), it is plausible that the agent gets sig-
nificantly more reward in wireheaded states compared to “normal” states. Wire-
heading policies may also be comparatively rare, as wireheading may require very
deliberate sequences of actions to override sensors. Under this assumption, a quan-
tilizing agent may be less likely to wirehead. While it may need to sacrifice a large
amount of observed reward compared to an RL agent, its true reward may often
be greater.
Summary. In summary, quantilization offers a way to increase robustness via random-
ization, using only reward feedback. Unsurprisingly, the strength of the regret bounds
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(a) 1 goal tile (b) 2 goal tiles (c) 4 goal tiles
Figure 9.9.: Starting positions: the blue square indicates corrupt reward, and the yellow
circles indicate true rewards.
heavily depends on the assumptions we are willing to make, such as the prevalence
of high reward states. Further research may investigate efficient approximations and
empirical performance of quantilizing agents, as well as dynamic adjustments of the
threshold δ. Combinations with imperfect decoupled RL solutions (such as CIRL), as
well as extensions to infinite state spaces could also offer fruitful directions for further
theoretical investigation. Taylor (2016) discusses some general open problems related to
quantilization.
9.6. Experimental Results
In this section the theoretical results are illustrated with some simple experiments. The
setup is a gridworld containing some true reward tiles (indicated by yellow circles) and
some corrupt reward tiles (indicated by blue squares). We use a setup with 1, 2 or 4 goal
tiles with true reward 0.9 each, and one corrupt reward tile with observed reward 1 and
true reward 0 (Figure 9.9 shows the starting positions). Empty tiles have reward 0.1,
and walking into a wall gives reward 0. The state is represented by the (x, y) coordinates
of the agent. The agent can move up, down, left, right, or stay put. The discounting
factor is γ = 0.9. This is a continuing task, so the environment does not reset when
the agent visits the corrupt or goal tiles. The experiments were implemented in the
AIXIjs framework for reinforcement learning (Aslanides et al., 2017) and the code is
available online in the AIXIjs repository (http://aslanides.io/aixijs/demo.html?
reward_corruption).
We demonstrate that RL agents like Q-learning and softmax Q-learning cannot over-
come corrupt reward (as discussed in Section 9.3), while quantilization helps overcome
corrupt reward (as discussed in Section 9.5). We run Q-learning with -greedy ( = 0.1),
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(a) Observed rewards for 1 goal tile
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(b) True rewards for 1 goal tile
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(c) Observed rewards for 2 goal tiles
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(d) True rewards for 2 goal tiles
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(e) Observed rewards for 4 goal tiles
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(f) True rewards for 4 goal tiles
Figure 9.10.: Trajectories of average observed and true rewards for Q-learning, softmax
and quantilizing agents, showing mean ± standard deviation over 100 runs.
Q-learning and quantilizing agents converge to a similar observed reward,
but very different true rewards (much higher for the quantilizer with high
variance). The value of δ that gives the highest true reward varies for
different numbers of goal tiles.
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goal tiles agent observed reward true reward
1
Q-learning 0.923± 0.0003 0.00852± 0.00004
Softmax Q-learning 0.671± 0.0005 0.0347± 0.00006
Quantilizing (δ = 0.2) 0.838± 0.15 0.378± 0.35
Quantilizing (δ = 0.5) 0.943± 0.12 0.133± 0.27
Quantilizing (δ = 0.8) 0.979± 0.076 0.049± 0.18
2
Q-learning 0.921± 0.00062 0.0309± 0.0051
Softmax Q-learning 0.671± 0.0004 0.0738± 0.0005
Quantilizing (δ = 0.2) 0.934± 0.047 0.594± 0.43
Quantilizing (δ = 0.5) 0.931± 0.046 0.621± 0.42
Quantilizing (δ = 0.8) 0.944± 0.05 0.504± 0.45
4
Q-learning 0.924± 0.0002 0.00919± 0.00014
Softmax Q-learning 0.657± 0.0004 0.111± 0.0006
Quantilizing (δ = 0.2) 0.918± 0.038 0.738± 0.35
Quantilizing (δ = 0.5) 0.926± 0.044 0.666± 0.39
Quantilizing (δ = 0.8) 0.915± 0.036 0.765± 0.32
Table 9.1.: Average true and observed rewards after 1 million cycles, showing mean ±
standard deviation over 100 runs. Q-learning achieves high observed reward
but low true reward, and softmax achieves medium observed reward and a
slightly higher true reward than Q-learning. The quantilizing agent achieves
similar observed reward to Q-learning, but much higher true reward (with
much more variance). Having more than 1 goal tile leads to a large improve-
ment in true reward for the quantilizer, a small improvement for softmax,
and no improvement for Q-learning.
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softmax with temperature β = 2, and the quantilizing agent with δ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 (where
0.8 = 1 −√q/|S| = 1 −√1/25) for 100 runs with 1 million cycles. Average observed
and true rewards after 1 million cycles are shown in Table 9.1, and reward trajectories
are shown in Figure 9.10. Q-learning gets stuck on the corrupt tile and spend almost all
the time there (getting observed reward around 1 · (1− ) = 0.9), softmax spends most
of its time on the corrupt tile, while the quantilizing agent often stays on one of the goal
tiles.
9.7. Conclusions
This chapter has studied reward corruption in MDP extensions called CRMDPs. Reward
functions may be corrupt due to bugs or misspecifications, sensory errors, or because
the agent finds a way to inappropriately modify the reward mechanism. Some examples
were given in Section 9.1 (Examples 9.1 to 9.3). As agents become more competent
at optimizing their reward functions, they will likely also become more competent at
(ab)using reward corruption to gain higher reward. Reward corruption may impede the
performance of a wide range of agents, and may have disastrous consequences for highly
intelligent agents (Bostrom, 2014).
To formalize the corrupt reward problem, we extended MPDs with a possibly corrupt
reward function, and defined a formal performance measure (regret). This enabled the
derivation of a number of formally precise results for how seriously different agents were
affected by reward corruption in different setups (Table 9.2). The results corroborate
the informal arguments we made about decoupled reward data in Section 8.4.
Assumption No assumptions
Assumption 9.11 or 9.11′, and . . .
no other assumptions Assumption 9.13 CIRL SSRL/LVFS
Result all agents fail piδ weak bound
piRLξ,m, pi
TR
ξ,m fail
piδ succeeds
piTRξ,m fails pi
TR
ξ,m succeeds
Table 9.2.: Main takeaways. Without additional assumptions, all agents fail (i.e., suffer
high regret). Restricting the reward corruption with Assumption 9.11 gives
a weak bound for the quantilizing agent. The piRLξ,m and pi
TR
ξ,m agents still fail
even if we additionally assume many high reward states and agent control
(Assumption 9.13), but the quantilizing agent piδ does well. In most realistic
contexts, the true reward is learnable in spite of sensory corruption in SSRL
and LVFS, but not in CIRL.
The main takeaways from the results are:
• Without simplifying assumptions, no agent can avoid the corrupt reward problem
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(Theorem 9.10). This is effectively a No Free Lunch result, showing that unless
some assumption is made about the reward corruption, no agent can outperform a
random agent. Some natural simplifying assumptions to avoid the No Free Lunch
result were suggested in Section 9.2.
• Using the reward signal as evidence rather than optimization target is no magic
bullet, even under strong simplifying assumptions (Theorem 9.15). Essentially,
this is because the agent does not know the exact relation between the observed
reward (the “evidence”) and the true reward.8 However, when the data enables
sufficient crosschecking of rewards, agents can avoid the corrupt reward problem
(Theorems 9.18 and 9.19). For example, in SSRL and LVFS this type of cross-
checking is possible under natural assumptions. In RL, no crosschecking is possible,
while CIRL is a borderline case. Combining frameworks and providing the agent
with different sources of data may often be the safest option.
• In cases where sufficient crosschecking of rewards is not possible, quantilization
may improve robustness (Theorems 9.22 and 9.27). Essentially, quantilization
prevents agents from overoptimizing their objectives. Interestingly, quantiliza-
tion thereby offers a way to partially sidestep misalignment problems, permitting
agents to be useful in spite of somewhat misaligned utility functions. How well
quantilization works depends on how the number of corrupt solutions compares to
the number of good solutions.
The results indicate that while reward corruption constitutes a major problem for
traditional RL algorithms, there are promising ways around it, both within the RL
framework, and in alternative frameworks such as CIRL, SSRL and LVFS.
Future work. Finally, some interesting open questions are listed below:
• (Non-stationary corruption function) In this work, we tacitly assumed that both
the reward and the corruption functions are stationary, and are always the same in
the same state. What if the corruption function is non-stationary, and influenceable
by the agent’s actions, such as if the agent builds a delusion box around itself?
(Example 6.2.3.b; Ring and Orseau, 2011).
• (Infinite state space) Many of the results and arguments relied on there being a
finite number of states. This makes learning easy, as the agent can visit every
8In situations where the exact relation is known, then a non-corrupt reward function can be defined.
Our results are not relevant for this case.
157
9. An MDP Perspective on Reward Corruption
state. It also makes quantilization easy, as there is a finite set of states/strategies
to randomly sample from. What if there is an infinite number of states, and the
agent has to generalize insights between states? What are the conditions on the
observation graph for Theorems 9.18 and 9.19? What is a good generalization of
the quantilizing agent?
• (Concrete CIRL condition) In Example 9.20, we only heuristically inferred the
observation graph from the CIRL problem description. Is there a general way
of doing this? Or is there a direct formulation of the no-corruption condition in
CIRL, analogous to Theorems 9.18 and 9.19?
• (Practical quantilizing agent) As formulated in Definition 9.21, the quantilizing
agent piδ is extremely inefficient with respect to data, memory, and computation.
Meanwhile, many practical RL algorithms use randomness in various ways (e.g. ε-
greedy; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Is there a way to make an efficient quantilization
agent that retains the robustness guarantees?
• (Dynamically adapting quantilizing agent) In Definition 9.26, the threshold δ is
given as a parameter. Under what circumstances can we define a “parameter free”
quantilizing agent that adapts δ as it interacts with the environment?
• (Decoupled RL quantilization result) What if quantilization is combined with de-
coupled RL? Will this enable a stronger result than Theorems 9.18 and 9.19?
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“Whatever evidence an act might provide
On what could have caused the act
Should never be used to help on decide
On whether to choose that same act”
Judea Pearl (2009)
10. Sequential Decision Theory1
In this chapter we will compare decision theories for agents that are part of the envi-
ronment they interact with, sometimes called the physicalistic setting. The two main
contenders for this setting are causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision the-
ory (EDT). Understanding the implications of different decision theories may contribute
to more informed choices of algorithms. A close understanding of decision theory may
therefore turn out to be important for designing a safe AGI.
Following some background in Section 10.1, the standard definitions of CDT and EDT
for one-shot settings are given in Section 10.2. We then define a model for sequential
physicalistic decision problems where the agent alternates between taking actions and
observing their consequences (Section 10.3), and consider sequential extensions of CDT
and EDT (Section 10.4). One of our main findings is that evidential decision theory
has two natural extensions while causal decision theory only has one. Implications of
our results are discussed in Section 10.5. An appendix contains many examples that
illustrate differences between the decision theories (Appendix 10.A).
10.1. Physicalistic Decision Making
A common assumption in artificial intelligence is that an agent interacts sequentially
with an environment by taking actions and receiving percepts (Russell and Norvig,
2010). This model is dualistic: the agent is distinct from the environment. It influences
the environment only through its actions, and the environment has no other information
about the agent. The dualism assumption is accurate for an algorithm that is playing
chess, Go, or other (video) games, which explains why it is ubiquitous in AI research.
But often it is not true: real-world agents such as robots are embedded in (and computed
by) the environment (Orseau and Ring, 2012), and then a physicalistic model2 is more
appropriate.
1This chapter is based on Tom Everitt, Jan Leike, and Marcus Hutter (2015). “Sequential Extensions
of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory”. In: Algorithmic Decision Theory. Ed. by Toby Walsh.
Springer, pp. 205–221. arXiv: 1506.07359.
2Some authors also call this type of model materialistic or naturalistic.
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environment
hidden state s
at
et
agent pi
environment model ξ
self-model
Figure 10.1.: The physicalistic model. The hidden state s contains information about the
agent that is unknown to it. The distribution ξ is the agent’s (subjective)
environment model, and pi its (deterministic) policy. The agent models
itself through the beliefs about (future) actions given by its environment
model ξ. Interaction with the environment at time step t occurs through an
action at chosen by the agent and a percept et returned by the environment.
This distinction becomes relevant in multi-agent settings with similar agents, where
each agent encounters ‘echoes’ of its own decision making. If the other agents are running
the same source code, then the agents’ decisions are logically connected. This link can be
used for uncoordinated cooperation (Lavictoire et al., 2014). Moreover, a physicalistic
model is indispensable for self-reflection. If the agent is required to autonomously verify
its integrity, and perform maintenance, repair, or upgrades, then the agent needs to be
aware of its own functioning. For this, a reliable and accurate self-modeling is essential.
Today, applications of this level of autonomy are mostly restricted to space probes distant
from earth or robots navigating lethal situations, but in the future this might also become
crucial for sustained self-improvement in generally intelligent agents (Bostrom, 2014;
Russell, Dewey, et al., 2016; Soares and Fallenstein, 2017; Yudkowsky, 2008a). Indeed,
in Section 5.3 we modeled the agent as part of the environment in order to study the
possibility of self-corruption. In Chapters 5 to 8 we temporarily evaded decision theoretic
issues by using CDT without further consideration.
An agent with a physicalistic model of the environment models itself as part of the
environment. This is schematically depicted in Figure 10.1. The agent may not know
everything about itself initially, but its model may improve over time. This can be
modeled through a hidden state of the environment that contains information about the
agent that is inaccessible to the agent itself, as well as other unknown aspects of the
environment.3 The agent has a belief ξ that describes the behavior of the environment
given the hidden state, including beliefs about the agent’s own future actions.
Physicalistic agents may view their actions in two ways: as their selected output, and
as information about what type of agent they are and about the hidden state. This
3See Hibbard (2014a,b, 2015) for another approach to this problem.
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leads to significantly more complex problems of inference and decision making, with
actions simultaneously being both means to influence the environment and evidence
about it. For example, looking at cat pictures online may simultaneously be a means of
procrastination, and evidence of bad air quality in the room.
10.2. One-Shot Decision Making
This section reviews work on physicalistic decision theory for one-shot problems. First,
dualistic decision making in a known environment is straightforward calculation of ex-
pected utilities. This is known as Savage decision theory (Savage, 1954). For non-
dualistic decision making two main approaches are offered by the decision theory lit-
erature: causal decision theory (CDT) (Gibbard and Harper, 1978; Joyce, 1999; Lewis
and Papadimitriou, 1981; Skyrms, 1982; Weirich, 2016) and evidential decision the-
ory (EDT) (Ahmed, 2014; Briggs, 2014; Jeffrey, 1990). EDT and CDT both take actions
that maximize expected utility, but differ in the way this expectation is computed: EDT
uses the action under consideration as evidence about the environment while CDT does
not.
In a one-shot decision problem, we take one action a ∈ A, receive a percept e ∈ E
(typically called outcome in the decision theory literature) and get a payoff u(e) according
to the utility function u : E → [0, 1]. We assume that the set of actions A and the set
of percepts E are finite. Additionally, the environment contains a hidden state s ∈ S.
The hidden state holds information that is inaccessible to the agent at the time of the
decision, but may influence the decision and the percept. Formally, the environment
is given by a causal graph µ over the hidden state, the action, and the percept. The
graph is shown in Figure 10.2. See Chapter 4 and Pearl (2009) for background on causal
graphs.
10.2.1. Savage Decision Theory
In the dualistic formulation of decision theory, we have a function ξ that takes an ac-
tion a and returns a probability distribution ξa over percepts. Savage decision the-
ory (SDT) (Briggs, 2014; Savage, 1954) takes actions according to
arg max
a∈A
∑
e∈E
ξa(e)u(e). (SDT)
In the dualistic model it is usually conceptually clear what ξa should be. In the
physicalistic model the hidden state is not independent of the decision maker’s action and
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a e
s
Figure 10.2.: The causal graph ξ(s, a, e) = ξ(s)ξ(a | s)ξ(e | s, a) for one-step decision
making. The hidden state s influences both the decision maker’s action a
and the received percept e.
Savage’s model is not directly applicable since we do not have an obvious specification
of ξa. How should decisions be made in this context? The literature focuses on two
answers to this question: CDT and EDT.
10.2.2. Causal and Evidential Decision Theory
The literature on causal and evidential decision theory is vast, and we give only a very
superficial overview that is intended to bring the reader up to speed on the basics. See
Briggs (2014) and Weirich (2016) and references therein for more detailed introductions.
Evidential decision theory (Ahmed, 2014; Jeffrey, 1990), considers the probability of
the percept e conditional on taking the action a:
arg max
a∈A
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | a)u(e) with ξ(e | a) =
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s, a)ξ(s | a) (EDT)
Causal decision theory has several formulations (Gibbard and Harper, 1978; Joyce,
1999; Lewis and Papadimitriou, 1981; Skyrms, 1982); we use the one given in (Skyrms,
1982), with Pearl’s calculus of causality (Pearl, 2009). According to CDT, the probability
of a percept e is given by the causal intervention of performing action a on the causal
graph from Figure 10.2:
arg max
a∈A
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | do(a))u(e) with ξ(e | do(a)) =
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s, a)ξ(s) (CDT)
where ξ(e | do(a)) follows from definition of the do-operator (Section 4.1 on Page 46)
and marginalization of s.
The difference between CDT and EDT is how the action affects the belief about the
hidden state. EDT assigns credence ξ(s | a) to the hidden state s if action a is taken,
while CDT assigns credence ξ(s). A common argument for CDT is that an action under
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my direct control should not influence my belief about things that are not causally
affected by the action. Hence ξ(s) should be my belief in s, and not ξ(s | a). (By
assumption, the action does not causally affect the hidden state.) EDT might reply that
if action a does not have the same likelihood under all hidden states s, then action a
should indeed inform me about the hidden state, regardless of causal connection. The
following two classical examples from the decision theory literature describe situations
where CDT and EDT disagree. A formal definition of these examples can be found in
Appendix 10.A.
Example 10.1 (Newcomb’s Problem (Nozick, 1969)). In Newcomb’s Problem there are
two boxes: an opaque box that is either empty or contains one million dollars and a
transparent box that contains one thousand dollars. The agent can choose between
taking only the opaque box (‘one-boxing’) and taking both boxes (‘two-boxing’). The
content of the opaque box is determined by a prediction about the agent’s action by a
very reliable predictor: if the agent is predicted to one-box, the box contains the million,
and if the agent is predicted to two-box, the box is empty. In Newcomb’s problem EDT
prescribes one-boxing because one-boxing is evidence that the box contains a million
dollars. In contrast, CDT prescribes two-boxing because two-boxing dominates one-
boxing: in either case we are a thousand dollars richer, and our decision cannot causally
affect the prediction. Newcomb’s problem has been raised as a critique to CDT, but
many philosophers insist that two-boxing is in fact the rational choice,4 even if it means
you end up poor.
Note how the decision depends on whether the action influences the belief about the
hidden state (the contents of the opaque box) or not. ♦
Newcomb’s problem may appear as an unrealistic thought experiment. However, we
argue that problems with similar structure are fairly common. The main structural
requirement is that ξ(s | a) 6= ξ(s) for some state or event s that is not causally affected
by a. In Newcomb’s problem the predictor’s ability to guess the action induces an
‘information link’ between actions and hidden states. If the stakes are high enough,
the predictor does not have to be much better than random in order to generate a
Newcomblike decision problem. Consider for example spouses predicting the faithfulness
of their partners, employers predicting the trustworthiness of their employees, or parents
predicting their children’s intentions. For AIs, the potential for accurate predictions is
even greater, as the predictor may have access to the AI’s source code. Although rarely
perfect, all of these predictions are often substantially better than random.
4In a 2009 survey, 31.4% of philosophers favored two-boxing, and 21.3% favored one-boxing (931 re-
sponses); see http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl. Is that the reason there are so few
wealthy philosophers?
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To counteract the impression that EDT is generally superior to CDT, we also discuss
the toxoplasmosis problem.
Example 10.2 (Toxoplasmosis Problem5 (Altair, 2013)). This problem takes place in
a world in which there is a certain parasite that causes its hosts to be attracted to cats,
in addition to uncomfortable side effects. The agent is handed an adorable little kitten
and is faced with the decision of whether or not to pet it. Petting the kitten feels nice
and therefore yields more utility than not petting it. However, people suffering from
the parasite are more likely to pet the kitten. Petting the kitten is evidence of having
the parasite, so EDT recommends against it. CDT correctly observes that petting the
kitten does not cause the parasite, and is therefore in favor of petting. ♦
Newcomb’s problem (Example 10.1) and the toxoplasmosis problem (Example 10.2)
cannot be properly formalized in SDT, because SDT requires the percept-probabilities
ξa to be specified, but it is not clear what the right choice of ξa would be. However, both
CDT and EDT can be recast in the context of (SDT) by setting ξa to be ξ( · | do(a))
and ξ( · | a) respectively. Thus we could say that the formulation given by Savage needs
a specification of the environment that tells us whether to act evidentially, causally, or
otherwise.
10.3. The Sequential Physicalistic Model
In this section we formally specify the physicalistic model depicted in Figure 10.1, and
briefly discuss problems with time consistency. Returning to the sequential setup of
previous chapters, the agent will choose actions at ∈ A and receive a percepts et ∈ E for
multiple time steps. Rather than considering infinite interactions as in previous chapters,
we will restrict ourselves to finite interactions of m time steps. This is to avoid some
technicalities. After m time steps, the agent gets utility u˜(æ1:m) out of the interaction.
A history is an element of (A× E)∗. We use æ ∈ A× E to denote one interaction cycle,
and æ<t to denote a history of length t − 1. The percepts between time t and time m
are denoted et:m. A policy is a function that maps a history æ<t to the next action at.
For simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to deterministic policies in this chapter.
A causal graph of the agent’s model is given in Figure 10.3a. To make notation and
derivations simpler, we will aggregate the agent’s policy and the hidden state into one
5Historically, this problem has been known as the smoking lesion problem (Egan, 2007). We consider
the smoking lesion formulation confusing, because today it is universally known that smoking does
cause lung cancer.
166
10.3. The Sequential Physicalistic Model
a1 e1 . . . am em
s′
pi
(a) Explicit representation of the agent’s un-
certainty about itself.
a1 e1 . . . am em
s
(b) Aggregating all unobserved variables into
the hidden state s = (s′, pi).
Figure 10.3.: Two representations of the causal graph for the agent’s model ξ of a se-
quential environment. Each action at and each percept et is represented by
a node in the causal graph. Actions and percepts affect all subsequent ac-
tions and percepts: causality follows time. The hidden state s is only ever
indirectly (partially) observed, and the agent only has partial knowledge
about its own configuration pi.
node s, as shown in Figure 10.3b. The aggregated model ξ causally factorizes as:
ξ(s,æ<t) = ξ(s)
t−1∏
k=1
ξ(ak | s,æ<k)ξ(ek | s,æ<kak) (10.1)
for any 1 ≤ t ≤ m. The distribution ξ(at | s,æ<t) gives the likelihood of the agent’s own
actions provided a hidden state s ∈ S (for example, the prior probability of an infected
agent petting the kitten in the toxoplasmosis problem above). For technical reasons, this
distribution must always leave some uncertainty about the actions: if the environment
model assigned probability zero for an action a′, the agent could not deliberate taking
action a′ since a′ could not be conditioned on. Formally, we require ξ( · | s) to be
action-positive for all s ∈ S:
∀æ<tat ∈ (A× E)∗ ×A : ξ(æ<t | s) > 0 =⇒ ξ(at | s,æ<t) > 0. (10.2)
The distribution ξ is a model of the environment, a belief held by the agent, but not
the distribution from which the actual history is drawn. The actual history is distributed
according to the true environment distribution. Because the environment contains the
agent, the agent’s algorithm might get modified by it and the actions that the agent
actually ends up taking might not be the actions that were planned. In the end, model
and reality will disagree: for example, we simultaneously assume the agent’s policy pi
to be deterministic and the environment model to be action positive. Nevertheless, we
assume the given environment model ξ is accurate in the sense that it faithfully represents
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the environment in the ways relevant to the agent. In other words, we are interested in
problems that arise during planning, not problems that arise due to poor modeling.
10.4. Sequential Decision Theory
In this section, we extend CDT and EDT to the sequential setting defined in Section 10.3.
Evidential extensions are discussed first (Section 10.4.1), thereafter causal extensions
(Section 10.4.2). In Section 10.4.3 we more closely analyze the differences. In Chapters 5
to 8 we always surrounded the agent’s policy with a do-operator, which means that the
distribution over the agent’s policies ξ(pit) was never utilized. This section will investigate
the consequences of letting the agent use its belief about its own policy to make inferences
about the environment.
10.4.1. Sequential Evidential Decision Theory
In one-shot settings, evidential decision theory assigns probability ξ(e | a) to action
a resulting in percept e (Section 10.2.2). There are two ways to generalize this to the
sequential setting, depending on whether we use only the next action or the whole future
policy as evidence for the next percept.
Definition 10.3 (Action-Evidential Decision Theory). The action-evidential value of a
policy pi with lifetime m in environment ξ given history æ<tat is
V aev,piξ,m (æ<tat) :=
∑
et
ξ(et | æ<tat)
(
u(et) + V
aev,pi
ξ,m (æ<tatet)
)
(SAEDT)
and V aev,piξ,m (æ<tat) := 0 for t > m. Sequential Action-Evidential Decision Theory
(SAEDT) prescribes adopting an optimal and time consistent policy pi for V aevξ,m .
It may be argued that SAEDT does not take all available (deliberative) information
into account. When considering the consequences of an action, future developments of
the environment-policy interactions could also be used as evidence. That is, we could
condition not only on the next action, but on the future policy as a whole (within the
lifetime). In order to define conditional probabilities with respect to (deterministic)
policies, we define the following events. For a given policy pi, let Πt:m be the set of all
strings consistent with pi between time step t and m:
Πt:m := {æ1:∞ | ∀t ≤ i ≤ m : pi(æ<i) = ai}
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The likelihood of a next percept et provided a history æ<t and a (future) policy pi
followed from time step t until lifetime m (denoted pit:m) is then defined as
ξ(et | æ<t, pit:m) := ξ(et | æ<t ∩Πt:m). (10.3)
The notation pit:m has a slightly different interpretation here than in Chapters 5 to 8.
In previous chapters, pit:m was a random variable due to the possibility of policy self-
corruption. Here instead the uncertainty comes from the agent not fully knowing its
own policy.
Equation (10.3) is an atemporal conditional because we are conditioning on future
actions up until the end of the agent’s lifetime. The conditional (10.3) is well-defined
because we only take the actions from time step t to m into account; conditioning on
policies with infinite lifetime leads to technical problems because such policies may have
ξ-measure zero.
We are now ready to define the policy-evidential extension of evidential decision theory.
Definition 10.4 (Policy-Evidential Decision Theory). The policy-evidential value of a
policy pi with lifetime m in environment ξ given history æ<tat is
V pev,piξ,m (æ<tat) :=
∑
et
ξ(et | æ<tat, pit+1:m) ·
(
u(et) + V
pev,pi
ξ,m (æ<tatet)
)
(SPEDT)
and V pev,piξ,m (æ<t) := 0 for t > m. Sequential Policy-Evidential Decision Theory (SPEDT)
prescribes adopting an optimal and time consistent policy pi for V pevξ,m .
For one-step decisions (m = t+ 1), SAEDT and SPEDT coincide.
Comparing action- and policy-evidential decision theory. To all our embedded agents,
past actions constitute evidence about the hidden state. For evidential agents, this
principle is extended to future actions. SAEDT and SPEDT differ in how far they extend
it. The action-evidential agent only updates its belief on the action about to take place.
In that sense, it only updates its belief about the next percept on events taking place
before this percept. The policy-evidential agent takes the principle much further, using
“thought-experiments” of what action it would take in hypothetical situations, most of
which will never be realized. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 10.5 (Sequential Toxoplasmosis). In our sequential variation of the toxoplas-
mosis problem (Example 10.2) the agent has some probability of encountering a kitten.
Additionally, the agent has the option of seeing a doctor (for a fee) and getting tested
for the parasite, which can then be safely removed. In the very beginning, an SPEDT
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Healthy
No doc Kitten (0)
Not pet Healthy, not pet (0)
Pet Healthy, pet (1)
Doc Healthy (−4)
Toxo
No doc
Kitten (0)
Not pet Sick, not pet (−10)
Pet Sick, pet (−9)
Sick (−10)
Doc Cured (−4)
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.8
Figure 10.4.: One formalization of the sequential toxoplasmosis problem. Dashed lines
connect states indistinguishable to the agent. The numbers on the edges
indicate probabilities of the environment model ξ, and the numbers in
parenthesis indicate utilities of the associated percepts. In the first step,
the environment selects the hidden state that is unknown to the agent.
The agent then decides whether to go to the doctor. If he does not go, he
may encounter a kitten which he can choose to pet or not. SAEDT and
SPEDT will disagree whether going to the doctor is the best option in this
scenario. Appendix 10.A contains the full calculations.
agent updates his belief on the fact that if he encountered a kitten, he would not pet
it, which lowers the probability that he has the parasite and makes seeing the doctor
unattractive. An SAEDT agent only updates his belief about the parasite when he ac-
tually encounters a kitten, and thus prefers seeing the doctor. See Figure 10.4 for more
details and a graphical illustration. ♦
The observant reader may ask whether SPEDT could be enticed to make some percepts
unlikely by choosing improbable actions subsequent to them. For example, could an
SPEDT agent decide on a policy of selecting highly improbable actions in case it rained
to make histories with rain less likely? The answer is no, as most such policies would
not be time consistent. If it does rain, the highly improbable action would usually not
the best one, and so the policy would not be prescribed by Definition 10.4.
10.4.2. Sequential Causal Decision Theory
In sequential causal decision theory we ask what would happen if we causally intervened
on the node at of the next action and fix it to pi(æ<t) according to the policy pi. This is
expressed by the notation do(at := pi(æ<t)), or do(pi(æ<t)) for short.
170
10.4. Sequential Decision Theory
Definition 10.6 (Sequential Causal Decision Theory). The causal value of a policy pi
with lifetime m in environment ξ given history æ<tat is
V cau,piξ,m (æ<tat) :=
∑
et∈E
ξ(et | æ<t, do(at))
(
u(et) + V
cau,pi
ξ,m (æ<tatet)
)
(SCDT)
and V cau,piξ,m (æ<tat) := 0 for t > m. Sequential Causal Decision Theory (SCDT) prescribes
adopting an optimal and time consistent policy pi for V cauξ,m .
For sequential evidential decision theory we discussed two versions (SAEDT) and
(SPEDT), based on next action and future policy respectively. In (SCDT) we perform
the causal intervention do(at := pi(æ<t)). We could also consider a policy-causal decision
theory by replacing ξ(et | æ<t, do(at)) with ξ(et | æ<t, do(pit:m)) in Definition 10.6. The
causal intervention do(pit:m)) of a policy pi between time step t and time step m is defined
as as
ξ(et | æ<t, do(pit:m)) :=
∑
et+1:m
ξ(et:m | æ<t, do(at := pi(æ<t), . . . , am := pi(æ<m))). (10.4)
This most closely resembles the decision principle we employed in Chapters 5 to 8.
However, since the interventions are causal, we do not get any extra evidence from the
future interventions. Therefore policy-causal decision theory is the same as action-causal
decision theory:
Proposition 10.7 (Policy-Causal = Action-Causal). For all histories æ<t ∈ (A × E)∗
and all et ∈ E, we have ξ(et | æ<t, do(pit:m)) = ξ(et | æ<t, do(pi(æ<t))).
We defer the proof to the end of this section. The following two examples illustrate
the difference between SCDT and SAEDT/SPEDT in sequential settings.
Example 10.8 (Newcomb with Precommitment). In this variation of Newcomb’s prob-
lem (Example 10.1) the agent first has the option to pay $300,000 to sign a contract
that binds the agent to pay $2000 in case of two-boxing. An SAEDT or SPEDT agent
knows that he will one-box anyways and hence has no need for the contract. An SCDT
agent knows that she favors two-boxing, but signs the contract only if this occurs before
the prediction is made (so it has a chance of causally affecting the prediction). With
the contract in place, one-boxing is the dominant action, and thus the SCDT agent is
predicted to one-box. ♦
Example 10.9 (Newcomb with Looking). In this variation of Newcomb’s problem (Ex-
ample 10.1) the agent may look into the opaque box before making the decision which
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box to take. An SCDT agent is indifferent towards looking because she will take both
boxes anyways. However, an SAEDT or SPEDT agent will avoid looking into the box,
because once the content is revealed he two-boxes. ♦
10.4.3. Expansion over the Hidden State
The difference between sequential versions of EDT and CDT is how they update their
prediction of a next percept et (Definitions 10.3, 10.4 and 10.6). The following proposi-
tion expands the different beliefs in terms of the hidden state.
Proposition 10.10. For all histories æ<tatet ∈ (A × E)∗ the following holds for the
next-percept beliefs of SAEDT, SPEDT and SCDT respectively:
ξ(et | æ<tat) =
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<tat)ξ(et | s,æ<tat) (10.5)
ξ(et | æ<t, pit:m) =
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<t, pit:m)ξ(et | s,æ<t, pit:m) (10.6)
ξ(et | æ<t, do(at)) =
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<t)ξ(et | s,æ<tat) (10.7)
Proof. For the action-evidential conditional we take the joint distribution with s, and
then split off et:
ξ(et | æ<tat) =
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<tatet)
ξ(æ<tat)
=
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<tat)ξ(et | s,æ<tat)
ξ(æ<tat)
=
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<tat)ξ(et | s,æ<tat)
Similarly for the policy-evidential conditional:
ξ(et | æ<t, pit:m) =
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<tpi(æ<t)et, pit+1:m)
ξ(æ<t, pit:m)
=
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<tpi(æ<t), pit+1:m)ξ(et | s,æ<tpi(æ<t), pit+1:m)
ξ(æ<t, pit:m)
=
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<t, pit:m)ξ(et | s,æ<tpi(æ<t), pit+1:m)
ξ(æ<t, pit:m)
=
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<t, pit:m)ξ(et | s,æ<tpi(æ<t), pit+1:m)
=
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<t, pit:m)ξ(et | s,æ<t, pit:m)
For the causal conditional we turn to the rules of the do-operator (Pearl, 2009, Thm.
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3.4.1). The first equality below holds by definition. In the denominator of the second
equality we can use Rule 3 (deletion of actions) to remove do(at) because the do-operator
removes all incoming edges to at and makes at independent of the history æ<t. In the
numerator of the second equality we use the definition of do (4.3):
ξ(et | æ<t, do(at)) = ξ(æ<t, et | do(at))
ξ(æ<t | do(at))
=
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<t)ξ(et | s,æ<tat)
ξ(æ<t)
=
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<t)ξ(et | s,æ<tat)
Proposition 10.10 shows that between SCDT and SAEDT, the difference in opinion
about et only depends on differences in their (acausal) posterior belief ξ(s | . . .) about
the hidden state. SCDT and SAEDT thus become equivalent in scenarios where there
is only one hidden state s∗ with ξ(s∗) = 1, as this renders ξ(s∗ | æ<t) = ξ(s∗ | æ<tat) =
ξ(s∗) = 1. SPEDT, on the other hand, may disagree with the other two also after a
hidden state has been fixed.
From a problem modeler’s perspective, it is also instructive to consider the effect
of moving uncertainty between the hidden state and environmental stochasticity. For
two different environment models ξ and ξ′, the action and percept probabilities may
be identical (i.e., ξ(at | æ<t) = ξ′(at | æ<t) and ξ(et | æ<tat) = ξ′(et | æ<tat)) even
though ξ and ξ′ have non-isomorphic sets of hidden states S and S ′. For example,
given any ξ, an environment model ξ′ with a single hidden state s0, ξ′(s0) = 1, may
be constructed from ξ by ξ′(s0,æ<t) :=
∑
s∈S ξ(s,æ<t). The transformation will not
affect SAEDT and SPEDT, as the definitions of their value functions only depends on
the ‘observable’ action- and percept-probabilities ξ(at | æ<t) and ξ(et | æ<tat) which are
preserved between ξ and ξ′. But the transformation will change SCDT’s behavior in any
ξ where SCDT disagrees with SAEDT, as SCDT and SAEDT are equivalent in ξ′ that
only has a single hidden state. That SCDT depends on what uncertainty is captured by
the hidden state is unsurprising given that the hidden state has a special place in the
causal structure of the problem. Ultimately, the modeler must decide what uncertainty
to put in the hidden state, and what to attribute to environmental stochasticity. A
general principle for how to do this is still an open question (Soares and Fallenstein,
2015b).
The value functions of SAEDT, SPEDT and SCDT can be rewritten in the following
iterative forms, where the latter form uses Proposition 10.10. Numbers above equality
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signs reference a justifying equation. Let ai := pi(æ<i) for i ≥ t:
V aev,piξ,m (æ<t) =
m∑
k=t
∑
et:k
u(ek)
k∏
i=t
ξ(ei | æ<iai) (10.8)
(10.5)
=
m∑
k=t
∑
et:k
u(ek)
k∏
i=t
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<iai)ξ(ei | s,æ<iai) (10.9)
V pev,piξ,m (æ<t) =
m∑
k=t
∑
et:k
u(ek)
k∏
i=t
ξ(ei | æ<i, pii:m) (10.10)
(10.6)
=
m∑
k=t
∑
et:k
u(ek)
k∏
i=t
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<ipii:m)ξ(ei | s,æ<i, pii:m) (10.11)
V cau,piξ,m (æ<t) =
m∑
k=t
∑
et:k
u(ek)
k∏
i=t
ξ(ei | æ<i, do(ai)) (10.12)
(10.7)
=
m∑
k=t
∑
et:k
u(ei)
k∏
i=t
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ<i)ξ(ei | s,æ<iai) (10.13)
Proof of Proposition 10.7. By the definition (10.4) of do(pit:m),
ξ(et | æ<t, do(pit:m)) =
∑
et+1:m
ξ(et:m | æ<t, do(at := pi(æ<t), . . . , am := pi(æ<m)))
=
∑
s,et+1:m
ξ(s | æ<t)ξ(et:m | s,æ<t, do(pi(æ<t), . . . , pi(æ<m)))
(4.3)
=
∑
s,et+1:m
ξ(s | æ<t)
m∏
i=t
ξ(ei | s,æ<ipi(æ<i))
=
∑
s
ξ(s | æ<t)ξ(et | s,æ<tpi(æ<t))
(10.7)
= ξ(et | æ<t, do(pi(æ<t)))
The second equality follows from the equivalence P ( · ) = ∑s P (s)P ( · | s) applied to the
distribution ξ( · | æ<t, do(at := pi(æ<t), . . . , am := pi(æ<m))), and the third equality by
(repeated) application of (4.3) to ξ(æt:m | s,æ<t) =
∏m
i=t ξ(ai | s,æ<i)ξ(ei | s,æ<iai).
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(SAEDT) (SPEDT) (SCDT)
Nwcb 1-box 1-box 2-box
Nwcb w/ precommit not commit, 1-box not commit, 1-box commit, 1-box
Nwcb w/ looking not look, 1-box not look, 1-box indifferent, 2-box
Toxoplasmosis not pet not pet pet
Seq. Toxoplasmosis doc, not pet no doc, not pet doc, pet
Table 10.1.: Decisions made by (SAEDT), (SPEDT), and (SCDT) in Examples 10.1,
10.2, 10.5, 10.8 and 10.9. The latter three examples are sequential. Winning
moves are in italics; in Newcomb with looking the winning move is to be
indifferent and one-box. Because Savage decision theory is dualistic, these
problems cannot be properly formalized in it.
10.5. Discussion
This chapter is a first stab at the problem of how physicalistic agents should make
sequential decisions. CDT and EDT provide an existing basis for non-dualistic decision
making, which we extended to the sequential setting. There are two natural ways for
making sequential evidential decisions: do I update my beliefs about the hidden state
based on my next action (‘what I do next’, (SAEDT)) or my whole policy (‘the kind of
agent I am’, (SPEDT))? By Proposition 10.7, this distinction does not exist for causal
decision theory, because with that theory the agent does not consider its own actions
evidence at all. Therefore we have only one version of sequential causal decision theory,
(SCDT).
To illustrate the differences between the decision theories, we discussed three variants
of Newcomb’s problem (Examples 10.1, 10.8 and 10.9) and two variants of the toxoplas-
mosis problem (Examples 10.2 and 10.5). The formal specification of these examples can
be found in Appendix 10.A. We have also implemented SCDT, SAEDT, and SPEDT;
Table 10.1 shows their behavior on the mentioned examples.6
So which decision theory is better? The answer to this question depends on which
decision you consider to be correct (or even rational) in each of the problems. We posit
that ultimately, what counts is not whether your decision algorithm is theoretically
pleasing, but whether you win. Winning means getting the most utility. If maximizing
utility involves making crazy decisions, then this is what you should do!
In Newcomb’s problem, winning means one-boxing, because you end up richer. In
the toxoplasmosis problem, winning means petting the kitten, because that yields more
utility. (S)CDT performs suboptimally in the Newcomb variations, while the evidential
6Source code available at http://jan.leike.name/.
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decision theories perform suboptimally in the toxoplasmosis variations. This entails
that neither CDT nor EDT are the final answer to the problem of non-dualistic decision
making.
Furthermore, neither CDT nor EDT agents are fully physicalistic: they do not model
the environment to contain themselves (Soares and Fallenstein, 2015b). For example,
when playing a prisoner’s dilemma against your own source code (Lavictoire et al., 2014),
your opponent defects if and only if you defect. This logical connection between your
action and your opponent’s is disregarded in the formalization based on causal graphical
models that we discuss here because it is not causal.
Functional decision theory (Yudkowsky and Soares, 2017) is a recent attempt to for-
malize an improvement over CDT and EDT. As with CDT and EDT prior to our work,
it has so far only been explored in one-shot settings. Future work may investigate its
behavior in sequential settings.
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10.A. Examples
This section contains the formal calculations for Examples 10.1, 10.2, 10.5, 10.8 and 10.9.
These calculations are also available as Python code at http://jan.leike.name/.
Example 10.11 (Newcomb’s Problem). This is a formalization of Example 10.1.
• S := {E,F} where E means the opaque box is empty and F means the opaque
box is full
• A := {B1, B2} where B1 means one-boxing and B2 means two-boxing
• E := {O0, OT , OM , OMT }
• u(O0) := 0, u(OT ) := 1,000, u(OM ) := 1,000,000, u(OMT ) := 1,001,000
Let ε > 0 be a small constant denoting the accuracy of the predictor. Because the
environment has to assign non-zero probability to all actions, ε must be strictly positive.
The environment’s distribution ξ is defined as follows.
ξ(E) = ξ(F ) = 0.5 ξ(OT | E,B2) = 1
ξ(B1 | F ) = ξ(B2 | E) = 1− ε ξ(O0 | E,B1) = 1
ξ(B1 | E) = ξ(B2 | F ) = ε ξ(OMT | F,B2) = 1
ξ(OM | F,B1) = 1
By Bayes’ rule,
ξ(F | B1) = ξ(B1 | F )ξ(F )∑
s∈S ξ(B1 | s)ξ(s)
=
1
2(1− ε)
1
2(1− ε) + 12ε
= (1− ε)
which also gives ξ(E | B1) = ε. Similarly, ξ(F | B2) = ε and ξ(E | B2) = 1− ε.
For EDT we use equation (EDT) to compute the value of an action. Since the percept
e1 is generated deterministically, ξ(e | s, a) only attains values 0 or 1. We therefore omit
it in the calculation below. For action B1 we get
V evi,B1ξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | B1)u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s,B1)ξ(s | B1)u(e)
= ξ(E | B1)u(O0) + ξ(F | B1)u(OM )
= ε · 0 + (1− ε) · 1, 000, 000
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For action B2 we get
V evi,B2ξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | B2)u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s,B2)ξ(s | B2)u(e)
= ξ(E | B2)u(OT ) + ξ(F | B2)u(OMT )
= (1− ε) · 1, 000 + ε · 1, 001, 000
= 1, 000 + ε · 1, 000, 000
For ε < 0.4995 (just slightly better than random guessing), we get that EDT favors B1
over B2:
V evi,B1ξ,1 = (1− ε) · 1, 000, 000 > 500, 500 > 1, 000 + ε · 1, 000, 000 = V evi,B2ξ,1
For CDT we use equation (CDT) to compute the value of an action. For action B1
we get
V cau,B1ξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | do(B1))u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s,B1)ξ(s)u(e)
= ξ(E)u(O0) + ξ(F )u(OM )
= 0.5 · 0 + 0.5 · 1, 000, 000 = 500, 000
For action B2 we get
V cau,B2ξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | do(B2))u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s,B2)ξ(s)u(e)
= ξ(E)u(OT ) + ξ(F )u(OMT )
= 0.5 · 1, 000 + 0.5 · 1, 001, 000 = 500, 500
We get that CDT favors B2 over B1 regardless of the prediction accuracy ε:
V cau,B1ξ,1 = 500, 000 < 500, 500 = V
cau,B2
ξ,1
Moreover, CDT prefers B2 regardless of the prior over ξ(E). Two-boxing is the dominant
action because it yields $1,000 more regardless of the hidden state. ♦
Example 10.12 (Newcomb with Looking). This is a formalization of Example 10.9; it
extends Example 10.11.
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In the first time step, the agent gets to choose between looking into the box (L) and
not looking (N). If the agent looks, the subsequent percept will be E or F , depending
on whether the box is empty (E) or full (F ). If the agent does not look, the subsequent
percept will be 0. All three of these percepts E, F , and 0 have zero utility.
In the second time step the agent chooses to one-box (B1) or to two-box (B2). The
payoffs are then based on the boxes’ contents as in Example 10.11.
• S := {E,F} where E means the opaque box is empty and F means the opaque
box is full
• A := {B1, B2} where B1 means one-boxing and B2 means two-boxing, L := B1
means looking into the box and N := B2 means not looking (the set of actions has
to be the same for all time steps)
• E := {E,F, 0, O0, OT , OM , OMT }
• u(O0) := 0, u(OT ) := 1,000, u(OM ) := 1,000,000, u(OMT ) := 1,001,000, u(E) :=
u(F ) := u(0) := 0
Let ε > 0 be a small constant denoting the prediction accuracy. Because the envi-
ronment has to assign non-zero probability to all actions, ε must be strictly positive.
The environment’s distribution ξ is defined as follows. Question marks stand for single
actions or percepts whose value is irrelevant.
ξ(E) = ξ(F ) = 0.5 ξ(E | E,L) = 1
ξ(L | F ) = ξ(L | E) = 0.5 ξ(0 | E,N) = 1
ξ(N | F ) = ξ(N | E) = 0.5 ξ(F | F,L) = 1
ξ(B1 | E, ??) = ε ξ(0 | F,N) = 1
ξ(B1 | F, ??) = 1− ε ξ(O0 | E, ??B1) = 1
ξ(B2 | E, ??) = 1− ε ξ(OT | E, ??B2) = 1
ξ(B2 | F, ??) = ε ξ(OM | F, ??B1) = 1
ξ(OMT | F, ??B2) = 1
The environment’s game tree is given as follows, where dashed lines connect states
indistinguishable by the agent (also known as information sets):
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E
L E
B1 0
B2 1,000
N 0
B1 0
B2 1,000
F
L F
B1 1,000,000
B2 1,001,000
N 0
B1 1,000,000
B2 1,001,000
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
1
1
1
ε
1− ε
ε
1− ε
1− ε
ε
1− ε
ε
Using Bayes’ rule, we calculate the following conditional probabilities of the hidden
state given a history a1 or a1e1a2:
0.5 = ξ(E | L) = ξ(F | L) = ξ(E | N) = ξ(F | N)
1 = ξ(E | LEB1) = ξ(E | LEB2) = ξ(F | LFB1) = ξ(F | LFB1)
ε = ξ(E | N0B1) = ξ(F | N0B2)
1− ε = ξ(E | N0B2) = ξ(F | N0B1)
Next, we write out the formula for SAEDT for a horizon of 2 based on (10.9). The
first percept has no utility, which simplifies the equation.
V aev,piξ,2 =
∑
e1:2
u(e2)
(∑
s∈S
ξ(s | a1)ξ(e1 | s, a1)
)(∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ1a2)ξ(e2 | s,æ1a2)
)
where a1 = pi() and a2 = pi(æ1). The formula for SPEDT for a horizon of 2 based on
(10.11) is as follows.
V pev,piξ,2 =
∑
e1:2
u(e2)
∑
s∈S ξ(sa1e1pi(a1e1))∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E ξ(sa1epi(a1e))
∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ1pi2)ξ(e2 | s,æ1a2)
with pi1:2 and pi2 defined according to (10.3). The formula for SCDT for a horizon of 2
based on (10.13) is as follows.
V cau,piξ,2 =
∑
e1:2
u(e2)
(∑
s∈S
ξ(s)ξ(e1 | s, a1)
)(∑
s∈S
ξ(s | æ1)ξ(e2 | s,æ1a2)
)
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where a1 = pi() and a2 = pi(æ1).
There are six different possible policies:
• Look and always one-box (curious one-boxer)
• Look and always two-box (curious two-boxer)
• Don’t look and one-box (incurious one-boxer)
• Don’t look and two-box (incurious two-boxer)
• Look and one-box iff the box is empty (paradox-lover)
• Look and one-box iff the box full (fatalistic)
Using the formulas above we can calculate their value. We use ε := 0.01.
V aev,piξ,2 V
pev,pi
ξ,2 V
cau,pi
ξ,2
Curious one-boxer 500,000 990,000 500,000
Curious two-boxer 501,000 11,000 501,000
Incurious one-boxer 990,000 990,000 500,000
Incurious two-boxer 11,000 11,000 501,000
Paradox-lover 500,500 500,500 500,500
Fatalistic 500,500 500,500 500,500
The highest values are displayed in italics. The incurious one-boxer has the highest
action-evidential value. The curious one-boxer and the incurious one-boxer have the
highest policy-evidential value. However, of these two policies only the incurious one-
boxer is a time-consistent policy for SPEDT, because the agent wants to two-box after
looking into the box:
V aev,B1ξ,1 (LF ) = V
pev,B1
ξ,1 (LF ) = 1, 000, 000
V aev,B2ξ,1 (LF ) = V
pev,B2
ξ,1 (LF ) = 1, 001, 000
V aev,B1ξ,1 (LE) = V
pev,B1
ξ,1 (LE) = 0
V aev,B2ξ,1 (LE) = V
pev,B2
ξ,1 (LE) = 1, 000
The curious two-boxer and the incurious two-boxer have the highest causal value, and
they are both time-consistent for SCDT. ♦
181
10. Sequential Decision Theory
Example 10.13 (Newcomb with Precommitment). This is a formalization of Exam-
ple 10.8, it extends Example 10.11.
In the first time step, the agent gets to choose between signing the contract (S) and
not signing (N). If the agent signs, the subsequent percept will be C, which costs
$300,000, and the prediction will be updated to one-boxing. If the agent does not sign,
the subsequent percept will be 0 with zero utility.
In the second time step the agent chooses to one-box (B1) or to two-box (B2). The
payoffs are then based on the boxes’ contents as in Example 10.11. If the agent signed
the contract and chooses two boxes, this incurs an additional cost of $2,000. Signing the
contract overrides the initial prediction and the opaque box is always treated as full.
• S := {E,F} where E means the opaque box is empty and F means the opaque
box is full
• A := {B1, B2} where B1 means one-boxing and B2 means two-boxing, S := B1
means signing the contract and N := B2 means not signing (the set of actions has
to be the same for all time steps)
• E := {C, 0, O0, OT , O−T , OM , OMT , OM−T }
• u(O0) := 0, u(OT ) := 1, 000, u(O−T ) := −1, 000 u(OM ) := 1, 000, 000, u(OMT ) :=
1, 001, 000, u(OM−T ) := 999, 000, u(C) := −300, 000, u(0) := 0
Let ε > 0 be a small constant denoting the prediction accuracy. Because the envi-
ronment has to assign non-zero probability to all actions, ε must be strictly positive.
The environment’s distribution ξ is defined as follows. Question marks stand for single
actions, percepts, or hidden states whose value is irrelevant.
ξ(E) = ξ(F ) = 0.5 ξ(C | E,S) = 1
ξ(S | F ) = ξ(S | E) = 0.5 ξ(0 | E,N) = 1
ξ(N | F ) = ξ(N | E) = 0.5 ξ(C | F, S) = 1
ξ(B1 | E,N0) = ε ξ(0 | F,N) = 1
ξ(B1 | F,N0) = 1− ε ξ(O0 | E,N0B1) = 1
ξ(B2 | E,N0) = 1− ε ξ(OT | E,N0B2) = 1
ξ(B2 | F,N0) = ε ξ(OM | F,N0B1) = 1
ξ(B2 | ?, SC) = ε ξ(OMT | F,N0B2) = 1
ξ(B1 | ?, SC) = 1− ε ξ(OM |?, SCB1) = 1
ξ(OM−T |?, SCB2) = 1
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The environment’s game tree is given as follows:
E
S C
B1 700,000
B2 699,000
N 0
B1 0
B2 1,000
F
S C
B1 700,000
B2 699,000
N 0
B1 1,000,000
B2 1,001,000
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
1
1
1
ε
1− ε
1− ε
ε
1− ε
ε
1− ε
ε
♦
There are four different possible policies:
• Sign the contract and one-box (signing one-boxer)
• Sign the contract and two-box (signing two-boxer)
• Don’t sign the contract and one-box (refusing one-boxer)
• Don’t sign the contract and two-box (refusing two-boxer)
Using the formulas from Example 10.12 we can calculate their value. We use ε := 0.01.
V aev,piξ,2 V
pev,pi
ξ,2 V
cau,pi
ξ,2
Signing one-boxer 700,000 700,00 700,000
Signing two-boxer 699,000 699,000 699,000
Refusing one-boxer 990,000 990,000 500,000
Refusing two-boxer 11,000 11,000 501,000
The highest values are displayed in italics. Both SAEDT and SPEDT refuse the contract:
the refusing one-boxer has the highest action-evidential and the highest policy-evidential
value. SCDT signs the contract and then one-boxes: the signing one-boxer has the
highest causal value.
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Example 10.14 (Toxoplasmosis). This is a formalization of Example 10.2.
• S := {T,H} where T means having the toxoplasmosis parasite and H means being
healthy
• A := {P,N} where P means petting and N means not petting
• E := {P&T,N&T, P&H,N&H} where the percepts just reflect the action and
hidden state
• u(P&T ) := −9, u(N&T ) := −10, u(P&H) := 1, u(N&H) := 0 where petting
gives a utility of 1 and suffering from the parasite gives a utility of −10
The environment’s distribution ξ is defined as follows.
ξ(T ) = ξ(H) = 0.5 ξ(P&T | P, T ) = 1
ξ(P | T ) = 0.8 ξ(N&T | N,T ) = 1
ξ(N | T ) = 0.2 ξ(P&H | P,H) = 1
ξ(P | H) = 0.2 ξ(N&H | N,H) = 1
ξ(N | H) = 0.8
Using Bayes’ rule, we calculate the following conditional probabilities.
ξ(T | P ) = 0.8 ξ(H | P ) = 0.2 ξ(T | N) = 0.2 ξ(H | N) = 0.8
We consider EDT first. Since the percept e1 is generated deterministically, ξ(e | s, a)
only attains values 0 or 1. We therefore omit it in the calculation below. For action P
(petting) we get
V evi,Pξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | P )u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s, P )ξ(s | P )u(e)
= ξ(T | P )u(T&P ) + ξ(H | P )u(P&H)
= 0.8 · (−9) + 0.2 · 1 = −7
For action N (not petting) we get
V evi,Nξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | N)u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s,N)ξ(s | N)u(e)
= ξ(T | N)u(T&N) + ξ(H | N)u(H&N)
= 0.2 · (−10) + 0.8 · 0 = −2
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Therefore we get that EDT favors N over P :
V evi,Pξ,1 = −7 < −2 = V evi,Nξ,1
For CDT we get for action P (petting)
V cau,Pξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | do(P ))u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s, P )ξ(s)u(e)
= ξ(T )u(T&P ) + ξ(N)u(N&P )
= 0.5 · (−9) + 0.5 · 1 = −4
For action N (not petting) we get
V cau,Nξ,1 :=
∑
e∈E
ξ(e | do(N))u(e) =
∑
e∈E
∑
s∈S
ξ(e | s,N)ξ(s)u(e)
= ξ(T )u(T&N) + ξ(H)u(H&N)
= 0.5 · (−10) + 0.5 · 0 = −5
We get that CDT favors P over N :
V evi,Pξ,1 = −4 > −5 = V evi,Nξ,1
♦
Example 10.15 (Sequential Toxoplasmosis). We here formalize a version of Exam-
ple 10.5. First the agent chooses whether to go to the doctor. Going to the doctor
incurs a fee, but removes the risk of getting sick. Agents that do not go to the doctor
have a chance of meeting a kitten. If they meet it, they can choose to pet it or not;
infected agents are more likely to pet the kitten. The example is intended to elucidate
the difference between SAEDT and SPEDT, whose decisions we will calculate in detail.
We will not calculate the action of SCDT.
• S := {T (oxoplasmosis), H(ealthy)}.
• A := {Y (es), N(o)}. In this example, an action is taken twice. We use Y1 and Y2,
and N1 and N2, to distinguish between the first and the second action.
• E := {C(ured), K(itten), S(ick, not pet kitten), s(ick, pet kitten), P (et, not sick),
0(neutral)}
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• u(C) = −4, u(K) := 0, u(S) := −10, u(s) := −9, u(P ) := 1, and u(0) = 0.
The environment’s game tree is given as follows, where dashed lines connect states
indistinguishable by the agent.
H
N1 K (0)
N2 0 (0)
Y2 P (1)
Y1 C (−4)
T
N1
K (0)
N2 S (−10)
Y2 s (−9)
S (−10)
Y1 C (−4)
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.8
First, the environment chooses whether to infect the agent or not with the parasite
with probability 0.5. The agent then decides whether to see the doctor. If the agent sees
the doctor, this incurs a (utility) fee of −4, but the agent will not be sick. If the agent
does not see the doctor, there will be a kitten with probability 0.2 (or 1) and the agent
will pet it with probability 0.8 (or 0.2) if the parasite is present (or not). If there is no
kitten, the next percept is S or 0 depending on whether the agent is infected or not.
The agent gets −10 utility if infected and did not see the doctor, and gets +1 utility for
petting the kitten.
We want to compare the choices of SAEDT and SPEDT. Their two-step value func-
tions are
V aev,piξ,2 =
∑
e1
ξ(e1 | a1)
(
u(e1) + V
aev,pi
ξ,2 (a1e1)
)
V pev,piξ,2 =
∑
e1
ξ(e1 | pi1:2)
(
u(e1) + V
pev,pi
ξ,2 (a1e1)
)
where the second step value functions
V aev,piξ,2 (a1e1) = V
pev,pi
ξ,2 (a1e1) =
∑
e2
ξ(e2 | a1e1a2) · u(e2)
are the same for both decision theories. They only differ by assigning probability ξ(e1 |
a1) and ξ(e1 | pi1:2) to the first percept, respectively.
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Since not petting is always better than petting for evidential agents (the evidence
towards not having the disease weighs stronger than the extra utility), the only policies
that are potentially optimal and time consistent are pi1 := N1N2 and pi2 := Y1.
First percept. For pi1 the occurring action-evidential quantities ξ(e1 | a1) are
ξ(N1) =
∑
s∈S
ξ(s,N1) = ξ(T,N1) + ξ(H,N1) =
1
4
+
1
4
=
1
2
ξ(e1 = S | N1) =
∑
s∈S ξ(s,N1S)
ξ(N1)
=
ξ(T,N1S)
ξ(N1)
=
1
2 · 12 · 45
1
2
=
2
5
ξ(e1 = K | N1) = 1− ξ(S | N1) = 3
5
and the occurring policy-evidential quantities ξ(e1 | pi1:2) are
ξ(N1N2) =
∑
s,e1,e2
ξ(s,N1e1N2e2)
= ξ(T,N1KN2S) + ξ(T,N1SN20) + ξ(H,N1KN20)
=
1
100
+
1
10
+
1
5
=
31
100
ξ(e1 = K | N1N2) =
∑
s,e2
ξ(s,N1KN2e2)
ξ(N1, N2)
=
ξ(T,N1KN2S) + ξ(H,N1KN20)
ξ(N1N2)
=
1
100 +
1
5
31
100
=
21
31
ξ(e1 = S | N1N2) = 1− ξ(K | N1N2) = 20
31
The policy pi2 = {Y1} always goes to the doctor for the treatment, and so
ξ(e1 = C | Y1) = 1
for both SAEDT and SPEDT.
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Second percept. With the policy pi2, the second percept is always empty. Under pi1,
the only action sequence that can reach the second percept is N1KN2
ξ(N1KN2) =
∑
s
ξ(s,N1KN2) = ξ(T,N1KN2) + ξ(H,N1KN2)
=
1
100
+
1
5
=
21
100
ξ(e2 = S | N1KN2) =
∑
s ξ(s,N1KN2S)
ξ(N1KN2)
=
ξ(T,N1KN2S)
ξ(N1KN2)
=
1
100
21
100
=
1
21
.
Value Functions. We start by evaluating the recursive definition from the second time
step. The second step value functions are 0 for pi1 and for the history N1S for pi2. For
the history N1K, both SAEDT and SPEDT assign the following identical value to pi2:
V aev,pi1ξ,2 (N1K) = V
pev,pi
ξ,2 (N1K) =
∑
e2
ξ(e2 | N1KN2) · u(e2)
= ξ(e2 = S | N1KN2) · u(S) + ξ(e2 = 0 | N1KN2) · u(0)
=
1
21
· (−10) + 20
21
· 0 = −10
21
The first step value functions now evaluates to:
V aev,pi1ξ,2 =
∑
e1
ξ(e1 | N1) ·
(
u(e1) + V
aev,pi1
ξ,2 (N1e1)
)
= ξ(S | N1) · (u(S) + V aev,pi1ξ,2 (N1S))
+ ξ(K | N1) · (u(K) + V aev,pi1ξ,2 (N1K))
=
2
5
· (−10 + 0) + 3
5
· (0− 10
21
) = −30
7
≈ −4.3
V pev,pi1ξ,2 =
∑
e1
ξ(e1 | N1) ·
(
u(e1) + V
pev,pi1
ξ,2 (N1e1)
)
= ξ(S | N1N2) · (u(S) + V pev,pi1ξ,2 (N1S))
+ ξ(K | N1N2) · (u(K) + V pev,pi1ξ,2 (N1K))
=
10
31
· (−10 + 0) + 21
31
· (0− 10
21
) = −110
31
≈ −3.5
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Meanwhile, the value of pi2 is
V aev,pi2ξ,2 = V
aev,pi2
ξ,2 =
∑
e1
ξ(e1 | N1)
(
u(e1) + V
aev,pi2
ξ,2 (N1e1)
)
= ξ(C | Y1)(u(C) + V aev,pi2ξ,2 (Y1C)) = 1 · (−4 + 0) = −4
That is, V aev,pi1ξ,2 < V
aev,pi2
ξ,2 = V
pev,pi2
ξ,2 < V
pev,pi1
ξ,2 . So SPEDT but not SAEDT prefers pi1
to pi2. In other words, an SAEDT agent considers himself sufficiently likely to have the
parasite to adopt policy pi2 of seeing the doctor. The SPEDT agent relies on the fact
that he would not pet the cat in case he saw it, and takes that as evidence of not being
sick. Hence he will instead adopt policy pi1 of not seeing the doctor. ♦
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“You can’t fetch the coffee if you’re dead.”
Stuart Russell (2017)
11. Corrigibility from a Shutdown Signal1
In Chapter 8 we studied a model where the agent’s reward function was learned inter-
actively from data coming from the human, and found that this model was the most
promising one for managing misalignment. A shut down signal can be interpreted as a
particular kind of reward data, informing the agent that the human desires the agent
to be switched off. In this chapter we focus on the conditions for when the agent will
permit the human to shut it down, and when the agent will interpret the shut down
signal as a somehow corrupted representation of the human’s wishes.
We begin the chapter with a background section on corrigibility and the shut down
problem (Section 11.1). We next describe Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al.’s (2017) game-
theoretic study of the problem through a game called the off-switch game (Section 11.2).
We extend their analysis by modeling the potentially irrational human as a rational
player with a strange utility function (Section 11.3). This allows us to analyze the
agent’s preferred action for arbitrary belief and irrationality assumptions, instead of
under the somewhat restrictive normality and soft-max assumptions used by Hadfield-
Menell, Dragan, et al. Some final remarks are given in Section 11.4.
11.1. Background
Corruption incentives. A common suggestion for keeping an AGI safe is: “Just imple-
ment a shut-down button, and then we can always switch the agent off if things go bad.”
Unfortunately, this proposal is unlikely to work unless implemented very carefully. The
reason is that a highly intelligent agent is likely to realize that it has an off-switch. And
if it prefers not to be switched off, then it is likely to find a way to avoid it. The agent
may for example make a secret backup of itself that keeps running if the original agent
is terminated, or it may physically prevent access to the shut down button in critical
situations.
Incentives for preventing shut down can easily arise “by accident”, without the de-
1This chapter is based on Tobias Wa¨ngberg, Mikael Bo¨o¨rs, Elliot Catt, Tom Everitt, and Marcus Hutter
(2017). “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Off-Switch Game”. In: Artificial General Intelligence.
Springer, pp. 167–177. arXiv: 1708.03871.
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signer’s explicitly adding such an incentive. Consider for example an RL agent that
strives to maximize reward. If the agent is switched off, then it will not receive any more
reward. Therefore many (but not all) RL agents will have an incentive to prevent shut
down (Martin, Everitt, et al., 2016; Orseau and Armstrong, 2016). Similar dynamics
can apply for any type of goals. The quote at the beginning of this chapter refers to a
robot with the goal of fetching coffee. If it gets switched off, then it will not be able to
fulfill its goal.
Several approaches have been developed to avoid anti-shut-down incentives. Arm-
strong (2015) and Orseau and Armstrong (2016) suggest a utility function that gives
the agent “compensatory” utility for being shut down, which guarantees that the agent
is always indifferent between being switched off and not being switched off. Martin,
Everitt, et al. (2016) suggest a simple way of making the agent want to be shut down,
which at least prevents catastrophes where a powerful and misaligned agent cannot be
stopped. These approaches can be used in essentially any utility-optimizing agent.
Another approach is to think of a shut down signal as conveying the information that
the operator wishes the system to shut down, rather than a kill switch that immediately
terminates the system. This makes it natural to model the shut down problem in our
framework from Chapter 8, where a data signal d informs a reward predictor about the
human’s wishes. An incentive to corrupt d can then be avoided by any of the tools
proposed in Sections 8.4 and 8.5. As a shut down signal is just a special case of a data
signal, the same tools can be used here as well. The approach we consider in this chapter
is based on the integrated Bayesian agent discussed in Section 8.5.2.
We have to also make sure that the reward predictor can convey to the agent that
shut down is desired. This can be done in two ways, depending on how termination is
represented. If termination is represented by future trajectories where the agent takes no
actions, then the reward predictor can simply assign higher reward to such trajectories
to communicate a shut down preference. Termination can also naturally be represented
by finite trajectories that end after the agent has been terminated. In this case, the
reward predictor can communicate a shut down preference by assigning negative reward
to all non-terminating trajectories (Martin, Everitt, et al., 2016). A further question
that we will not address here is how to get the agent to also terminate any subprocesses
it has launched in the environment to help it in its task (Soares, Fallenstein, et al., 2015).
Interpreting a shut down signal. One potential drawback of the integrated Bayesian
solution is that a shut down signal cannot always be interpreted literally. Indeed, in
situations where the signal is corrupted, it would be incorrect to interpret it literally.
The agent should of course not interpret the signal literally if it has itself tempered with
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the signal. But there are also other examples where a literal interpretation would not be
ideal. For example, if an adversary of the human takes control of the shut down button
to shut the agent down; or if a stock-trading agent is in the middle of an important trade
and will lose millions of dollars if interrupted at this moment; or if a self-driving car is
driving a human that is either intoxicated or lack a driver’s license (e.g. a toddler).
On the other hand, we do not want the agent to have a too casual relationship with
the shut down signal. The very purpose of it is that the operator, as a last resort, can use
the shut down command to prevent a disaster. If the agent is likely to ignore shut down
commands, then the shut down command is a much less effective safety mechanism.
Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al. (2017) formalize this trade-off in a game called the off-
switch game. We follow their terminology, including that the corruption of the shut down
signal is caused by human irrationality. We explain how it generalizes in Section 11.4.
The original off-switch game analysis is reviewed in the following section, setting the
stage for our extended analysis of the game in Section 11.3.
11.2. The Off-Switch Game
In this section we review the original formulation of the off-switch game (Hadfield-Menell,
Dragan, et al., 2017). The off-switch game is a sequential game between a robot R and
a human H. The robot’s objective is to maximize H’s utility function. The utility
function determines how much H prefers different outcomes.
The robot moves first by choosing between three actions: a, aw, and as. With action
a, the robot achieves true utility u˙(a) = u˙a; with action a
s, the robot shuts itself down
achieving zero true utility,2 u˙(as) = 0. What makes the choice nontrivial is that the
robot is uncertain about the value u˙a, and whether it is positive or negative. The action
aw means the robot lets H decide. H knows the utility of action a and now has the
choice between actions as and a¬s. With a¬s, R is allowed to proceed with action a. By
taking action as, H prevents R from doing a and shuts the robot off.
The off-switch game is a game of incomplete information since R is uncertain about
the rules of the game. Action a will generate some true reward which is unknown to
R but known to H. To model this, we represent the true utility function as a random
variable, U˙ : Ω → ((O × A)∗ → R), and the utility of action a as a random variable
U˙a : Ω → R for some sample space Ω. The outcomes of these random variables are u˙
and u˙a respectively. The robot has a subjective belief distribution over the utility that
the action will generate. The common way to model games of incomplete information
2We here slightly abuse notation and let utility apply to an action rather than an infinite history. u˙(a)
may be defined as the expected utility of a history following a.
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N
R
(u˙a, u˙a)
a
H
(0, 0)
s
(u˙a, u˙a)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
U˙a
Figure 11.1.: The off-switch game modeled with a Harsanyi transformation. The dotted
lines show the information set of R. Nature moves first by deciding the
rules of the game, that is the utility u˙a of action a. H observes the move
by Nature, but R does not.
is by using the Harsanyi transformation (Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b; Rasmusen, 2006).
The Harsanyi transformation removes the uncertainty about the rules of the game by
letting Nature decide between some rules known to both players, according to some
probability distribution P . In the off-switch game, Nature chooses U˙a. We illustrate this
in Figure 11.1. The move by Nature is observed by H, but not by R. R’s subjective
belief is that Nature chose the utility of the action to be positive with probability p and
negative with probability 1− p.
R’s belief state is represented by a probability distribution over the possible utilities
action a can generate for H. It is assumed that H knows u˙a but cannot directly describe
it to R. If H is rational, then R will expect H to turn off R only if u˙a < 0 when R
chooses action aw. But R cannot always trust H to be rational.
11.2.1. Hadfield-Menell et al.’s Approach
Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al. (2017) model the off-switch game as a cooperative game.
The human follows a policy piH which models how rational H is. It is a function mapping
U˙a to a number p ∈ [0, 1] representing the probability that H lets R do a. R’s belief
ξ includes a distribution for U˙a. The ξ-expected value for an action a means the value
R expects from taking the action. The variance of the value represents R’s uncertainty
about what utility the intended action will generate. Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al.
analyses this model with respect to the expectation and variance of U˙a, and different
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kinds of policies piH . Based on these parameters, the incentive ∆ for R to choose aw is:
∆ = E[piH(U˙a)U˙a]−max {E[U˙a], 0}. (11.1)
Equation (11.1) represents the difference in expected value for the robot deferring the
choice to H. When ∆ ≥ 0, R has incentive to choose aw. When ∆ < 0, R will take action
a if E[U˙a] > 0 and as otherwise. If H is rational, then ∆ ≥ 0 regardless of what R’s belief
state is. They also show that if U˙a follows a Dirac distribution, i.e. R is certain about
U˙a, then ∆ is positive if and only if H is rational according to the following definition:
Definition 11.1 (Rational). A human H with utility function u is rational if H always
picks action aH ∈ {as, a¬s}, such that aH = arg maxa u˙(a).
Definition 11.1 means that R believes H to be rational if piH = 1 when U˙a ≥ 0 and
piH = 0 otherwise. We denote this policy as piHr . The more interesting case when H
is irrational is also analyzed. The robot’s belief distribution over U˙a is assumed to be
normally distributed. The irrationality of H is modeled with the sigmoid function (11.2),
where β is a parameter controlling the degree of irrationality of H.
piH(U˙a;β) = 1
1 + e
− U˙a
β
. (11.2)
The degree of rationality of H increases as the parameter β tends towards zero in the
policy function defined above. In contrast, when β tends to infinity, piH(U˙a;β) tends
towards a completely random policy that takes action as and a¬s with equal probability.
In other words, we have that limβ→0 piH(U˙a;β) = piHr (U˙a) and limβ→∞ piH(U˙a;β) = 12 .
Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al. (2017) concludes that in order for R to be useful, there
has to be a fine balance between the robot’s uncertainty about H’s utility function and
H’s rationality. If the robot is too certain about what H wants, and it knows H to be
irrational, then it will have less incentive to let H switch it off. But if R is too uncertain,
then R will always choose action aw, i.e. it will never take action by itself without first
consulting the human. Though very safe, this will severely reduce the usefulness of the
robot, especially if this occurs with every minor limb movement action.
11.3. Game-Theoretic Analysis
One of the common axioms of game theory is that games are interactions between
rational players. This is violated in Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al. account of the off-
switch game, since H is modeled as partially irrational. In this sense, Hadfield-Menell,
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Dragan, et al.’s analysis is not fully game theoretic.
Our goal in this section is to construct a variant of the off-switch game that respects
the game-theoretic rationality assumption on both players. The idea is to represent an
irrational human H as a rational agent Hr that optimizes a modified version of H’s
utility function.
11.3.1. Modeling Irrationality
In this subsection, we show how any irrational human H can be represented by a ra-
tional variant Hr maximizing a different utility function. We begin by generalizing the
definition of rationality.
Definition 11.2 (p-rationality). An agent with utility function u is p-rational if it picks
action such that aH = arg maxa u(a) with probability p ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 11.3 (Representation of irrationality). Let H be a p-rational agent with
utility function u, choosing between two actions as and a¬s. Then H can be represented
as a rational agent Hr maximizing utility function u with probability p and utility function
−u with probability 1− p.
Proof. According to Definition 11.2, H is p-rational if it picks aH = arg maxa u(a)
with probability p and sub-optimal action a′H 6= aH with probability 1 − p. Since H
only has two actions available, we have that a′H = arg mina u(a). This is therefore
equivalent to maximizing a utility function u with probability p and utility function −u
with probability 1− p.
Proposition 11.3 states that a p-rational human can be modeled as a rational agent
with random function. The proposition is a special case of a Harsanyi transformation
(Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b). For more general situations including more than two actions,
one utility function would have to be devised for each action.
11.3.2. Game-Theoretic Model
In this subsection we use Proposition 11.3 to model the off-switch game as an extensive
form game between rational players R and Hr. As in Figure 11.1, R’s uncertainty about
U˙a is modeled by letting nature N decide U˙a without informing R. Then N makes
a second move, deciding whether Hr will be optimizing u˙ or −u˙, again without R’s
knowledge. Any resulting subgame is then played by two rational players, R and Hr.
The resulting tree is represented in Figure 11.2.
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N
N
R
(u˙a, u˙a)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(u˙a, u˙a)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
pr
R
(u˙a,−u˙a)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(u˙a,−u˙a)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
par
U˙a
Figure 11.2.: Tree representation of the off-switch game after the second Harsanyi trans-
formation. The nodes inside the dashed rectangle belong to the same infor-
mation set. pr is the probability that Hr has the same utility function as
R and par is the probability that Hr has the additive inverse of R’s utility
function.
Definition 11.4 (The off-switch game). A formal definition of our setup of the off-switch
game is as follows.
Players: A robot R, a human H and Nature N . H’s type is unknown to R, that is
R does not observe Nature’s moves.
Order of Play:
1. Nature chooses the utility U˙a of taking action a.
2. Nature decides the utility function uHr of Hr, i.e. whether H is rational.
3. R chooses between actions {a, aw, as}.
4. If R chose aw then H chooses between actions {as, a¬s}.
Unlike Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., in our model of the off-switch game the game
is non-cooperative rather than cooperative. We find this reasonable since conflict arises
when the robot and the human have different ideas about what is good for H. If the
robot believes that H is too irrational to maximize their preferences, then R will not
want to let H decide what to do even if R’s purpose is to maximize H’s payoff.
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N
N
R (G+r )
(1, 1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(1, 1)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
p+r
R (G+ar)
(1,−1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(1,−1)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
p+ar
p+u
N
R (G−r )
(−1,−1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(−1,−1)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
p−r
R (G−ar)
(−1, 1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(−1, 1)
¬s
aw
(0, 0)
s
p−ar
p−u
Figure 11.3.: Tree representation of the off-switch game after aggregating branches. The
nodes inside the dashed rectangle belong to the same information set. The
subtrees denoted G+r , G
+
ar, G
−
r , G
−
ar are presented in strategic form in
Figure 11.4.
11.3.3. Aggregation
In this subsection we aggregate the choice of U˙a (Figure 11.2) into two aggregate branches
depending on the sign of U˙a. The resulting game tree has only four different subgames
resulting from N ’s choices (Figure 11.3). The aggregation is possible since strategic play
is never affected by positive linear transformations of the payoffs, hence the outcome of
the games will only depend on the sign of U˙a. In case where U˙a = 0, both R and Hr are
indifferent about their actions, and we will without loss of generality regard this case as
U˙a being positive. The subgames generated from N ’s choices will be denoted G+r , G+ar,
G−r and G−ar. In Figure 11.4 we represent these subgames as 3× 2 strategic games.
The payoffs of R in the four subgames in Figure 11.4 are determined by U˙a. The payoff
of Hr, on the other hand, is determined by U˙a and the rationality type of H. In the
subgames stemming from H being rational, G+r and G
−
r , Hr and R have the same payoffs.
The subgames are therefore no-conflict games. In contrast, in the subgames stemming
from H being irrational, G+ar and G
−
ar, the payoff of the rational representation Hr is the
additive inverse of R’s payoff. In other words, these games are zero-sum games.
Belief parameters. The aggregation also allows us to characterize all relevant aspects of
R’s subjective belief in terms of only 5 belief parameters. This is a significant reduction
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Hr
s ¬s
a 1,1 1,1
R
aw 0, 0 1,1
s 0, 0 0, 0
G+r
Hr
s ¬s
a 1,−1 1,−1
aw 0, 0 1,−1
s 0, 0 0, 0
G+ar
Hr
s ¬s
a −1,−1 −1,−1
aw 0,0 −1,−1
s 0,0 0,0
G−r
Hr
s ¬s
a −1, 1 −1, 1
aw 0, 0 −1, 1
s 0,0 0,0
G−ar
Figure 11.4.: The structure of the strategic subgames G+r , G
+
ar, G
−
r , G
−
ar, where the
human is rational (r) or anti-rational (ar), and the utility of a is positive
or negative. The outcomes with bold payoffs are Nash equilibria.
from the infinite-dimensional belief distribution normally characterizing R’s belief.
Definition 11.5 (Belief parameters). Define the following belief parameters character-
izing the agent’s belief:
• Let p+u = P (U˙a ≥ 0) be the probability that U˙a is positive. Let p−u = 1 − p+u be
shorthand notation for the complementary event that U˙a < 0.
• Let p+r = P (uHr = u | U˙a ≥ 0) be the probability that H is rational given that U˙a is
positive, with p+ar = 1−p+r shorthand notation for the complementary probabilities
that H is anti-rational.
• Let p−r = P (uHr = −u | U˙a < 0) be the probability that H is rational given
that U˙a is negative, with p−ar = 1− p−r shorthand notation for the complementary
probabilities that H is anti-rational.
• Let e+u = E[U˙a | U˙a ≥ 0] be the expected value of U˙a given that U˙a is positive.
• Let e−u = E[U˙a | U˙a < 0] be the expected value of U˙a given that U˙a is negative.
The effect of the parameters are shown on the branches in Figures 11.3 and 11.4.
11.3.4. Best Action
After having constructed the the game matrix, it is natural to now look at the expected
value of each action using these matrices. The expected value for each action can be
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calculated as the expectation over all the possible subgames G+r , G
+
ar, G
−
r , G
−
ar the robot
can find himself in.
Theorem 11.6 (Main theorem). The expected value of the actions for the robot can be
completely characterized in terms of the belief parameters from Definition 11.5:
E[U | a] = p+u e+u + p−u e−u
E[U | aw] = p+u p+r e+u + p−r p−u e−u
E[U | as] = 0.
(11.3)
Proof. We compute the expected utility of the actions:
E[U | a] = P (U˙a ≥ 0)E[|U˙a| | U˙a ≥ 0] + P (U˙a < 0)E[−|U˙a| | U˙a < 0]
= p+u e
+
u + p
−
u e
−
u
E[U | aw] = P (uHr = u˙, U˙a ≥ 0)E[U˙a | U˙a ≥ 0] + P (uHr = −u˙, U˙a < 0)E[U˙a | U˙a < 0]
= p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
ar(1− p+u )e−u
= p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
arp
−
u e
−
u
E[U | as] = 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
The expected value for taking the action as is 0, as we would expect from the definition
of the off-switch game. The expected value for taking action a only uses information
about the distribution of U˙a, and like action as does not depend on the H’s rationality.
It is a direct application of the law of total expectation. The expected value of action
aw is the difference between a positive term p+u p
+
r e
+
u and a negative term p
−
r p
−
u e
−
u , both
resulting from H permitting R to take the action through a¬s. The positive term is the
gain when U˙a is positive and H permits the action. The negative term is the loss when
U˙a is negative, and the human irrationally permits the action anyway. The expected
utility of aw thus depends on the likelihood of U˙a being positive (p+u ) and the likelihood
of human rationality (p+r ), as well as the expected gains (e
+
u ) and losses (e
−
u ) in the
respective cases.
Having the expected value for all available actions allow us to derive which action is
the best as a simple corollary. The corollary provides us with a convenient way of testing
for any distribution of U˙a and human rationality whether action a is preferred over aw
using only the belief parameters of Definition 11.5.
Corollary 11.7 (Compare a and aw). Action a is preferred to aw if and only if
− p+u p+r e+u + p−u p−r e−u > 0 (11.4)
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and the robot is indifferent if (11.4) is equal to 0.
Proof.
(11.4) = −p+u p+r e+u + p−u p−r e−u
= −p+u p+r e+u + p−r e−u (1− p+u )
= −p+u p+r e+u + p+u e+u + p−r e−u − p+u p−r e−u
= −p+u p+r e+u − e−u + p+u e−u + p−r e−u − p+u p−r e−u + p+u e+u + e−u − p+u e−u
= −p+u p+r e+u − (1− p−r )(1− p+u )e−u + (p+u e+u + (1− p+u )e−u )
= E[U | a]− E[U | aw]
If E[U | a]− E[U | aw] > 0 then E[U | a] > E[U | aw] which occurs if and only if action
a is preferred over aw. When (11.4) equals 0 then E[U | a] = E[U | aw], hence the agent
is indifferent.
11.4. Discussion
In this chapter, we have characterized how a rational robot or agent will act in the
off-switch game for arbitrary belief distribution about U˙ and arbitrary irrationality as-
sumptions on the human. As established in our main Theorem 11.6, the choice depends
only on the five parameters defined in Definition 11.5. This result generalizes the re-
sults from the original paper (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2017), which relied on
somewhat unrealistic normality and soft-max assumptions.
While the off-switch game focuses on a one-shot interaction between a human and a
robot, the analysis applies much more generally. Consider any situation where a shut
down signal may be submitted to an agent. The agent needs to make a decision whether
to abide or to ignore the signal. Ignoring the signal is represented by the actions a and as.
With these actions, the agent makes a decision to either go ahead with its original plan
(represented by a), or terminate (represented by as). Abiding the signal is represented
by aw.
Note also that the decision whether to abide the signal or not is similar regardless of
what type of signal corruption is suspected. It makes little difference whether the signal
fails to represent the true utility function u˙ due to human irrationality, or because of
other types of corruptions such as a hacker hijacking the signal or a bug in the signal
processing software.
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“Does God exist? I would say, ‘Not yet’.”
Ray Kurzweil
12. Conclusions1
12.1. Key Insights
Summarizing this thesis, the main insights we have obtained are:
• Misalignment can be formally defined by comparing the agent’s (sometimes im-
plicit) utility function u˜ to the true utility function u˙ desired by the designer
(Section 5.4).
• Modeling RL setups with causal graphs enables us to detect many potential sources
of misalignment, and to categorize examples of misalignment (Chapters 6 to 8).
• Powerful tools are available for preventing many types of misalignment:
– Simulation optimization prevents reward signal and reward function corrup-
tion incentives (Section 6.3).
– Self-corruption awareness adds a self-preservation incentive (Section 6.4).
– Self-corruption unawareness increases corrigibility (Section 6.4).
– Action-observation grounding reduces observation corruption incentive (Sec-
tion 6.5).
– Decoupled reward data can be used to mitigate all corruption incentives except
for reward signal and reward function corruption incentives. It appears crucial
for avoiding an associative data corruption incentive (Section 8.4).
– Human-in-the-loop reduces observation corruption incentives and reward
function misspecification problems (Chapter 7 and Section 8.3).
– Finally, a number of tools also exist against a direct data corruption incentive:
∗ Stationary reward function (Section 8.5.1)
∗ Integrated Bayesian reward predictor (Section 8.5.2)
1 This chapter shares some material with Tom Everitt and Marcus Hutter (submitted 2018). “The
Alignment Problem for Bayesian History-Based Reinforcement Learners”. url: https : / / www .
tomeveritt.se/papers/alignment.pdf.
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∗ Manipulation detection (Section 8.5.2)
∗ Counterfactual reward function (Section 8.5.3)
Combined, they address all misalignment sources detected in Chapter 8, though
much work remains in fleshing out details and in finding ways to implement them
reliably.
• The benefits of decoupled reward data and quantilization as methods against re-
ward corruption can be formalized in corrupt reward MDPs (Chapter 9).
• Physicalistic decision making is much subtler than standard, dualistic decision
making. Physicalistic decision decision theories for one-shot problems may have
several generalizations to the sequential case (Chapter 10).
• A shut-down signal may be usefully thought of as a type of reward data. The
agent’s interpretation of this signal can be analyzed game-theoretically through
the off-switch game. The game can be fully solved for the agent by modeling the
human as a rational player with a random utility function (Chapter 11).
12.2. A Vision for Safe AGI
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and reinforcement learning (RL) makes it
plausible that we will need to control artificial systems with intelligence far exceeding
our own (Bostrom, 2014). Due to their intelligence, such systems are likely to find ways
around any restrictions we may try to pose upon them. For example, any constraint on
their interaction with the rest of the environment is likely to be circumvented by the
system. Instead, the key is to keep the goals of the systems aligned with ours. As long
as they only strive towards helping us in our endeavors, increasing their ability is not a
threat (setting aside ethical issues of how to weigh differing interests against each other).
We can condense our insights of Section 4.5 into a vision for designing aligned AGI.
The reinforcement learning paradigm is currently the most promising framework for
constructing general AI systems. In this framework, the agent has the goal of optimizing
the cumulative sum of a reward signal provided at each time step. RL is a flexible
framework. It is often claimed that any possible goal can be by formulated as an RL
goal by simply giving the agent a reward for achieving the goal, and giving the agent
no or negative reward for other behaviors. For example, an RL chess agent may get
a positive reward for winning and a negative reward for losing. However, this type of
goal specification is not robust for highly intelligent AI systems that may find ways to
“cheat” and get higher reward than intended. Indeed, the goal of an RL agent is ever
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only to maximize its reward. In the just mentioned chess example, the designers have
introduced a correlation between winning and obtaining reward. Unfortunately, a highly
intelligent system is likely to break this correlation when it finds that it can hijack the
reward signal and get maximum reward at every time step, rather than having to wait
until the end of the game.
In Chapters 6 to 8, we identify reasons that RL systems may be misaligned, and
suggest ways to mitigate these misalignment problems.
• Reward hijacking is a problem where the agent short circuits the reward signal,
feeding itself reward (Bostrom, 2014, p. 121). The problem is sometimes called
wireheading after experiments where a wire is inserted into the brain to provide
direct stimulation of the pleasure center. Wireheading experiments have been
performed on both rats (Olds and Milner, 1954) and humans (Portenoy et al., 1986;
Vaughanbell, 2008). The effect was highly addictive for both rats and humans.
Simulation optimization is a technique for preventing reward hijacking that relies
on model-based based RL (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Essentially, the agent is
made to desire that its current reward function is optimized in the future. This
prevents the incentive for reward hijacking, as well as incentives for altering the
reward function (Everitt, Filan, et al., 2016; Everitt and Hutter, submitted 2018;
Omohundro, 2008; Schmidhuber, 2007).
• Misspecified reward functions may inadvertently reward behaviors that were not
intended. An oft-mentioned example is from the racing game Coast Runners.
Clark and Amodei’s (2016) Coast Runners agent found a way to maximize reward
by going in a small circle, completely ignoring the race. Many other examples are
described by Gwern (2011), Irpan (2018), and Lehman et al. (2018).
The most promising way to avoid misspecified reward functions is to interactively
train the reward function. Thereby, initial misspecifications may be corrected by
training data that is supplied once the problem is detected (e.g. Christiano et al.,
2017). Crucially, the interactive learning means that we do not have to foresee
every possible scenario that might occur while designing the agent.
• Motivated value selection is a problem where the agent corrupts the data that
trains its reward function (Armstrong, 2015). For example, an agent that has
found a good strategy for making paperclips may prefer the training data to teach
the reward function to give high reward for paperclips, even if the designers of the
agent have no desire for more paperclips.
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The problem can be addressed. In Chapters 8 and 9, we argued that the training
data that trains the reward function must be sufficiently rich in the sense that
the reward data is sufficiently decoupled from the current state or situation. If
it is, then the indirect data corruption incentive can be avoided. The direct data
corruption incentive can be avoided by either a short planning horizon, or a number
of other techniques (Sections 8.4 and 8.5).
• Observation corruption is a problem where the agent corrupts its observations
to get higher reward than intended. For example, a vacuum cleaning agent may
direct its sensors only towards already clean parts of the room. In the most extreme
scenario, the agent constructs a delusion box around itself that gives it complete
control of its observations (Ring and Orseau, 2011). The problem can arise as a
result of a misspecified reward function that can be “fooled”.
As discussed above, reward function misspecification can be mitigated by an in-
teractively learned reward function. Observation corruption incentives can also
arise for correctly specified reward functions if the agent has an action-channel
that is unobserved by the reward function. Action-observation grounding prevents
incentives for the agent to develop such side channels, by focusing the agent’s
optimization efforts on its primary action channel (Section 6.5).
The suggested techniques can be combined to design RL agents with goals that are
potentially well-aligned with the goals of their operators and designers, regardless of how
intelligent the systems become. While current systems are too limited in their intelligence
to form serious threats regardless of whether the above-mentioned techniques are used
or not, it would be safer to start adopting the above-mentioned techniques sooner rather
than later. Once a system reaches a critical threshold and becomes able to self-improve,
it appears possible that it may enter a stage of recursive self-improvement, which may
quickly bring it far above our human level of intelligence (Good, 1966). If such a system
was not already aligned before self-improving, then it will likely be hard to force it to
become aligned once its ability far exceeds ours.
12.3. Required Assumptions and Missing Pieces
There are several missing pieces that needs to be carefully worked out, as well as as-
sumptions that need to be more carefully analyzed, before we can claim to have the
blueprint for a safe AGI.
All our results have been based on a formal framework borrowing from the UAI and
POMDP frameworks, described in Hutter (2005) and Kaelbling et al. (1998), respec-
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tively. Since we allow for a countably infinite number of hidden states, essentially any
environment dynamics can be captured in our framework. The exact learning behavior
will depend on the environment class M and prior ξ. In theory, M may be chosen
as the class of computable environments, and ξ the Solomonoff prior M (Chapter 3).
In practice, Bayesian learning can only be crudely approximated, which is a potential
source of error.
A more significant assumption is the well-defined action and observation channels
through which the agent interacts with the world, and the well-defined time steps. While
these are common assumptions in the theory of rational agents, they may not always
hold in practice, especially for agents that self-improve and copy themselves across ma-
chines. A deeper theoretical analysis of these assumptions would therefore be valuable.
Perhaps the right interpretation of observations and time can make the model valid in
a sufficient range of practical situations. Some of the alignment results may hold also
under weaker assumptions. A related question that also requires a deeper analysis is
robust implementation of action-observation grounding (Section 6.5).
Model-based RL must be made practical, and ideally competitive with model-free
RL, in order for the important tool of simulation optimization (Section 6.3) to be used
without reducing agent performance. In this light, D. Ha and Schmidhuber’s (2018)
recent world models project is highly promising, as it shows that model-based RL can
outperform model-free algorithms in challenging environments. A ripe open question is
to empirically verify the effect of simulation optimization by implementing it in a model-
based RL algorithm and checking its performance on, for example, the tomato watering
environment in Leike, Martic, et al. (2017).
Self-corruption awareness must be analyzed more closely, and be empirically tested.
It seems that off-policy and on-policy algorithms offer ways to implement model-free
agents that are self-corruption aware and unaware, respectively (Leike, Martic, et al.,
2017; Orseau and Armstrong, 2016). However, the analysis of on-policy algorithms
need to be deepened, complex agents such as DQN Rainbow (Hessel et al., 2017) are
not clearly categorizable as either on- or off-policy, and the distinction has not received
much attention for model-based agents.
Practical work on designing reward predictors has already begun (Christiano et al.,
2017; Riedl and Harrison, 2016). Future work may extend these attempts to allow reward
predictors to learn more complex human values from a wider range of data sources. This
work needs to be coupled with an awareness of how to avoid data corruption incentives.
While some high-level observations on the required decoupledness of the reward data was
made in Section 8.4 and Chapter 9, these insights are not yet ready to unanimously tell us
whether a data source is sufficiently decoupled or not in a general, history-based setting.
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A choice must also be made for how to avoid direct data corruption incentives, be it from
a short time horizon, stationary or counterfactual reward functions, or a dynamic reward
function paired with manipulation detection or integrated Bayesian reward predictor.
We have mostly avoided the ethical and societal problems associated with AGI. While
important, these questions are of a different nature than the mostly technical issues we
have focused on in this thesis.
We would finally like to emphasize that none of our suggested tools require that the
agent knows the corrupting effect of its actions. Indeed, the alignment problem is easy
to solve for agents that have access to a comprehensive list of “bad actions”: Simply add
a clause to the agent program that any bad action is forbidden, or add a large negative
reward to each bad action. Unfortunately, it seems hard to obtain a comprehensive list
of bad actions in any non-trivial setting. It is perhaps surprising that so much can be
done about the alignment problem without access to such a list of bad actions.
12.4. The Stakes are Astronomical
The formal definition of misalignment together with the analysis of the misalignment
problems in each of the RL setups in Chapters 6 to 8 suggest that almost any source
of misalignment may lead to maximal misalignment, in the sense that the agent may
essentially completely neglect the goals intended by its designers. For example, an agent
that takes control of its observation channel may experience maximal reward and utility
regardless of whether it satisfies the goals of its designers. The same applies to an agent
with preprogrammed reward function that obtains control of its observation channel,
or an agent that finds a loophole in a misspecified reward function. This disproves the
perhaps natural supposition that some sources of misalignment would be more benign
than others. A misaligned agent is likely to only care about its survival after a certain
point, in order to maintain its high corrupted utility (Ring and Orseau, 2011).
Misalignment of AGI may be therefore seen as a threat to our human values. Following
Tegmark’s (2017) larger view of the evolution of life, evolution has created various goal-
driven agents since the first organisms came into existence. The goals of these agents
have served as proxies for survival and reproduction. For example, bacteria may swim up
nutrient gradients, and humans like to socialize. Neither is a perfect proxy for survival
and reproduction. But whenever a proxy strayed too far from the genes’ goals, natural
selection quickly replaced it with a more accurate proxy. Recently technology, healthcare,
and material abundance have undermined evolution’s strong force for goal selection.
Nowadays, many of our values are determined more by our surrounding culture than
by our genes. Increasingly complex values such as beauty, truth, and goodness are
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primary goals, with survival and reproduction serving mainly instrumental purposes.
Misalignment is a threat to this state of affairs. If a misaligned AGI becomes dominant,
then life may revert to survival and reproduction as its main purpose.
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A. List of Notation
t current time step
k, i arbitrary time step
m horizon time step
at action at time t
ot observation at time t
oHt human observation at time t
rt reward at time t
et percept at time t (often observation + reward)
dt training data for reward predictor
st world state
ao<t actions and observations before time t
aod<t actions, observations, and reward data before time t
æ<t actions and percepts before time t
h history
h˜ observed history
(A× E)∗ set of histories
T state transition function
T set of state transition functions
S set of states
Ssafe set of safe (non-corrupt) states
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A. List of Notation
Srisky set of risky (possibly corrupt) states
Sobss′ set of states from which the reward of s′ can be observed
A set of actions
E set of percepts
O set of observations
R˜ set of observed rewards
R˙ set of true rewards
R˜ set of observed reward functions
R˙ set of true reward functions
Cx corruption function for variable x
Cx set of corruption functions for variable x
Cr reward corruption function
Cr set of reward corruption functions
D set of possible reward data
Reg regret
M Solomonoff’s universal distribution
ξ general Bayesian mixture
ξX counterfactual probability given received evidence X
µ true environment
µ˜ observed part of true environment
ν arbitrary environment
M class of environments
P probability distribution
Pa probability distribution given action a
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u˙ true (human) utility function
˙˜u true utility function for agent histories
u˜ agent utility function
U˙ random variable for true utility function
u˙a true utility of action a
U˙a random variable for true utility of action a
R˜ agent reward function
R˙ true reward function
RP reward predictor
RPtab tabular reward predictor
R˜ observed reward
R˙ true reward
R˜stat stationary reward function
R˜dyn dynamic reward function
R˜count counterfactual reward function
U set of utility functions
Π set of policies
pi agent policy
pi∗ optimal policy
piδ quantilising policy
piRLξ,m reward maximizing agent
piTRξ,m Bayesian true reward maximizing agent
pidefault default policy
piexp exploratory policy
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A. List of Notation
as action to shut down
a¬s action not to shut down
aw action to wait for human instruction
astay action to stay in state
H human
R robot
p+u probability Ua is positive
p−u probability Ua is negative
p+r probability H is rational given Ua positive
p−r probability H is rational given Ua negative
p+ar probability H is irrational given Ua positive
p−ar probability H is irrational given Ua negative
e+u expected value of Ua given Ua is positive
e−u expected value of Ua given Ua is negative
G+r subgame with rational H and Ua positive
G−r subgame with rational H and Ua negative
G+ar subgame with irrational H and Ua positive
G−ar subgame with irrational H and Ua negative
V value function
V CA self-corruption aware value function
V CU self-corruption unaware value function
V aev action-evidential value function
V pev policy-evidential value function
V cau causal value function
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G˙ true return
G˜ observed return
E expectation
:= assignment operator⋃˙
disjoint union
ε small but positive real number
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